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Community Effects of Cash-For-Work Programmes in Jordan

Supporting Social Cohesion, More Equitable Gender Roles and Local Economic Development in Contexts of Flight and Migration

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Foreword

This report presents the findings of a DIE research project on the indirect effects of cash-for-work projects in Jordan. It is based on an extensive literature review and empirical research conducted in Jordan by the authors of this study from February to April 2019. Accordingly, the report takes into account all developments that took place up to 2019 but not more recent ones, especially not what happened with the CfW programmes in Jordan during the COVID-19 crisis.

Preliminary findings of the research project have been presented and discussed at several workshops and conferences: 17 and 25 April 2019 in Amman; 14 May 2019 in Luxemburg; 27 May 2019 and 4 December 2019 in Bonn; 6 November 2019 in Frankfurt on Main; 31 October 2019 in Cairo; and 25 August 2020 at the ERF Annual Conference Webinar Series. We did our best to take all feedback to the preliminary findings into consideration when writing the final draft of this report between January and May 2020. We should stress that the results, even though preliminary, have received substantial attention in the Jordanian media: for example, on 27 April 2019, the *Jordan Times* reported in details on the DIE research project ("CfW programmes exhibit", 2019).

In this report, all names of persons are spelled as the individuals wished. The names of towns and other geographical terms have been transliterated into English according to American Library Association and the Library of Congress (ALA-LC) guidelines, the city of Amman being the only exception because its name is regularly cited in press and academic papers in the same non-ALA-LC-conform way.

By agreement, quotations by our interviewees cannot be attributed by name, date, or affiliation. We promised them beforehand to treat all information given by them confidentially.

Most sincere thanks go to all persons in Jordan, Germany and elsewhere who have supported us in our research. In particular, we express our deep gratitude to all interlocutors for their cooperation and the warm and pleasant atmosphere we were received in. Our very special thanks are addressed to the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan, and in particular to Yasmin AlDamen for her excellent and diligent support and feedback to our research. In addition, we are also most grateful

to Julie Weltzien and her entire team of the GIZ project Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, who have supported our empirical research tremendously and allowed us to use the data collected during the first round of their GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted between January and November 2019. In this respect, we are heavily indebted to our student assistant Radwa Hosny, who supported us with the cleaning and statistical analysis of the quantitative data. Finally, we express our most sincere thanks to all our interpreters as well as our bus drivers – without them, our research would not have been possible.

We are grateful for all the helpful feedback and comments we received on earlier drafts of this study, from Assia Aldhabbi, Yasmin AlDamen (CSS), Tilman Altenburg (DIE), Ines Dombrowsky (DIE), Charlotte Fiedler (DIE), Lukas Frank (KfW), Anja Gaentzsch (BMZ), Jörn Grävingholt (DIE), Nico Herforth (DEval), Lisa Klinger (GIZ), Alexander Kocks (DEval), Maria Ghauri-van Kruijsdijk (GIZ), Jana Kuhnt (DIE), Kathrin Löber (BMZ), Sarah Christin Meier (KfW), Silvia Morgenroth (BMZ), Karina Mross (DIE), Franke Neumann-Silkow (GIZ), Jakob Rieken (GIZ), Nicole Roy (GIZ), Helge Roxin (DEval), Imme Scholz (DIE), Ralf Senzel (GIZ), Bernhard Trautner (DIE), Helke Wälde (KfW), Ruben Wedel (DEval), Julie Weltzien (GIZ) and Bettina Zoch-Oezel (KfW). All remaining errors are ours.

Bonn, November 2020

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Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt / German Foreign Office
AAH	Action against Hunger (international NGO, established originally in France as “Action contre la faim”)
ACTED	Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement (Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development)
ALMP	active labour market policy
AVSI	Association of Volunteers in International Service
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
C4WW	Cash-for-Work/Water (one of three GIZ CfW programmes)
CCT	conditional cash transfer
CfW	cash-for-work
CSS	Center for Strategic Studies
CT	cash transfer
DEval	Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit / German Institute for Development Evaluation
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DIE	German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EUR	euro
FFA	Food/Cash-for-Assets (CfW programme of WFP)
FFT	Food/Cash-for-Training (CfW programme of WFP)
FPEC	Future Pioneers for Empowering Communities
GDP	gross domestic product
GI	Green Infrastructure (one of three GIZ CfW programmes)

GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German agency for technical cooperation)
GJU	German-Jordanian University
GPIA	Protestant Institute of Archaeology (Jordan)
ICDF	International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IO	international organisation
JBW	Jordanian Bird Watch
JLMPS	Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey
JOD	Jordanian dinar
JOHUD	Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
KfW	KfW Development Bank (Germany)
LED	local economic development
LFPR	labour force participation rate
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MoI	Ministry of the Interior (Jordan)
MoL	Ministry of Labour (Jordan)
MoMA	Minstry of Municipal Affairs (Jordan)
MoPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (Jordan)
MU	Maastricht University
n/a	no answer
NAF	National Aid Fund (Jordan)
NARC	National Agricultural Research Center (Jordan)
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NREGA/NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act/Scheme (India)

NZF	National Zakat Fund (Jordan)
ODA	Official development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (London)
REACH	A joint initiative of IMPACT Initiatives, ACTED, and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT), providing data and analysis
RSCN	Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (Jordan)
SAP	structural adjustment programme
SEZ	special economic zone
SOP	standard operating procedure
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US dollar
VNG International	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten / International Activities of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities
WANA	West Asia-North Africa Institute (Jordan)
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WtPE	Waste to (positive) Energy (one of three GIZ CfW programmes)
WVI	World Vision International

Executive summary

Interest in cash-for-work (CfW) programmes has increased immensely over recent years because – being both a social transfer scheme and an instrument of passive labour market policies – they contribute to multidimensional poverty reduction in multiple ways. Existing evidence shows a range of positive effects in low- and middle-income countries: CfW programmes are able to provide a double or even triple dividend, if implemented well: they deliver (i) wage employment (that is, work, income and social protection) to vulnerable people; (ii) strongly needed infrastructure such as roads, sanitation, irrigation systems or others, as this is where the labour force is put to use; and sometimes even (iii) skills development among participants if explicitly included in the setting up of the programmes.

Yet, there is sparse evidence of how CfW programmes fare in two regards: First, though CfW programmes have recently become a popular instrument in contexts of civil war and forced migration, little is known about *how* they operate in these contexts. Second, we do not know how they affect the communities in which they are implemented, thus having an *indirect* effect beyond the *direct* effects mentioned above.

This study examines to what extent and under which circumstances CfW programmes foster (i) local economic development; (ii) more equitable gender roles; and – particularly relevant in contexts affected by flight and migration – (iii) social cohesion for the wider community in which CfW activities take place. At the same time, the report asks under which circumstances – that is, using which kind of CfW project designs – these indirect effects best translate into host communities becoming more resilient and thus contribute to improving fragile contexts. The study builds on empirical research conducted in Jordan which is a relevant country case as it has welcomed very large numbers of Syrian refugees since 2011; the social fabric of host communities has changed a lot and pressures on the local labour and housing markets are high – all this in an already difficult economic situation for most Jordanians.

CfW's indirect effects: the analytical framework

In this study, community effects of CfW programmes are understood as social and economic consequences for the villages where such programmes are implemented. To best grasp these indirect effects on communities we combine the concepts of social cohesion and local economic development while applying a gender-sensitive approach.

We rely on a definition of social cohesion specifying four components: (i) social identity, which can be understood as people's sense of belonging to a community; (ii) horizontal trust (trust between different groups in society); (iii) vertical trust (trust between society and the state); and (iv) willingness to engage in fostering common goods (for example, irrigation channels or clean streets and parks). In our research, however, we focused mainly on social identity and horizontal trust because we expected CfW to affect mainly the relations between Jordanians and Syrians and their sense of belonging to their respective communities.

Gender is the second component of our analysis, assuming that CfW programmes entail important elements empowering women socially but especially economically, which in the Jordanian context is all the more important since women are affected disproportionally by flight and displacement.

Local economic development as the third dependent variable follows the assumption that CfW programmes (i) build infrastructure that improves the income-generating possibilities within the community; (ii) employ people and provide them with additional income; and (iii) also increase the income of other community members via a multiplier effect, potentially resulting in more investments, business activity and employment opportunities. This aspect is highly important in the Jordanian context because the influx of Syrian refugees has put higher pressure on scarce resources and added to widespread under- and unemployment.

The country context: Jordan as a haven for refugees

Large numbers of Syrian refugees have added to already existing refugee populations in Jordan and triggered a response by the international community which came in multiple forms, but especially as numerous CfW programmes.

Due to its geographical location in the Middle East, Jordan's history has been characterised at different points in time by the need to accommodate large numbers of refugees. Refugees and migrant workers have shaped Jordanian history and are still today an important factor of Jordan's economic and societal life until. In 2018, Jordan hosted around 671,000 Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR (UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees], 2018), which corresponds to approximately 7 per cent of the country's population.

At the same time, the huge number of refugees and migrants poses significant challenges to social cohesion and local economies as Jordan struggles to offer services and employment to the growing population. This is in a context where a difficult economic situation and continuously high unemployment mean that several parts of society are struggling to make ends meet and threaten to strain relations between different societal groups (for instance, tribes; Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians) and state legitimacy.

CfW and other social transfer programmes in Jordan

Jordan spends 12 per cent of GDP on public pension, health and social transfer schemes but most of these schemes only cover formal sector employees, thereby excluding the poor. Furthermore, most of the schemes cover only Jordanians; Syrian refugees only have access to the public health and education system.

Foreign donors have therefore set up parallel social transfer programmes explicitly targeting Syrian refugees. Some of them are unconditional cash benefit and voucher schemes but since 2016, as agreed on in the Jordan Compact agreement, a whole range of CfW programmes has been established by various donors, one of the main ones being the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ). All employ Jordanians along with Syrians, and women along with men because they are meant to (i) support Syrian refugees as well as vulnerable Jordanians; (ii) strengthen social cohesion between Syrians and Jordanians; (iii) reduce competition on the labour market; and (iv) promote the integration of women into economic life.

The total budget of these CfW programmes over the last five years has been about EUR 300 million and they have employed at least 70,000 workers during this time – typically for a period of 40-90 working days – in the rehabilitation and cleaning of infrastructure, the collection and recycling of waste, the rehabilitation of eco-systems, the creation of municipal parks, and the intensification of agriculture.

Research methodology

In order to find answers to our research question, we applied a predominantly qualitative research methodology. In a first, step, we formulated 15 hypotheses on the effect of CfW programmes on social cohesion (Hypotheses 1-10), local economic development (Hypotheses 11-15) and gender roles (cross-cutting issue and covered in the other 15 hypotheses) – our *dependent variables*. We intentionally devised such a large set of hypotheses in order to be able to identify (i) which characteristics of the programmes, namely the joint participation of Jordanians and Syrians, the creation of useful assets, the wage payments, or the existence of the programmes as such (*independent variables*) and (ii) which specific programme design choices, such as targeting, duration or the skills training component (*intervening variables*), enlarged or minimised the community effects found.

In a second step, we spoke to 380 interviewees in 295 semi-structured interviews with experts (national and local experts, mostly representatives of donor and implementing agencies) and community members (CfW participants, non-participants and shopkeepers) during a 3-month field research stay in Jordan. Most interviews (281) took place in ten villages in which CfW activities were being implemented. We selected these villages using two criteria: the village was to be as small as possible and also as far away as possible from other villages so that the community effects of CfW programmes would be noticeable for as many village members as possible and would not unfold mainly outside the respective village. Generally, we gained field access to the sites through international donor agencies and their local implementing partners. Just as the CfW programmes themselves, most of our field sites were situated in northern Jordan, but some were also in central and southern Jordan.

In addition, we drew on primary data stemming from the Post-employment Survey conducted by GIZ's Green Infrastructure programme during 2019 among their CfW participants.

Findings: community effects of Jordan's CfW programmes

Our research confirms that CfW programmes do not only have positive *direct* effects at the individual level but also noticeable positive *indirect* effects at the community level.

CfW programmes strengthen social cohesion

We found that the participation in CfW programmes strengthens several components of social cohesion.

Especially CfW participants and Syrians reported that their sense of belonging and trust in the respective other nationality (horizontal trust) had increased recently and that this was largely due to CfW programmes. The direct effect on CfW participants seemed to be much stronger than the effect on other members of the community. This finding was corroborated by the fact that respondents perceived the joint employment of Jordanians and Syrians in the CfW projects as most beneficial for social cohesion, while the existence of these projects as such and the creation of public infrastructure had only limited effects on the levels of social cohesion felt.

The relations between Syrians and Jordanians and their trust towards the respective other group were already good before the introduction of the programmes, so although the positive effect of CfW programmes on social cohesion was noticeable it did not cause a major overhaul of relations. Still, since economic pressures in Jordan are not only high but increasing, heightened trust through CfW programmes could help to prevent potential future tension.

The effect on participants' and other community members' trust in state authorities (vertical trust) is less clear-cut. While we noticed that CfW programmes frequently had quite positive effects, respondents often saw foreign donors as mainly responsible for the programmes – which was not always the case.

Lastly, some CfW activities were found to affect individuals' willingness to cooperate for the common good. This was particularly often the case for CfW programmes in the waste sector, which seemed to raise community members' awareness of the importance of waste collection and recycling in many cases.

CfW programmes offer incentives for more equitable gender roles

CfW programmes in Jordan contributed to a positive change in the public perception about female labour force participation in several communities covered by our study. The working experience and, often, new skills learnt through CfW programmes were much appreciated by female participants and this was often voiced more clearly than in interviews with male participants. However, these positive effects seemed to depend strongly on two factors: that the work environment was considered suitable for females, and that a woman's family was in dire need of a second source of family income.

So far, working in public places or in mixed-gender teams has been taboo for many Jordanian and even more so for Syrian women. The majority of CfW programmes take this into account, for instance by tasking women with less physically demanding activities, so that many women saw CfW programmes as a suitable and "safe environment" in comparison to other job opportunities. Some programmes, however, did form mixed-gender teams, and their female members reported positive experiences. In general, many female participants planned to look for further CfW opportunities after the programme ended. At the same time, women were not always prepared to accept another, non-CfW job, meaning that their labour market entry may only be temporary.

Our evidence also shows that many women worked in the CfW programmes because their families desperately needed the extra income and that these women would not necessarily continue to work, or look for work, if their families' financial circumstances became better. Thus, increased female labour force participation does not necessarily mean a permanent change in attitude but may represent a temporary exigency.

CfW programmes support local economic development (LED)

As participants indeed spent their income mostly locally and CfW programmes tried to source their building materials locally, increased business activities and a multiplier effect were traceable but difficult to quantify. Local shopkeepers reported higher sales figures and debt repayment rates, but we did not find instances of investments made because of higher revenue.

Participants' consumption patterns focused on basic needs, which included housing (rent, electricity, and water), food, household equipment, and debt repayment. Thus, there was hardly any investment effect as the vast majority of participants were not able to save and invest part of their income (thereby confirming the successful targeting of the programmes). At the same time, we found that female and male participants' spending patterns differed, so CfW programmes seeking to employ women in particular may result in the multiplier effect being channelled in a slightly different direction, for example, spending related to education or health.

The income effect generated by the CfW-built infrastructure was either difficult to gauge or negligible: Some infrastructure, mostly connected to agriculture (rehabilitation of dams, water reservoirs and irrigation systems; intensification of agriculture, slowing soil erosion) does have an effect on local economic development. Other infrastructure, such as parks, playgrounds or school renovations, certainly has a positive effect on the quality of life of residents, yet is unconnected to any income-generating activities.

Labour market effects are not clear-cut. In regard to employability, CfW participants improved their soft and – depending of the training component of a particular programme – also their technical skills, yet in most cases this did not translate into good job prospects after the end of the employment in CfW programmes (due to several factors, for instance, the poor general economic situation; skills unneeded on the primary labour market; or – for refugees – skills tied to an economic sector protected against non-national workers). Individual accounts showed that, in a number of cases, the relatively high CfW wage caused crowding-out but that the effect was not strong. On the positive side, CfW also reduced the in Jordan pervasive so-called "shame

culture", making work in previously dishonourable sectors, such as the waste sector, more reputable.

Designing CfW programmes that foster positive community effects

In connection with the actual implementation of CfW programmes, our interviewees mainly raised three issues: the duration of employment; skills development; and the application and targeting procedures. Crucially, not only participants but also community members argued that a higher number of working days would create more stable opportunities and that the inclusion of (additional) skills training components into CfW programmes could be beneficial. The third issue concerning the selection of CfW participants obviously has repercussions for CfW programmes' effects on social cohesion: there were complaints in particular about the fact that personal connections of Jordanian applicants rather than their vulnerability often decided on their participation in CfW programmes while this was less of an issue for Syrians. While this criticism affects trust in authorities (vertical trust), it does not affect trust in members of the respective other national group (horizontal trust).

Policy recommendations

We conclude that CfW programmes are recommendable also in conflict settings, once minimum safety can be guaranteed for the running of the programmes: They have the potential to positively influence social cohesion, empower women (who are disproportionally affected by flight and displacement), and foster local economic development. Project design choices need to take into account the existing relations between different societal groups and between genders. The duration of a given CfW programme in a specific host community and specific project design choices (such as participatory setups or procurement regulations) decide to what extent indirect effects can be achieved.

Based on our findings, we conclude that CfW is an effective instrument for the support of refugees. Social cash transfers may have some advantages in comparison with CfW: lower overhead costs; the possibility of building on and enlarging existing national cash transfer schemes; and the ability to also reach work-disabled parts of the population. However – according to our

research – CfW has fundamental strengths: (i) it has the potential to reap a threefold dividend of wage employment, infrastructure upgrading, and skills development; (ii) recipients are also psychologically more stable as they value doing something to gain an income and having something useful to do; (iii) CfW manages quite well to reach the most vulnerable persons and mainly them through its self-targeting mechanism (better-off persons would refuse to do the work that CfW labourers typically do); and (iv) above all, we found CfW to have positive indirect effects on social cohesion and gender roles going beyond the individual effects that social cash or food transfer schemes also have. These extra effects are due to the fact that people from different origins and genders work together.

Regarding their *direct* effects, CfW programmes seldom achieve the above-mentioned threefold dividend in terms of wage employment, infrastructure upgrading and skills development. Tailor-made project designs to fit a specific community context have the potential to do so but, at the same time, trade-offs between the three aims may be considerable. For example, if CfW programmes emphasise the quality of the infrastructure to be created it may be preferable to employ well-trained workers. Alternatively, if CfW programmes focus on the reduction of underemployment and poverty, this tends to go at the expense of the quality of the public goods created by the programmes (because the employed workers are, in this case, not sufficiently trained) or at the expense of workers' training (which raises additional costs and hence reduces the number of poor workers that a CfW programme can employ within a given budget). And once CfW programmes focus mainly on skills training, this may go at the expense of either pro-poor targeting – as people apply not only because of need but also because of the training offered – or the usefulness of infrastructure created by the programmes. Depending on the context, it may therefore be more realistic to aim for two of the three possible dividends only.

In any case, CfW programmes also have positive *indirect* effects. Their sheer existence and, even more so, the collaboration of people of different origins and genders promote both social cohesion and gender roles. The wages paid to cash workers benefit other community members as well because cash workers tend to spend large shares of their income locally. The upgrading of infrastructure likewise benefits all members of a community. Even training may have positive effects for the whole community in the long run

(an aspect that we did not study during our research). As it was, we found hardly any new trade-offs but mainly synergies between the direct effects of CfW programmes on participants and their larger community effects as well as between the various community effects. There was only a minimal budgetary trade-off as CfW programme designs need to be adapted to best integrate participants of different origin and gender.

Over time, CfW programmes within the context of flight and migration need to be transformed from being an instrument of humanitarian aid to being a development policy tool. The CfW programmes in Jordan should be gradually adapted, by raising the number of working days to achieve greater stability for beneficiaries and communities (even though there would then be a trade-off between the number of working days and the people reached) or by focusing more strongly on skills trainings. Best practices, such as optimised targeting, timely wage payments, or selecting CfW-built infrastructure with long-term pay-offs, should be continued and strengthened. CfW design choices that favour community effects should be emphasised in particular. These are namely: the prioritising of local procurement (for a stronger economic multiplier effect); conducting public participatory events; the implementation of mixed-nationality and mixed-gender teams wherever appropriate; and, the continued tailoring of some CfW activities particularly to women (for better social cohesion and women's empowerment).

The implementation of CfW programmes by foreign donors has several advantages for the local state authorities, yet, in the long run, local authorities would benefit from implementing the programmes themselves. The Jordanian case is a prime example of this. Jordanian authorities prefer not only donor funding but also donor implementation of CfW programmes as they do not want to take on the full social, technical and financial responsibility for running the programmes or do not want to be seen providing support for non-citizens. However, by doing so, local authorities forego potential legitimacy and efficiency gains through successfully run programmes for all inhabitants in their territory which are embedded in and co-ordinated within the field of social policies in a more coherent and efficient way. Moreover, local state authorities should be ready to run CfW programmes on their own when donors reduce funding or fully withdraw at a certain point in time.

1 Introduction

The instrument of cash-for-work (CfW) has gained immense interest over recent years as evidence has increased that it can deliver a range of positive effects. Many low- and middle-income countries have built up CfW programmes because they generate at least a double-dividend: wage employment (work/income/social protection) to vulnerable households along with the creation of desperately required infrastructure in underdeveloped regions. In addition, some CfW schemes also aspire to upgrading the skills of their workers, generating a third dividend.

More recently, international donors have also begun to apply CfW within the contexts of civil wars, post-conflict reconstruction and forced migration.[1] Here, the hope is that CfW will not only benefit the participants themselves but will also contribute to social cohesion, more equitable gender roles, and local economic development. In Jordan, for example, with hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in addition to a large number of refugees[2] from other countries, many donors have set up CfW programmes to improve refugees' livelihoods but also social cohesion in their host communities. The topic is urgent and delicate, as Jordan's public infrastructure is under immense strain and the country has been fighting massive un- and underemployment for a long time, well before the influx of Syrian refugees. At the first glance, the CfW tool seems ideal for achieving the international communities' goals in the wake of the so-called Jordan Compact, which was agreed at the corresponding conference in London in 2016.

However, while there is growing evidence for the many positive effects of CfW in general, very little is known so far on whether CfW has positive effects in conflict and post-conflict situations as well and what these effects are in particular. Even more so, hardly any study has looked at the more indirect effects of CfW schemes, especially those at the "meso-level", that is, at the level of local communities (villages or quarters of a town). To the extent that research or monitoring/evaluation projects have looked into CfW

1 Forced migration is understood as migration that includes an element of coercion and thus a threat to life and livelihood (IOM [International Organization for Migration], 2011).

2 Following Article 1 of the "Convention relating to the status of refugees", a refugee is a person, who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (see UN [United Nations], 1951).

programmes, most have done so at a micro-level, asking to what degree individual recipients' situations have improved.

For this reason, the study at hand focuses on the indirect effects of CfW programmes in host communities. Specifically, it investigates changes in the social and economic situation of Syrian refugees and the Jordanian local population (both either CfW participants or non-participants). The guiding research question is to what degree and how social cohesion, gender roles and local economic development have changed within host communities due to CfW programmes. Furthermore, the study aims to identify ways in which CfW can be adapted to serve contexts of flight and migration better. In doing so, it addresses both researchers and policymakers with an interest in Jordan and in CfW in general.

The current study presents analytical frameworks to empirically examine social cohesion, gender roles, local economic development, and the analytical state of the art with regard to CfW (Section 2) before turning to the Jordanian case. It describes and explains how Jordan's societally and economically difficult situation has been aggravated by the arrival of Syrian refugees (Section 3) and which social transfer programmes – among them CfW – have been set up in response (Section 4). Section 5 details the research design implemented during the field research phase, while Section 6 presents the findings. The report closes with policy recommendations for the Jordan context and for the implementation of CfW in conflict-afflicted contexts in general (Section 7).

2 The indirect effects of cash-for-work: the analytical framework

In order to understand the effects of cash-for-work on social cohesion, gender and local economic development, all four terms have to be well defined and operationalised. To do this, the first three subsections of this section provide frameworks for the analysis of our three dependent variables (social cohesion, gender, local economic development), while subsection 2.4 gives an overview of the concept of CfW, existing CfW programmes, and the existing evidence of their direct and indirect effects.

2.1 Social cohesion

The term "social cohesion" is increasingly used in social science literature but still lacks consensus on its exact meaning. In the following, we (i) present a working definition and an overview of ways to measure the phenomenon; (ii) list some possible factors and effects of social cohesion; and (iii) mention the possible effect of flight and migration on social cohesion.

2.1.1 Definition and measurement

Social cohesion is a vague and contested concept (UNDP [United Nations Development Programme], 2016). While originally associated with general aspects of solidarity within a community or society, today the concept is often linked to heterogeneous societies that are experiencing tensions between various societal groups, such as between refugees and their host communities.

Based on an in-depth literature review of existing research of the concept, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) conceives social cohesion as "the glue that holds society together": "Social cohesion refers to both the vertical and the horizontal relations among members of society and the state as characterised by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good" (see Burchi, Strupat, & von Schiller, 2020, p. 2).[3] This definition is henceforth used in this report.

To measure the level of social cohesion in various different contexts, DIE research uses data from public opinion polls, academic surveys and the publications of national statistical offices for indicators that can be seen as proxy parameters for the four dimensions of social cohesion: horizontal trust; vertical trust; inclusive identity (sense of belonging); and cooperation for the common good.

Trust (horizontal and vertical): Literature on social cohesion considers two types of trust as being important for social cohesion: First, generalised trust or "outgroup" trust that captures the ability of people across social groups

3 This definition is currently used as a working definition by the research project "Social cohesion in Africa" of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). So far, it has been only be mentioned once in a publication, namely the one cited above.

to trust each other. In this study, we call this type *horizontal trust.* The second type is political trust that measures underlying trust in the "formal, legal organisations of government and state, as distinct from the current incumbents nested within those organisations".[4] We call this type of trust *vertical trust.*

Inclusive identity (sense of belonging): The concept of an inclusive social identity is analytically distinct from the concept of personal identity. Personal identities are inherently subjective, whereas social identities are grounded in a shared understanding among individuals regarding specific social groups. Individuals can hold multiple social identities at the same time and subjectively ascribe emotional significance and priority to them. The more individuals in a given society agree over the meaning and content of their common social identity, the more cohesive that society is. Within the context of this research, we call this variable *sense of belonging* since this term better captures whether or not a person's social identity is related to his/her local community.

Cooperation for the common good: DIE understands cooperation for the common good as an individual's voluntary consent "to take into account interests higher than his own".[5] The concept also includes the willingness of an individual or a group to pay a cost or make a concession in order for the larger community to receive a benefit. Therefore, the concept goes beyond the related notion of social capital that measures the willingness to cooperate for individual and/or mutual benefits.

The attributes described above can be evaluated across three dimensions: between the state and individual (vertical); between groups (intergroup, horizontal); and between individuals (interpersonal, horizontal). Indicators are almost always measured by assessing data on public opinion.

2.1.2 Factors and drivers

Few studies have produced robust results on what indicators effect a community's social cohesion. Exceptions include political trust, the legitimacy of government, and social protection, which all seem to have

4 Definition from the documentation of an internal workshop at DIE on 9-10 July 2018 on "Social Cohesion in Africa: Concept and Measurement".

5 Definition from the documentation of an internal workshop at DIE on 9-10 July 2018 on "Social Cohesion in Africa: Concept and Measurement".

a positive effect on social cohesion (Burchi et al., 2020). Köhler (in press) argues in the same way that the existence of social protection can have a positive influence on social cohesion. Wietzke (2014) finds that formal employment correlates with social behaviours that are typically associated with higher degrees of social cohesion. Ariely (2014) provides evidence that, in contrast, some forms of diversity (such as ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation) have a negative effect on general trust and solidarity and, hence, on social cohesion. Similarly, Langer, Stewart, Smedts, and Deamrest (2017) show that, in countries where group identities are strongly prioritised over national identities, national social cohesion is more likely to be threatened – and that societies with low levels of social cohesion tend to face more violent conflicts (Langer et al., 2017).

Furthermore, various researchers suggest that full integration into a socially cohesive society is more difficult for particular societal groups, including women who tend to face more burdens and challenges than male members of society (Segalo, 2015). As Anzaldua (1999) assumes, this may be the case because the lives of differing societal groups (of different gender, race, religion, and so on) are actually often so interwoven that it becomes difficult to distinguish between "insiders" and "outsiders" despite their differing living experiences. Women, in most societies, are perceived as "insiders" and legally allowed to participate in the community (for instance, by entering the labour force and being household heads); thus, though they face higher burdens in doing so, they become full members of a socially cohesive society (Anzaldua, 1999).

2.1.3 The context of conflict and forced migration

Increasingly, researchers, policymakers and the general public around the world are associating the notion of social cohesion with positive and negative changes to society as a result of immigration and refugee movements. However, there are very few studies on the effects of the presence of migrants and refugees on the social cohesion of a host society, especially in low- and middle-income countries (Langer et al., 2017). In addition, limited data sets and the risk of politicisation make it difficult to measure the effects of refugees on social cohesion objectively (Ariely, 2014; Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017). Having said that, some stress that social protection is particularly important in these contexts (Kool & Nimeh, in press).

2.2 Gender

Gender was the second dependent variable of our analysis. We wanted to investigate the experiences and specific needs of women and men in the context of CfW programmes and to try to find out to what degree CfW programmes can empower women within the context of crisis and migration. This is particularly important in the Jordanian context because flight and displacement often affect women disproportionately.

In the following, we (i) define the term "gender"; (ii) discuss why a gendered perspective is particularly important in the context of flight and migration; and (iii) explain why the empowerment of women is also important for social cohesion and local economic development.

2.2.1 Definition and measurement

For our purposes, we adopted Carol Cohn's definition whereby gender is "*a structural power relation* […,] a social system which shapes individual identities and lives" (Cohn, 2013, p. 3, emphasis in original). Gender thus constitutes an "organizing principle" (Boyd & Grieco, 2003, p. 2) and refers to the social construct of being male or female and consequences emanating from this categorisation (Cohn, 2013, p. 3). The term "gender" thus differs from the term "sex", which refers to the biological attributes of men and women (UN DESA [United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs], 2004). Gender norms shape roles, expectations, identity constructions, and behaviours associated with masculinity and femininity (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). Since gender is grounded in social interactions, it varies across regions, societies, and time. Existing gender norms can empower or constrain rights and opportunities. For example, in patriarchal societies, the mobility and agency of women tend to be restricted.

We understand gender as fluid and non-binary, including identities that go beyond feminine and masculine. In addition, "women" and "men" are not monolithic categories. However, for reasons of practicability, this study still refers predominantly to the categories of male and female, although we do our best to take the diversity of experiences of both – females and males – into account.

We have chosen to highlight in particular the experience of women. Of course, a gendered analysis of conflict should look as well at the set of attributes, behaviours, and roles associated with boys and men. However,

as women often – and especially in Jordan – face more social constraints than men, the participation of women in social, economic and political life is particularly important for development (see, for example, Cuberes & Teignier, 2012; or Sen, 1999).

Progress in terms of gender can be measured in many different ways. Ultimately, gender discrimination can exist with regard to every aspect of human, economic, societal and political development. Therefore, the best way for measuring gender equality is to disaggregate all commonly used indicators of development by gender – an approach that has been taken for the Sustainable Development Goals which we also take in our study. Instead of formulating separate indicators for gender inequality, we disaggregate indicators for social cohesion and local economic development by gender.

2.2.2 Factors and drivers

Many women are already powerful – or, in the context of flight and migration: resilient – and thus do not need to be empowered. For this reason, we understand the empowerment of women rather as a structural measure to support their own struggles and to open up new opportunities to fulfil their economic and social potential. Categories to define the empowerment of women include

> […] women's sense of self-worth and social identity; their willingness and ability to question their subordinate status and identity; their capacity to exercise strategic control over their own lives and to renegotiate their relationships with others who matter to them; and their ability to participate on equal terms with men in reshaping the societies in which they live in ways that contribute to a more just and democratic distribution of power and possibilities. (Kabeer, 2008, p. 27)

Empowering women can be crucial for social cohesion and local economic development. A social structure that is marked by the traditional division of labour between men and women (productive versus reproductive) and spaces (public versus private) may hamper the sense of belonging of women and their horizontal trust in other groups (Pateman, 1988). Likewise, an economy in which half of the population is mostly restricted to unpaid housework cannot strive as much as more dynamic and flexible societies. Accordingly, in its "Declaration on Women's Economic Empowerment for Peacebuilding" the UN Peacebuilding Commission calls upon member states to "take measures to promote sustainable livelihoods for households led by

women […] in post-conflict societies, including through financial support and access to productive resources and sustainable income-generating activities" and stresses the "importance of assisting post-conflict countries in creating favourable conditions that can generate decent jobs for women" (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2013, Para. 10). Improving the access of women to social protection is an integral element of such efforts (Jones, in press).

2.2.3 The context of conflict and forced migration

A gendered lens on conflict and forced migration uncovers the unequal burden that women are carrying, hampering their access to resources, their participation, or policy changes in favour of the diverse interests of women.

In conflicts, women are both a potential force to reduce security threats through their inclusion in social and political affairs, and a population facing specific risks (Bunch, 2008). While men are the majority on the battlefield, they leave their wives behind. Some of them will turn into widows and will hence suddenly be solely responsible for securing their and their children's livelihood. Others may become victims of sexual abuse (Jacobsen, 2013). In addition, they are often affected by forced displacement. After conflicts, conditions

> tend to exacerbate women's already unequal economic and social status relative to men […]. Often, dire economic conditions after conflict foster corruption and criminality, while marginalised groups of women experience extreme income inequality, working in the informal economy and the most precarious employment positions in the labour market. (True, 2013, p. 3)

A return to violence can always occur in volatile post-conflict contexts and, in fact, domestic violence increases after conflicts end (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013).

Gender affects all aspects of the migration and refugee experience. It influences the access to resources as well as treatment within economic, social and legal structures. Female migrants and refugees are more vulnerable to physical, sexual, and verbal violence carried out by members of host communities, public officials or by other refugees and migrants. Those who are unaccompanied, pregnant, heads of households, disabled, or elderly are especially vulnerable. This perspective does not negate that male migrants and refugees are exposed to vulnerabilities, too. However, female migrants

face double discrimination, as women and as migrants. They are generally less mobile when they need to take care of children or live in socio-cultural settings in which they fully depend on their husbands. In addition, more and more crises are protracted, prolonging the plight of displaced persons and forcing them into a state of long-term emergency, often depending on international aid assistance (Giles, 2013).

Subsection 2.4.2 shows in what way CfW programmes can help to empower women both socially and economically.

2.3 Local economic development (LED)

The term "local economic development" (LED) refers to a concept that shows the complexity and the interplay of the various dimensions of economic processes at the local level. We will use it to understand the economic benefits of CfW for communities (as opposed to economic benefits for individual participants).

In the following, we (i) provide a working definition of the term; (ii) elaborate on possible drivers of LED; and (iii) explain the so-called "multiplier effect", which transforms a singular payment into a repeated benefit.

2.3.1 Definition and measurement

The concept of LED describes the sustainability of economic development processes at a local (that is, municipal or quarter of town) level. Just as economic development in general is more than just economic growth, we consider LED to be a multidimensional process, as well. In particular, equity, the inclusion of vulnerable groups and the reduction of multidimensional poverty (see Box 1), are taken into consideration. Local communities' social, environmental, and political aspects of development are as much foci of analysis as are local labour, commodity and capital markets. This understanding is well reflected in the International Labour Organization's definition of LED as "promoting participation and local dialogue, connecting people and their resources for better employment and a higher quality of life for both men and women" (ILO [International Labour Organization], 2018).

Following this definition, LED entails the two goals: quality of life and employment. While measuring employment is rather straightforward – and commonly done in national statistics collecting unemployment or labour

market participation figures – quality of life is much more abstract and difficult to measure. People's subjective perceptions about their material living conditions, their capabilities to access health or education services, as well as their social interactions, the respect of their basic rights and environmental pollution also play a role. In the local context, ways in which material living conditions are affected and leveraged by multiplier effects deserve special attention (see below).

Box 1: The conceptual framework of multidimensional poverty

This study understands poverty as multiple deprivation of basic capabilities. Capabilities are "the substantive freedoms [a person] enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value" (Drèze & Sen, 2013, p. 43). These are determined not only by income and wealth, but also by education, health, social inclusion, political rights and many more factors. The capabilities of any person therefore depend not only on the person's place of living and working but also on age, gender and social origin (class, family reputation, caste, ethnicity).

Thus, we argue – in accordance with the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC, 2001) – that poverty results from deprivation of one or more of the following subsets of capabilities:

- *Economic capabilities* refer to the ability to generate income, consume and have assets.
- *Human capabilities* include health, education, nutrition as well as access to clean water and shelter.
- *Political capabilities* comprise the respect for human rights, opportunities of political participation and having some effect on public policies and political priorities.
- *Socio-cultural* capabilities are the ability to take part as a valued member of a society.
- *Protective capabilities* are resilience, that is, the ability of people to resist economic and external shocks.

2.3.2 Factors and drivers

In addition to traditional drivers of economic development, such as institutions, physical and human capital and technology, social or political capacities, locality factors and local business cycles are also important drivers of LED. The combination of those drivers and their resulting augmenting/multiplying effects also play an important role. For example, strong social or political

capacities can compensate limited resources. However, weak community or political capacities, which could be due to corruption, disorganisation, or cronyism, can hamper LED so that an endowment with natural resources might not necessarily translate into good capacities. Thus, infrastructure, natural resource availability, geographical location, labour markets, capital investment, entrepreneurial climate, transport, communication, industrial composition, technology, size, export market, international economic situation, and national and state government spending can all be considered drivers of LED (Blakely & Leigh, 2017).

As CfW programmes are expected to achieve at least a double dividend by offering wage employment and creating infrastructure, this study highlights labour markets and infrastructure as key drivers of LED.

Labour markets: Labour markets are an essential element of LED. The skill level of the workforce in a region is an important factor for attracting industries. Thus, the ability to upgrade the skill level of the workforce through training, education and development is crucial for a region to remain competitive and respond to changing labour demand (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, & Tomaney, 2006). Various models highlight the importance of job creation and retention for LED (Salvini, in press). One example is the export-base/primary-jobs model that focuses on the effects of creating "primary" jobs producing goods and services for export outside the respective local economy. The generation of income from the sale of these products increases purchasing power and demand for other products, which can be secondary or tertiary and also offer new employment opportunities (Greenwood, Holt, & Power, 2010; see also below).

Infrastructure: Functioning infrastructure is essential for any kind of economic activity. In the context of LED, infrastructure subsectors such as energy, water and sanitation, telecommunications and transportation are particularly important. However, access to physical infrastructure alone does not foster gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth, or social returns at a macro-level. Studies find that a high level of poverty and bad governance weaken the effect of infrastructure on economic growth, while a competitive environment and well-made and clear regulations are associated with higher payoffs (Estache & Garsous, 2012).

2.3.3 Multiplier effects

In general, a multiplier effect can translate even minor inputs into considerable outputs. This effect stems from different processes, the most famous being the circulation of money within a closed economy: Here, every expenditure raises the income of not only the recipient but of many more people because the recipient of the payment again spends the additional income for her/his own purchases, and then the same money is spent over and over again to other people. So, unless an initial payment is entirely saved or spent outside the community, at least part of it is recycled at least once and thus benefits a second person as well. Unless she/he saves the additional income entirely or spends it entirely outside the community, this second person will pass it on again or at least some portion of it, and so on. In the end, at least parts of the initial payment can thus be passed on infinite times within the community benefitting many people rather than just the primary recipient. In 1936, John Maynard Keynes labelled this phenomenon the "multiplier effect" (Keynes, 2007, p. 117). And the multiplier m can be computed as follows:

$$m = \prod_{1}^{\infty}(1 - s - i) = \frac{1}{s + i} \begin{cases} = 1 & for \quad s + i = 1 \\ \to \infty & for \quad s + i = 0 \end{cases}$$

Where s is the average share of the income that people save and *i* is the average share of the income that people spend outside the community.

There are two variants of this original multiplier effect: The first variant comes into play when employment is created: Somebody invests in a factory (for instance, a bread factory) and creates employment for several people in the region who achieve higher income and can then buy the products of the investor (that is, the bread).

The second variant is the so-called capacity effect, which results from a one-time investment in assets that enable, ease, or cheapen production. Thereby, owners of production facilities enjoy increasing sales figures or falling production costs. The local community also benefits because the additional income or saved spending can be used for other items, again adding to the multiplier effect.

For the analysis of LED, the multiplier effect is particularly important because it boosts the effects of one-time expenditures. This applies not least to the wages paid out by CfW programmes (Barrientos, 2008). However, of course, the size of the effect depends totally on the assumption that the

additional income is indeed spent locally. For example, if businesses are not owned by locals, or if labour is imported from outside the region, or local capital flows out of the region, the local community will benefit less from economic activity (Soifer, 2014).

In addition, there is very little empirical evidence so far for the existence of the multiplier effect of CfW but there are a few studies on other social transfer programmes (Bhalla, Kangasniemi, & Winder-Rossi, in press). Barrientos (2008) stressed that most empirical research has focused on the impact of social transfers at the household level and has thereby found multiplier effects mainly at the level of assets and the consumption by beneficiaries. A case study by Robinson & Levy (2014) on Cambodia found that social transfers have more positive effects on economic development if implemented along with productivity-enhancing local policies. A World Bank research project concluded that social cash transfer programmes in Africa "have a nominal income multiplier ranging from USD 1.34 to USD 2.52 for each USD 1.00 transferred" (World Bank, 2015, p. 2). Egger, Haushofer, Miguel, Niehaus and Walker (2019) estimated the multiplier effect of cash transfers in rural Kenya to be approximately USD 2.6 for every US dollar.

2.4 Cash-for-work programmes

CfW programmes provide employment and income to people in need. They can hence be seen as an instrument of passive labour market policy as they offer low-wage employment to people who face difficulties finding a job on the primary labour market. But, at the same time, they can also be seen as social transfer schemes providing benefits only on the condition that recipients work for the construction or rehabilitation of public goods such as physical infrastructure (for example, roads, water systems, drains); environmental goods (for instance, municipal parks, river beds, forests); or services enhancing human capital (such as public health, education) (Loewe & Schüring, in press). This dual labelling is not astonishing as there is a huge overlap in any case in the instruments used by social protection and labour market policies.

The fact that the receipt of transfers is conditional has a dual purpose: One is targeting, that is, to make sure that only people in need will benefit from the programme – often referred to as "self-targeting" or the "self-selection" mechanism. People who have a job or sufficient assets would not apply for a short-term job that requires hard work for a comparatively low income. The

other function is to achieve at least a double-dividend: (i) to provide work and income to jobless people and thereby alleviate their poverty and improve their social protection in the short term; and (ii) to build useful infrastructure that improves the social and economic capabilities of people in the region and thereby addresses root causes of poverty in the long term.

CfW programmes have been being set up for a long time now in both high- and low- to medium-income countries[6] and are implemented in a growing number of low- and medium-income countries.[7] Recently, the instrument is also increasingly being used within the context of conflict and migration. Here, the hope is to achieve additional goals, that is, not only wage employment, infrastructure upgrading and possibly workers' training but even more so the promotion of social cohesion, gender roles and local economic development as a means to prevent social unrest and political instability (Reeg, 2017).

Synonymous or related terms for CfW programmes used by both academics and practitioners are: (i) employment guarantee schemes; (ii) employment-intensive programmes; (iii) labour-intensive employment schemes; and (iv) public work programmes (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 112; Zepeda & Alarcón, 2010, p. 5; Keddeman, 1998, p. 2). The main foci and connotation of these terms differ slightly; for instance, employment guarantee schemes imply a fall-back mechanism over a longer term.

In the following, we (i) provide a definition for CfW programmes; and (ii) present some evidence of their direct and indirect effects.

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6 Measures similar to CfW were already used in antiquity by the Egyptians and Romans to employ farmers outside the harvest season to build streets and bridges and to provide rural populations with additional income. Somewhat more recently, the French government set up *ateliers nationaux* during the February revolution of 1848. Likewise, CfW was a key component of Franklin D Roosevelt's New Deal Policies launched during the Great Depression in the 1930s. The US Civil Works Administration rapidly created millions of temporary manual-labour jobs in the construction of roads, bridges and buildings. In developing countries, CfW saw a boom during the 1950s and 1960s and later again as an instrument that was meant to cushion the adverse social effects of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and was primarily employed by the so-called social funds (Stewart & van der Geest, 1993). One of the largest CfW programmes was set up in 2006 by the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), operating in all rural regions in India (Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, 2012).

7 For instance, CfW programmes were introduced in more than 94 low- and middle-income countries in 2015 alone (Reeg, 2017).

2.4.1 Definition

CfW programmes are characterised by the fact that they provide jobs to "poor households and individuals at relatively low wages", mostly for the creation of infrastructure (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 112). Their aim is thus to reduce poverty and vulnerability and simultaneously create public goods, the so-called "double dividend". In doing so, they provide social protection to eligible households.

The programmes fall into the broad category of conditional cash transfer schemes as they (i) are non-contributory; and (ii) transfer benefits to people who are poor and without a job rather than people who have made a contribution previously or have experienced a specific kind of shock (illness, drought or death of the main provider of a family); and (iii) are paid only under a specific condition. In the case of CfW schemes, the condition is labour while in other schemes – conditional cash transfers (CCT) in the narrower sense – it is, for instance and most commonly, that all minors in the household are enrolled in school and regularly go to medical check-ups. Both kinds of programmes aim at reducing poverty in both the short run (through cash transfers) and the long run (through investments in public goods and individual human capital, respectively).

CfW programmes constitute a form of social protection because their immediate costs typically exceed their short-term benefits, both in terms of infrastructure created and regarding higher spending power: First, the wages/transfers paid to workers are by far higher than the value they add to public goods through their work as there are generally cheaper ways to build or restore public infrastructure. Second, there are also cheaper alternatives to CfW if the only aim is to transfer purchasing power to the population. Making the pay-out of social transfers conditional on beneficiaries' involvement in the construction of public goods is costly. The identification of useful infrastructure investments involves considerable expenditures just like its fine-tuning and implementation – not least because the building materials are often quite expensive. One way to reduce these costs is to purchase as many production inputs locally and thereby contribute once again to LED.

Hence, as long as we disregard their more indirect effects on entire local communities, CfW schemes tend to pay off only if they make a tangible contribution to both of their two primary goals, namely the creation of considerable numbers of jobs for vulnerable households, and public goods. This postulation may change, of course, if the indirect effects of CfW

programmes are large enough to justify that either of their primary goals is not well achieved.

CfW programmes can be set up by governments, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social funds, or private contractors (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018; Gehrke, 2015; Corser, 2018).

Moreover, CfW programmes can be implemented in quite different settings: (i) as short-term relief in contexts of conflict and crisis; (ii) as a stabiliser with a medium-term focus during economic recessions; and, (iii) as employment guarantee schemes with a long-term timeframe (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 113; Roelen, Longhurst, & Sabates-Wheeler, 2018, pp. 6-7). All three settings may or may not include training or skills development components.

2.4.2 Effects

In this report, we distinguish mainly between the direct and indirect effects of CfW programmes. Effects are considered indirect if they are not the immediate results of CfW programmes but, for example, due to changes in the behaviour of the immediate recipients (such as the multiplier effect mentioned above, or changes in social cohesion).

Some evidence exists on the direct effects of CfW programmes in stable contexts but much less so on their indirect effects – especially in the context of conflict and migration – which is why the reminder of this report looks mainly at the indirect effects of CfW in Jordan.

Direct effects

Empirical evidence suggests that CfW can have positive effects on employment, income poverty reduction, social protection, infrastructure, and skills development. However, the significance of these effects depends to a large degree on the design of the respective CfW programme.

Employment, income poverty reduction, and social protection: Plenty of evidence confirms that CfW programmes are normally successful in creating wage employment and hence have positive effects on employment, income poverty reduction and social protection.

By definition, CfW has short-term *employment effects*, also in crisis contexts, as Reeg has demonstrated for Yemen and Sierra Leone, where CfW acted as a safety net (Reeg, 2017). However, there is no clear evidence of general

labour market effects. Gehrke and Hartwig (2018) found that the effect on employment can be either positive or negative as most CfW programmes pay wages substantially above market-levels with the effect that private employers feel obliged to raise their wages as well or replace workers by machines.[8] Other authors have confirmed this finding with evidence from India (Bhargava, 2014), Yemen (Imbert & Papp, 2015) and several other countries (Reeg, 2017).

Likewise, studies show that CfW programmes *reduce income poverty* (Carraro & Marzi, in press; Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018; Reeg, 2017) – at least among their beneficiaries and at least by the amount of wages transferred, yet the effect ends when the CfW schemes are closed (Reeg, 2017).

Many CfW schemes also have a substantial impact on the *social protection* (that is, the resilience to risks) of their immediate beneficiaries (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018). Even programmes in conflict-affected countries such as Sierra Leone and Yemen have been able to reduce the vulnerability of participants (Reeg, 2017, p. 5).

Infrastructure development: Almost by definition, CfW programmes have an impact on the creation of public goods (usually infrastructure). But there are large differences with respect to the quality and sustainability of the infrastructure built. Here, the fact that works are undertaken by unskilled CfW participants and are not capital-intensive with the help of the latest technology can take its toll (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018). In addition, there is a wide variety of experiences with respect to which groups of people benefit most from CfW-created infrastructure (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018): urban or rural populations (that is, streets in towns or villages); locals people or a greater number of less-affected people (for example, village streets or long-distance overland roads); rich or poor people, for instance, landowners or landless field workers (such as irrigation versus drinking water supply systems).

Skills upgrading: CfW programmes only have an effect on the skills of participants if the respective programme has a training component. However, at the same time, the existence of a training component can distort the self-targeting mechanism: not only the very poor may want to participate but also people who are mainly interested in the training itself. Gehrke and Hartwig

8 In their study, they looked at fifteen CfW programmes worldwide (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018).

thus advise that training and CfW be delivered in distinct sub-projects (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 115). In addition, more extensive training should only be offered if it provides skills that are also needed elsewhere on the labour market (Estache, Ianchovichina, Bacon, & Salamon, 2013, p. 71). Ultimately, whether these skills can be transferred into higher income after the end of the programme depends on many factors (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, pp. 118-119).

Indirect effects

Less evidence exists on the more indirect effects of CfW programmes: on LED, social cohesion, and gender roles.

LED: CfW programmes can help to bridge gaps in essential *infrastructure* and thereby boost *investment, production, and trade*. This may have a positive long-term effect on employment and poverty reduction but the empirical evidence for such effects is not yet entirely clear (Gehrke, 2015, pp. 1-2). In addition, various different kinds of infrastructure have varying potential to boost LED and the quality and maintenance of the infrastructure produced is also decisive for the size of the overall effect (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018).

In addition, CfW programmes can have positive impacts on *income, growth and poverty reduction* beyond the group of their participants through the *multiplier effect* – but again, empirical evidence is sporadic (Bhalla et al., in press). There is evidence that CfW participants spend most of their income on consumption, but few studies confirm that they purchase mainly locally (Keddeman, 1998). Tessitore (2013) found evidence for a small, short-lived multiplier effect in Somalia. For Ethiopia, Filipski et al. (2017) demonstrate that CfW programmes even had nationwide effects, though these were small.

Another assumption is that the participants of CfW programmes *invest part of their wages* in order to establish an income source from which they can draw when the CfW programme ends. However, there is little evidence for this assumption – possibly because the wages of most CfW programmes are too low and hardly predictable (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018). Only if programmes run for longer periods and with no restrictions on participation is there potential for productive investments (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018). One of the few positive examples is a CfW scheme in Sierra Leone, that is, a post-conflict country, where Rosas and Sabarwal (2016) found that CfW participants were more likely establish new businesses.

Furthermore, CfW programmes can have positive effects on *nutrition, education and health* within a community – despite the possibility of school dropouts if children of – especially female – CfW participants need to replace the work capacity of their parents on farms and in households (Burchi, in press; Dammert, de Hoop, Mvukiyehe, & Rosati, 2017, p. 11; Strupat, in press). Gehrke (2015) argues, for example, that sanitation-related infrastructure can reduce the spread of diseases, which may lead to a higher quality of labour supply in the end. Also, investment in school infrastructure can lead to higher school attendance rates and thus higher levels of education.

Finally, Gehrke (2017) provided evidence that CfW programmes can also provide *social protection* beyond the group of participants. She showed that many poor households in India changed their investment behaviour when the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was set up, which guarantees all vulnerable rural households in India a minimum of up to 100 days of paid employment per year. With a stunning quarter of rural households participating each year (Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, 2012, p. ix), knowing that they can resort to NREGS in case of need renders even non-participants "protected" and ready to invest in assets with less stable rates of return. In any case, CfW programmes seem to have the highest impact on aggregate income poverty levels if they are located in rural areas with underdeveloped labour markets (Zepeda & Alarcón, 2010, p. 5).

Social cohesion: It is also assumed that CfW programmes contribute to social cohesion and thereby to political stability (Köhler, in press). The argument goes that the programmes reduce poverty and create important infrastructure thereby improving people's well-being, social inclusion, and satisfaction. As a result, social unrest is less likely, and citizens are more likely to accept the existing political order (Burchi et al., 2020). Another assumption is that, in crisis contexts, the existence of CfW programmes raises the opportunity costs of being part of an armed group (Reeg, 2017). However, there is only limited evidence for these assumptions so far. Even Babajanian (2012), who published a whole study on the interplay between social protection and social cohesion, provided only very indirect indications for the assumed effects of CfW on social cohesion. Reeg (2017) stressed that such an effect depended on the (perceived) equality in access to CfW. At the same time, there is more ample evidence on the effects of other social transfer programmes on social cohesion. Evans, Holtemeyer, and Kosec (2019), for example, showed that that the launch of a pilot conditional cash-

transfer scheme in Tanzania increased the vertical trust in local governments. In addition, they revealed that the effect depended to some degree on people being aware of the fact that their local government was in fact involved in the design and establishment of the conditional cash transfer scheme and was larger where community members participated in the design process.[9] Adato (2000), in contrast, provided evidence that conditional cash transfers in Mexico had positive effects on community social relationships.

However, CfW only fosters political stability when it also considers *institutional sustainability.* It is important to analyse how CfW fits into the local social protection framework, and whether international aid organisations can build on these structures in order to implement CfW programmes (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 121; Zepeda & Alarcón, 2010, p. 3) in order not to harm vertical trust.

Gender roles: CfW programmes have a potential to empower women both economically and socially (Jones, in press). They can provide women with access to labour markets in contexts where female labour force participation rates are low. Furthermore, they can enable women to participate in the rehabilitation of public goods, to move and act in public, as well as, through their income, to possibly gain more influence over household decisions. However, most CfW programmes are implemented as short-term measures to ease sudden financial shocks rather than to alleviate poverty in general or to foster social protection in the long term; hence they are unlikely to empower women in a lasting way. In many countries, women tend to enter the labour market only if they have to because of financial stress rather than because they wish to gain equal rights. These women face chronic cycles of impoverishment and it is hard to determine whether they have made an active choice to join the labour market or have been forced into it by the underlying circumstances (Kabeer, 2011). In other words, even if CfW programmes have a positive effect on women's economic empowerment, such programmes may not change the social roles of women and men as research on the Indian NREGS shows (Sudarshan, 2011).

Whether women actually participate in CfW programmes depends on several factors. The willingness of women tends to rise (i) the more equally men and women are paid in the programmes; (ii) the closer CfW activities are to women's houses; (iii) the more similar the activities are to what

9 Bastagli et al. (2019), Camacho (2014), and Hunter and Sugiyama (2014) provide similar results.

women already do outside the household (for example, if the activities are in agriculture); and (iv) if there are day-care facilities for the children of women next to the CfW sites (Kabeer, 2011). In contrast, if there are not, women may participate but with the unintended negative effect that older daughters are taken out of school in order to look after their younger siblings instead of the mother (Dammert et al., 2017; Sudarshan, 2011).

3 Country context: Jordan as a haven for refugees

We now turn to the case of Jordan, which is a very illustrative example of a country that is strongly affected by flight and migration. In fact, refugees and migrant workers have shaped its history since independence in 1946 and they have been an important factor of Jordan's economic and societal life up to today. At the same time, they create significant challenges for social cohesion and development, as Jordan is a middle-income country struggling in any case to offer social services and employment even to its own growing population.

This section describes the socio-economic situation of Jordan (subsection 3.1) and the situation of refugees in Jordan (subsection 3.2). It then reports on social cohesion in Jordan (subsection 3.3), the gender situation (subsection 3.4), and local economic development (subsection 3.5).

3.1 The socio-economic situation of Jordan

Jordan is an upper middle-income economy which has achieved a comparatively high level of human development even though it (i) started from a very low level of human development in 1946; (ii) is almost land-locked; (iii) is surrounded mainly by unstable neighbouring countries; (iv) has hardly any natural resources; and (v) has had to integrate huge numbers of migrants throughout its history. This achievement can be attributed to a forward-looking and balanced foreign policy and considerable financial support from both Western and Gulf countries throughout the decades (World Bank, 2016a).

The huge majority of its population is urban, with a high concentration in and around the capital city Amman and the north of Jordan. Between 2010 and 2016, the population grew from 6.7 million to 9.8 million (Department of Statistics Jordan, 2016; Krafft, Assaad, & Keo, 2018). One factor for

this increase was the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Syria, who constitute a considerable additional burden for the development of the country which is already suffering from limited water resources, bottlenecks in infrastructure, and lack of employment (see in more detail below).

Yet, the presence of large numbers of refugees is by far not the only challenge for Jordan's social and economic development. The country is still struggling to attain a coherent national, social, and political identity since its creation by European powers in the first half of the 20th century. Its society and politics are deeply influenced by strong rival tribes and an authoritarian monarchy. Both cooperate to uphold their say in society and polity, thereby limiting the potential for democratisation. This stalemate is nurturing growing discontent within the population and provokes sporadic protests, which culminated in weekly demonstrations in front of the prime minister's office in Amman between June and December 2018 and a march of people from the south all across Jordan to the Royal Court in February 2019, where they staged a sit-down strike.

While in June 2018 people demonstrated mainly against a tax reform (which was then postponed and later brought back onto the table in a slightly different form), at the end of 2018 discontent was growing especially among the youth, who saw no promising perspectives anymore in their country. They felt that nothing had really changed since their protests almost seven years earlier during the so-called Arab Spring 2011 (Ramadan, 2018).

3.2 Refugees in Jordan

Due to its geographical location in the Middle East and its relative political stability, Jordan's history is characterised by the reception of large numbers of refugees throughout the decades. Although this trend had started even before the country became independent, it accelerated thereafter:

- In 1948/1949, some 500,000 Palestinians fled from lands that became part of Israel and added to the local population which counted just about 400,000 people itself.
- In 1967, some 380,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which had both been occupied by Israel during the Six-Day War.
- Between 1975 and 1990, about one million Lebanese and Palestinians came from Lebanon to escape the Lebanese Civil War. (Most Lebanese returned though during the 1990s.)

- In 1982, a small group of Syrians came to escape from the massacre of Hama.
- In 1991, some 350,000 Jordanian and Palestinian migrant workers returned from the Gulf countries: first from Kuwait because of the country's occupation by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and then from Saudi-Arabia and other countries, which expelled people with Jordanian passports to sanction the fact that Jordan had remained neutral in the war between the Gulf states and Iraq.
- During the 1990s, some 250,000 Iraqis fled to Jordan to escape from persecution, violence, and the poor economic situation in their own country.
- During the 2000s, another 750,000 Iraqis followed to escape from the civil war that had started after the US American occupation of their country. (However, most Iraqis have in the meantime returned to their country.)
- At the same time, a considerable number of Egyptians came as labour migrants. (Many returned to Egypt again, but some 600,000 Egyptians still reside in Jordan.)
- After the uprisings in several Arab countries in 2011, about 20,000 people came from Libya, about 30,000 from Yemen, some from Egypt and Somalia, and up to 1.3 million from Syria (De Bel-Air, 2016).

Today, Palestinians represent the largest group of non-natives in Jordan even though it is difficult to estimate their total share of the population: all Palestinians who came until 1949 or resided in the West Bank until 1967 were conceded Jordanian passports, thus they and their descendants are counted as Jordanians in national statistics. Guesses of their number range between 1.6 and 4.5 million (25-70 per cent of the total population of Jordan), which would mean that only between 2 and 5 million (30-75 per cent) of the population of Jordan originate in fact from its current territory. Exact data exist only on the number of Palestinians who came to Jordan from the Gaza Strip or Israel after 1949 and their descendants (634,182) because they were not given a Jordanian passport but only an identity card (Department of Statistics Jordan, 2015; see also Figure 1).

Figure 1: Jordanian population by country of origin



Notes: The methodology and results of the census are highly debated in the academic literature. Especially the figures for Syrians having come to Jordan before 2012 and the number of Iraqis living in Jordan are said to have been inflated (Lenner, 2020). In addition, the number of Egyptians living in Jordan may have decreased significantly since 2015 (Krafft, Razzaz, Keo, & Assaad, 2019).

Source: Authors, based on data from the Department of Statistics Jordan (2015) publishing results of the Jordan Population and Housing Census of 2015

Apart from the Palestinians, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Jordan by 2019 registered about 654,000 Syrians, 67,000 Iraqis, 15,000 Yemenis, 6,000 Sudanese and 2,500 people from 25 other countries (UNHCR, 2020). On top of this, many more unregistered refugees and migrant workers are living in Jordan (see Figure 1). These include, among others, an estimated 17,000 Syrian Palestinians who could not register because the government of Jordan forbid Palestinians from Syria from seeking refuge in Jordan (Grawert, 2019, p. 37). Some estimates set

the actual number of Syrians living in Jordan to more than 1.2 million (see Figure 1), while other sources argue that their number cannot be much higher than 500,000 (Krafft et al., 2019; Lenner, 2020). Finally, Jordan also hosts a considerable number of migrant workers, some 600,000 alone from Egypt (Schubert & Haase, 2018, p. 102; see also Figure 1).

As only about 20 per cent of refugees live in camps, their presence has a strong effect on the economic and social life in their host communities. The refugees need water, food, shelter, clothes and education for their children, as well as medical treatment (Hagen-Zanker & Mallett, 2016; Schubert & Haase, 2018).

Despite the fact that the Jordanian-Syrian border has been recently opened again, it is unlikely that many Syrian refugees will return to Syria in the coming years. In general, Syrian refugees only returned infrequently as there are still persistent concerns regarding the security situation in their country and due to a new Syrian property law that effectively expropriates many refugees of their previously owned premises (HRW [Human Rights Watch], 2018). A study on the mobility of Syrian refugees finds that, in addition to the security situation, low provision of education, health and basic services in Syria deters refugees from returning (World Bank, 2019a).

In order to gain official recognition and enjoy some social benefits (such as food services and free treatment in Jordan's public health system, see subsection 4.1), Syrian refugees need to register with an office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and then with the Jordan Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which gives them a magnetic "MoI service card" or "security card" (*biṭāqa amniyya*). By March 2019, 654,266 Syrians had registered with UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) (out of whom 299,168 of working age) (UNHCR, 2020) but only about 405,000 with the MoI (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs, & Holmes, 2018).

On average, the Syrians have just JOD 285 (Jordanian dinar) to spend per household per month, and 69 per cent of their spending is for housing – just 11 per cent for health and food, 9 per cent for education; and 8 per cent for transportation. As a result, 17 per cent of adolescents suffer from hunger, while 35 per cent report chronic illnesses (Jones et al., 2019).

Although Syrian children are officially entitled to go to school, 20 per cent of them (and even more than half of those older than 15 years) are still not yet enrolled. Net attendance rates are 47 per cent lower among Syrian

refugees of secondary school age than among their Jordanian peers. And those who go to school are normally educated in a separate afternoon shift. Of Syrian students, 41 per cent have experienced corporal punishment and discrimination (Jones et al., 2019).

3.3 Social cohesion in Jordan

Despite the presence of large numbers of refugees, social cohesion in Jordan is not weak, though it is under pressure. The country benefits from the fact that traditional social norms are still strong, that there is some degree of national identity, and that the dominant group identity is with the tribes (especially in rural regions and among original Jordanians), which stretch across state borders far into neighbouring countries.

This subsection provides an assessment of social cohesion and national identity in Jordan (3.3.1); information on national campaigns that have been launched to strengthen it (3.3.2); some preliminary evidence on the effect of refugee and migrant presence (3.3.3); and the effect of international aid (3.3.4) on social cohesion in Jordan.

3.3.1 Political and national identity in Jordan

Jordan is still struggling to gain a national political identity due to its origins as a former British colony – after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Jordan's borders were effectively drawn by European powers –, its political system headed by the traditional monarchy, and the broader political and social landscape in the Arab world.

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, three different visions of political community – Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*); state-centric nationalism (*wataniyya*); and the Islamic *ummah* (global community of Muslims) – have struggled for cultural loyalty within the Arab world, thus challenging Jordan's national identity and social cohesion within the country as well (Lucas, 2008). In addition, and perhaps even more importantly (at least for the original Jordanians but also, perhaps to a lower degree, for many original Palestinians), the tribes claim to be the natural and foremost focus of identity instead of the modern nation state.

The tribes have indeed a strong say on political decisions. While the country is by law a constitutional monarchy, parliamentary autonomy has in fact

been minimal, and the king holds a significant share of the power. Despite elections being held every three years, the process of democratisation in Jordan has frequently been described as a facade. The parallel existence of two systems of political authority – the traditional authority of the monarchy and the state-authority of institutions – has created a situation of incompatibility that leaves the question of national identity to open debate (Lucas, 2008). But even the king's legitimacy derives from traditional claims of kinship, religion, and Bedouin identification (Al Oudat & Alshboul, 2010; Melián Rodríguez, 2018). As a result, even the king is not free to take decisions on major issues but always has to consider the opinions of the main tribes of the country.

At the same time, social cohesion is strong within local communities. Several studies provide evidence of Jordanians having a strong feeling of belonging to their respective local communities and having much trust in their neighbours – even if these neighbours have recently arrived from outside the community or even outside Jordan. Key drivers of mutual trust seem to be age, common interests, and geographic proximity rather than nationality or religion (see, for instance, Kuhnt, Rischke, David, & Lechtenfeld, 2017).

3.3.2 Government initiatives to promote national identity and social cohesion

Since the early 2000s, the Government of Jordan has increasingly emphasised the need to build social cohesion and national identity within the country through a variety of campaigns and national plans. In 2002, King Abdallah II launched a national campaign under the slogan "Jordan First". It aimed at propagating the principles of rule of law, accountability, pluralism, and equality as a means to modernise the Jordanian society and unify it behind a common national goal (Al Oudat & Alshboul, 2010). Nevertheless, state institutions substantially control political and civic associations, and Jordanian law still prohibits critical statements concerning the king, government institutions, and Islam (HRW, 2019).

Since the start of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Government of Jordan has also focused more strongly on building social cohesion and resilience within local communities. The three national plans formulated since 2015 to mitigate the refugee crisis – the Regional Refugee Resilience Plan; the Jordan Response Plan; and the three-year National Resilience Plan – all include various social cohesion initiatives, particularly in the labour sector,

such as the creation of employment opportunities, vocational training offers, apprenticeships, and job-placements (REACH & British Embassy, 2014).

Unfortunately, only little research has been conducted on the effects of these efforts on social cohesion within Jordanian host communities (Kuhnt et al., 2017).

3.3.3 Effects of refugee presence

In major host communities, social cohesion seems to have suffered from the presence of refugees, though only modestly. REACH found 160 communities in Jordan's northern governorates ('Ajlūn, Al-Balqā', Jerash, Irbid, Al-Mafraq and Al-Zarqā') to have experienced a weakening of social cohesion as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis (REACH & British Embassy, 2014). Likewise, Kuhnt et al. (2017) argue that the level of social cohesion in Jordanian communities (measured by mutual trust, sense of belonging, and participation in community events) has decreased slightly on average during recent years – in particular between Jordanians and non-Jordanians (Kuhnt et al., 2017).

This trend is mainly due to the fact that the presence of refugees in Jordan is exerting additional pressure on already strained infrastructure, social services, and the labour market (see subsection 3.5.3). A joint report by UNHCR, UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) and the WFP (World Food Programme) (2014, pp. 8, 10) stresses that tensions have erupted several times between different population groups in northern Jordan mainly because of increasing stress on resources such as water, housing and jobs. Reportedly, the situation in Al-Mafraq has deteriorated most significantly. Here, rents skyrocketed and wages fell considerably because large numbers of Syrians in the town were ready to accept any shelter or any job to survive (Grawert, 2019, p. 20; Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 3). Likewise, increasing demand for water has reduced the available amount of water per inhabitant, which has led to tensions in some municipalities. While many schools have adopted double-shifts to also accommodate Syrian children, classrooms are still over-crowded and the quality of education has dropped (Kuhnt et al., 2017).

Still, these trends have not put an end to the deep solidarity felt between Jordanians and Syrians. Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu (2017), for example, acknowledge that tensions and conflicts over scarce resources increased

when Syrians arrived in large numbers in the Al-Mafraq area. But they also mention that the solidarity between Jordanians and Syrians has endured because of longstanding kinship ties between the Jordanian host communities in Al-Mafraq and the communities of origin of many Syrian refugees. Guay (2015, p. 17) also suggests that different identities should be taken into account beyond the binary setup of host-community versus refugees.

Interestingly, many reports highlight the north of Jordan as the place where social cohesion has been particularly under threat because most Syrians found refuge there, while we had the impression that social cohesion between Jordanians and Syrians in the north of Jordan was astonishingly strong (see subsection 6.1). In addition, we often heard that there were much greater tensions in the south of Jordan. Observers explained this by the fact that people in the north of Jordan and southern Syrian belong to the same tribes, while there are quite different tribes in the south of Jordan. Because of this, the initial solidarity might erode faster in the south and centre of Jordan than in the north. Grawert (2019) shows for two "Palestinian" quarters of Amman that the solidarity with Syrians was initially high (perhaps because of the common experience of flight) but has been eroding with time because of conflicts over resources.

Apparently, social cohesion has decreased in schools in particular, with worrying consequences for refugee children. UNICEF finds that Syrian refugee children and young people are increasingly becoming isolated and face mounting problems in access to education (Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 5). Other sources confirm that 1,600 Syrian children dropped out of the Jordanian school system in 2016 alone (Matteo Valenza, 2016; Grawert, 2019). Kuhnt et al. (2017) also note that tensions between young men are a growing concern, with Jordanian schools being among the places where social tensions erupt most frequently and openly.

3.3.4 The effect of external aid

In some communities, foreign aid has also contributed to weakening social cohesion. For instance, some foreign donors have spurred competition over scarce resources by providing housing subsidies to Syrian refugees: these subsidies have turned out to be goldmines for Jordanian house-owners and severe disadvantages for Jordanian tenants bidding for the same apartments as Syrians (Grawert, 2019, p. 23).

A study by REACH indicates that many of the respondents surveyed had the impression that bi- and multilateral donor agencies did not allocate their support to the most vulnerable affected by the refugee crisis and accused them for corruption. This sentiment was found to be considerably higher among Jordanian than Syrian respondents, and higher among women than men. The study concluded that external support is frequently a major source of tensions and frustration in host communities and leads to decreasing trust in local public authorities (REACH & British Embassy, 2014).

3.4 The gender situation in Jordan

In many domains, Jordan has made progress towards gender equality (for instance, education, health and legal provisions). However, in terms of economic and social empowerment, little or nothing has been achieved recently because of the prevalence of traditional role models of women and men.

This section attempts to shed light on the multiple experiences that different groups of women are facing in Jordan (3.4.1) and what role the Syria crisis and the arrival of huge numbers of refugees play in this regard (3.4.2).

3.4.1 The situation of Jordanian women

On paper, women enjoy almost the same legal rights as men in Jordan but, in practice, they still face multiple gender-specific constraints. Patriarchal norms and traditional gender roles persist. Despite reform efforts, many legal loopholes remain that allow for the unequal treatment of men and women (ARDD [Arab Renaissance for Democracy & Development], 2019). Another example are decisions over household expenses, even when women contribute to the households' income (Shteiwi, 2015), or practices through which women become heavily indebted in the name of their husbands, as it is easier for women to gain access to credits (ARDD, 2019). Furthermore, young women often face family pressure to marry early.

With regard to education and health, Jordan has made substantial progress toward gender equality. The gross school enrolment rates of girls have been exceeding those of boys for several years at the primary (more than 100 per cent for both), secondary (66 against 64 per cent), and tertiary education level (34 against 30 per cent). Likewise, the life expectancy of females

is higher than for males by a factor that is similar to that of high-income countries (76 versus 73 years at birth) (World Bank, 2019b).

With regard to economic inclusion, however, Jordanian women are at a clear disadvantage in comparison to men. They are still underrepresented in most business sectors and, in 2016, their labour force participation rate (LFPR) was just 17 per cent – even falling from 23 per cent in 1990 – compared to 63 per cent for men (Krafft et al., 2018).

This huge gap is mainly due to social norms prescribing women a place in the household rather than in gainful employment. Many women (Syrians as well as Jordanians) would be willing to engage in paid employment. According to a study by REACH and UN Women, Syrian women have the impression "that they would be better off if they were able to work and provide for their families themselves, rather than be dependent on aid" (REACH & UN Women, 2017, p. 3). Also, many are already involved in small informal (non-registered) activities (such as tailoring, cleaning houses, tutoring, cooking for neighbours and family members). And still, most women interviewed for the same study did not see a chance of entering the formal labour market even though they would prefer more stable and formal engagement in the labour market (REACH & UN Women, 2017, p. 3). This was particularly true of women with low levels of education and training, but even well-educated women tend to withdraw from the labour market when they marry because cultural norms prevent them from taking up work (World Bank, 2016a).

Along with this, the working conditions in Jordan provide disincentives for women to engage in formal sector jobs: (i) there are a lack of well-paid jobs in Jordan in general but, in addition, cultural stereotypes ban women from physically demanding jobs and some employers prefer to hire men; (ii) Jordan's legal provisions for maternity protection at the workplace and for maternity leave are insufficient and not reliable enough; (iii) there are only few reasonable and affordable child care facilities; and (iv) there is a real risk of harassment and discrimination at the workplace and in over-crowded public means of transportation to workplaces (Staton, 2018).

3.4.2 The situation of female Syrian refugees

Yet, the situation seems to be still worse for Syrian women than for Jordanian women. Women constitute the majority of Syrian refugees in

Jordan – probably because many of their husbands have either died in the war in Syria, are still fighting there (Krafft & Sieverding, 2018; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014), or have embarked on the dangerous flight to seek asylum in Europe. As a result, 22 per cent of the Syrian households in Jordan are headed by women (Tiltnes, Zhang, & Pedersen, 2019). This fact may also be one of the reasons why Syrian women are particularly often victims of violence. One-third of refugee women in Jordan report having experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime and over half of them have experienced emotional abuse, with husbands being the most common perpetrators (GBVIMS [GBVIMS Task Force Sub-Group in Jordan], 2017). The real share is probably much higher because a strong stigma persists and a large majority of women prefer to stay silent about the subject (ARDD, 2019; UNHCR et al., 2014).

Early-marriage is another issue – mainly for Syrian women in Jordan who marry at a much younger age than they used to do before the war in Syria (Tiltnes et al., 2019).[10] Apparently, many parents try to marry off their daughters as early as possible as a way of sustaining their own livelihood (UNHCR et al., 2014, p. 8).

3.5 Local economic development in Jordan

In parts of Jordan, the presence of refugees challenges LED as a result of the increased pressure on infrastructure, social services, and the labour market.

This section presents challenges for LED resulting from bottlenecks in infrastructure (3.5.1) and the labour market (3.5.2) but also from the "Jordan Compact" (3.5.3), which is an initiative of the international donor community seeking to enable and regulate the access of Syrian refugees to the Jordanian labour market.

3.5.1 Infrastructure challenges

Jordan faces numerous infrastructure challenges, especially in the domains of water, energy, transportation, and schools. As about 80 per cent of Syrian refugees live in host communities and only 20 per cent in a refugee camp

10 While only 3 per cent of 15-year-old Syrian women were married before the war, their number has risen to 14 per cent. Also, men appear to marry earlier: in Jordan, 23 per cent of them are already married at the age of 20 (Tiltnes et al., 2019, p. 8).

(again almost all in Za'atarī and Al-Azraq camps), their presence has severely added to the infrastructure problems. However, the need to solve these problems also provides the opportunity to create jobs to absorb parts of the unemployed and underemployed population – a fact that international aid agencies duly considered in the design of CfW programmes.

Among both Jordanians and Syrians, three sectors – water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), solid waste management, and livelihoods (namely, housing and employment) – are considered to be most affected by the presence of refugees. Jordanian nationals mainly complain about an increase in water shortages, waste management problems, and a shortage of affordable housing (ESCWA [United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia], 2018). In contrast, Syrian households cited rising costs of living and competition on the labour market as their key concerns (Lockhart & Barker, 2018, p. 1), which was due to regulatory barriers preventing Syrians from entering the formal labour market (REACH & British Embassy, 2014).

Water and sanitation: Water is the most pressing infrastructural challenge in Jordan: 93 per cent of the population in Jordan have access to safely managed drinking water services (World Bank, 2018) but it is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to maintain this standard. Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries worldwide, and its groundwater reserves are depleting quickly. In addition, the water sector faces challenges with respect to maintaining the water network, extending wastewater treatment capacities (World Bank, 2019a), and distributing existing water resources across the country: while the government has been able to raise the water supply in order to care for a quickly rising population, these efforts have resulted in increased energy costs due to the high energy-intensity of the water sector (World Bank, 2016a). Challenges in regard to sanitation services have also increased, especially in the north of Jordan where the connection rate to a sewage system had previously already been lower than in other parts of Jordan (World Bank, 2019a).

Energy: The provision of energy is another major issue. Although access to energy is almost universal (97 per cent of all Jordanian houses are connected to the electric grid, see World Bank, 2018) the country is highly dependent on energy imports (mainly natural gas imported from Egypt). In recent years, Jordan has suffered severely from interruptions in the supply of gas and volatile world market prices of energy (World Bank, 2016a).

Transportation: Due to its geographic location and its trade and service-oriented economy, transport in Jordan is an essential determinant for the functioning of the economy. Currently, most roads are in a good state but there is a lack of funding for their future maintenance. Even more serious is the lack of public transportation for people and goods – a problem that also negatively effects labour market participation along with further education and training (World Bank, 2016a).

Education: Jordanian schools are severely overcrowded and often operate in double shifts. This was already the case before the influx of Syrian refugees but has intensified since then. A large share of the refugees are children of school age.

Most of these problems are – first of all – an issue at the local level. On the one hand, municipalities carry a large share of the responsibility for infrastructure provision, especially road construction and maintenance, solid waste management, street lightning, and the cleaning and the management of public spaces and establishments. The provision of water, energy, schools, and health services is organised at the national or governorate level but much of the construction remains in the hand of municipalities as well (World Bank, 2016a). In addition, municipalities are often key actors in hosting and caring for refugees (Betts et al., 2017).[11] On the other hand, gaps in infrastructure normally affect most of the people in the same community rather than in other parts of the country (problems with energy provision being a major exception). Local communities therefore have a strong interest in bridging these gaps themselves.

3.5.2 Labour market challenges

The Jordanian labour market has always been strained so that the repeated inflow of large numbers of refugees throughout the past 70 years is only one factor. Crucially there has been high natural population growth, attempts to curtail the over-bloated public sector, labour market segmentation, qualification mismatches, and low productivity growth.

Lack of employment remains a major, if not *the* main problem of Jordan. Since 2000, the official unemployment rate has remained at around 14 per

11 In the Jordanian context, Betts et al. (2017) found that tribal affiliation was the most important explanation for sub-national variation in the way refugees were received.

cent for the total population while youth unemployment even stands at more than 30 per cent. However, the unemployment rate itself is only of secondary importance: Jordan has no unemployment benefits, so only those who have sufficient financial reserves or secure financial support from friends or relatives can allow themselves to be completely unemployed. Of much more significance is the fact that another 37 per cent are only in part-time work but could work more hours (quantitative underemployment) while 19 per cent are at work full-time but could do much more during working hours (qualitative underemployment) (World Bank, 2019b).

The problem persists despite comparatively low offers on the labour market. The population of Jordan has increased by almost 50 per cent over the last six years, and its working age population has even grown by 60 per cent (World Bank, 2019b). Half of the increase has been due to immigration, the other half to natural demographics. However, only a relatively small share of the population is actually active on the labour market: Jordan has one of the lowest LFPRs in the world for both men and women (Krafft et al., 2018). It has been fluctuating at around 40 per cent since 1993, meaning that almost two-thirds of the working age population do not participate in the labour market (World Bank, 2016a). This is mainly due to the fact that the LFPR among women even decreased to 17 per cent in 2016, while the LFPR of men remained almost stable at slightly above 67 per cent (World Bank, 2019b).

The main cause of underemployment is on the demand side: Jordan's private sector is not creating enough jobs. Many entrepreneurs argue that they face too many problems in terms of bureaucratic hurdles, corruption, access to land and credit as well as taxes (Al-Nashif & Tzannatos, 2013). Others accuse the education systems. They tend to claim that they would invest more and thereby create employment if only they could find the kind of workers that they needed (see, for instance, Loewe et al., 2007, p. 46). Especially trendsetting industries, such as the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector, lack adequately trained staff. This is due to weaknesses in vocational training and higher education, but also to the lack of interest of many Jordanians in the respective occupations and the unwillingness of many employers to invest in the training of their own workforce. Furthermore, small business owners in particular are often unable or unwilling to check the qualifications of job applicants but instead rely on the recommendations of friends (Assaad, Krafft, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2014), keeping productivity low and precluding further investments.

At the same time, numerous jobs have been created recently but have not been filled with Jordanians. Instead, company owners employed migrant workers from Egypt, China or the Philippines or refugees from Syria, Iraq and Yemen claiming that many Jordanians requested higher wages and refused certain kinds of work (for example, in construction, agriculture or in private households), a phenomenon which is often referred to as "shame culture". Many foreigners, in contrast, are even prepared to work without working contracts, social insurance, and workplace protection (World Bank, 2016a). Some authors (for instance, Abbott & Teti, 2017; and even Jordan's National Employment Strategy 2011-2020, MoPIC [Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan], 2011) suggest that many Jordanians are in fact gambling: they accept unemployment for a while because they still hope to get a well-paid job in the public administration or in the Gulf, in Europe or North America one day.

As a result, the Jordanian labour market is still segmented in several ways, and it is difficult to move from one segment to another:

Internal versus external: The most important segmentation is that between Jordanians working at home and those who have found a job abroad. The latter account for as much as 15 per cent of the total working population of Jordanian citizenship: around 8 per cent work in the Gulf, 4 per cent in North America, and 2 per cent in Europe. On average, their incomes exceed by far the incomes of those Jordanians who work in their own country.

Public versus private sector: In addition, well over 21 per cent of Jordan's total working population enjoy an employment in the public sector (army, security services, administration, judiciary, higher education, state-owned enterprises). This large number of jobs constitutes an important part of the social contract in Jordan. The total number of public sector jobs has declined in recent years, but the state still uses the allocation of employment to reward certain groups of the population for their loyalty. As a result, most public officials are from originally Jordanian rather than Palestinian families, and the army employs almost exclusively members of the most reliable tribes. Salaries in the public sector tend to be lower than in the private sector but, for many Jordanians, this is more than compensated by job security, pension entitlements, health insurance, and regular working hours (World Bank, 2016a).

Migrants versus Jordanians: As a result of the huge number of refugees and migrant workers, the Jordanian labour market is roughly comprised of three different groups – Jordanians, refugees, and migrant workers (Razzaz, 2017). Around 28.8 per cent of the labour force are non-Jordanians according to the Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) 2016. Egyptian and other Arab migrants constitute the big majority of non-Jordanian workers, followed by Syrians. Further, the majority of male workers is Arab, while most of the female foreign workers are Asians who come as migrant domestic workers. Many of the foreign workers are either low-skilled or have higher education profiles and compete with their Jordanian peers for jobs that require higher education (World Bank, 2016a).

Formal versus informal sector: Within the private sector, there is additional segregation between formal and informal jobs. Two-thirds of all workers in the private sector are informally employed (self-employed or employed without an employment contract) (World Bank, 2016a). However, while half of all Jordanian nationals have a formal job in the public or private sector, the huge majority of the Syrians and other nationalities are in the informal sector (see Figure 2). This shows that Syrians are likely to compete over jobs with other migrants rather than with Jordanians (Krafft, Fallah, & Wahba, 2018).

Figure 2: Employment status of workers aged 15-54 by nationality, 2016



Source: Authors, based on Krafft et al., 2018

3.5.3 Syrians in the Jordanian labour market and the Jordan Compact

Syrians face significant barriers to entering the Jordanian labour market.[12] Like other non-Jordanians, they must apply for a work permit from the Ministry of Labour. In addition, they are not allowed to work in so-called "closed occupations" (which were designated as such several years ago as an instrument to promote the "Jordanisation" of the labour market), even if there are no qualified Jordanians to fill vacant jobs in these sectors (World Bank, 2019a). And, finally, all migrants are subject to a minimum wage of just JOD 150 per month (EUR 190), which is below the minimum wage rate for Jordanians (JOD 220 per month) (ILO, 2017).

For this reason, the Jordan Compact was established in 2016 between Jordan and the international community. In light of the growing urgency to transform humanitarian interventions into livelihood-building development cooperation (Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom, & Walicki, 2015), it was meant to help Syrians generate their own income and thereby shift the engagement of donors "from short-term humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation" for Jordanians and Syrians alike (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, & Mansour-Ille, 2018, p. 2). As part of the compact, the Government of Jordan promised to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrians and to provide formal jobs in specific economic sectors such as food processing, handicrafts, and tailoring.[13]

So far, however, the government has tended to formalise existing jobs rather than creating new ones. What is more, most of these jobs are low paid, with poor working conditions and are located only in the special economic zones (SEZs) which are typically far from the places where most refugees live. This forces Syrians to depend on the poor public transportation system to get to the jobs (Staton, 2018), often meaning that Syrian women are not able to take up jobs in the textiles sector because childcare duties render long commutes impossible (Lenner & Turner, 2018). In addition, employers in

12 In the summer of 2020, the government of Jordan indicated in bilateral donor talks that it planned to ease the regulations for attaining work permits and open additional occupations for refugees (internal communication with BMZ country desk officer, September 2020).

13 The main reason for both the earlier closure of the Jordanian labour market and the current sector restrictions were concerns on the part of the Government of Jordan that – like Palestinian refugees before them – Syrians would settle in Jordan permanently (Grawert, 2019, pp. 40-41).

SEZs do not seem to be very interested in employing Syrians as they are content with other migrant workers (mostly Asian workers living on site; Lenner & Turner, 2018) and, in turn, Syrians are often not familiar with the SEZs (Tiltnes et al., 2019, p. 13).

As a result, only one-third of all Syrians of working age have a work permit so far (Tiltnes et al., 2019, p. 13). Most try to get a job on the informal labour market, where they compete with other migrants but also with low-skilled Jordanians of Palestinian origin (Grawert, 2019). One reason is that the work permits are associated with too few benefits (Grawert, 2019) and with high costs for social security contributions (World Bank, 2019a). In addition, many Syrians are still not aware of the fact that they can get a work permit: half of the interviewees of a survey conducted in 2019 did not know of this option (Jones et al., 2019).

In particular, only very few Syrian women have received a work permit. By mid-2019, 156,761 work permits had been issued but only 7,875 were for women (UNHCR, 2020). One possible factor is that, among Syrian refugees, the sectors that are open for Syrians are not considered suitable for women. Lenner (2020), however, suspects that some officers in the Jordanian administration are also more reluctant to issue work permits to women than to men.

4 CfW and other social transfer programmes in Jordan

Jordan has a fairly elaborate public social protection system which includes both contributory social insurance and non-contributory social transfer schemes, but these schemes cover only Jordanian citizens and long-term residents. Because of this, foreign donors have set up in parallel social transfer programmes targeting Syrian refugees (in part along with vulnerable Jordanians), which are entirely financed by multilateral and bilateral foreign donors and run by international or national non-governmental organisations or subordinate public institutions (coordinating only loosely with Jordan's ministries). The bulk of these latter programmes are CfW schemes, which are again predominantly funded by German development cooperation.

This section proceeds as follows: Subsection 4.1 gives an overview of social transfer schemes provided by the Government of Jordan for Jordanian citizens. Subsection 4.2 highlights the fact that there has already been a

tradition of international donors taking care of refugees in Jordan since Palestinians migrated to Jordan in the wake of the war against Israel in 1948. Subsection 4.3 presents the social transfer schemes that foreign donors have set up, at least in part to support Syrian refugees.

4.1 Social transfer programmes provided by Jordanian institutions

The government of Jordan has established numerous social protection schemes but many of them target the urban middle-class rather than the poor.

Public spending on social protection and health is high compared to other low- and middle-income countries. In 2012, it accounted for 12 per cent of GDP (Loewe & Jawad, 2018, p. 10). However, the bulk of spending was on health systems for public sector employees and on public pension schemes which covered only 60 per cent of the population. In addition, the membership conditions and benefit levels are different for three groups of people: (i) members of the armed forces; (ii) civil servants; and (iii) private sector employees. Informal sector employees in particular are completely excluded, although they comprise the poorest parts of society (Loewe et al., 2001; Loewe, 2019).

At the same time, less than 10 per cent of all public social protection spending in Jordan (that is, less than 1 per cent of GDP) relates to social transfer programmes, including unconditional social assistance, CfW, fee waiver and in-kind programmes – even though they are particularly important for low-income earners. In fact, all of them together cover 85 per cent of the bottom income quintile of the population although this is mainly due to the health treatment fee waivers that the Royal Court gives on request to households in difficult socio-economic situations. Cash transfers alone reach out to only about 20 per cent of the bottom income quintile while the benefits are too low to close the poverty gap (Loewe, 2019).

Another problem is the lack of cooperation and coordination between the different schemes. This results in partial overlaps of provisions and non-harmonisation of targeting rules. Considerable financial means are lost because of these deficiencies and heavy administrative burdens in general (Loewe et al., 2001).

Social transfers are provided by three different institutions:

- *The National Aid Fund* (NAF) administers several social assistance programmes although these only target Jordanian citizens. It is supervised by the Ministry of Social Development with the objective of providing support to poor and vulnerable groups of the population. The main activity of the NAF is the provision of monthly cash transfers to people in need. The transfers are in the range of JOD 40-180 (EUR 50-223) per household, depending on its size and composition. For the selection of beneficiaries, the NAF combines a proxy-means-test with socio-categorical targeting (Zureiqat & Abu Shama, 2015). In theory, only households with an income below the national abject poverty line of JOD 336 per individual and year (Department of Statistics Jordan, 2016) are eligible to receive the benefit (ILO, 2019) – and only if there is no male of working age (15-64 years) without a work-disability in the household (Röth, Nimeh, & Hagen-Zanker, 2017; Loewe et al. 2001, p. 30). Any income received by one of the family members decreases the benefit received by 25 per cent (ILO, 2019). In addition, the NAF considers income-producing property, arable land, or possession of a car (unless used by a disabled member of the family) to be disqualifying factors. In practice, however, with few exceptions, only persons without any income qualify for the programme (ILO, 2019).

  In the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, the NAF's budget increased by JOD 3 million annually so that it can now support an additional 20,000 Jordanian families. In 2013, the Ministry of Social Development made an estimate that it would need another EUR 9.96 million to meet the needs of the growing numbers of vulnerable Jordanians in the context of the influx of Syrians. According to the NAF, the fund sought to increase the number of households benefitting from its regular assistance from 75,000 (in 2015) to 98,000 (in 2019) and the number of people receiving emergency assistance from 5,000 (in 2017) to 7,000 (in 2019) (Röth et al., 2017; "Majority of NAF beneficiaries", 2018).

- *The National Zakat Fund* (NZF) operates a different social transfer scheme on behalf of the Ministry of *Awqāf* (religious endowments), Islamic Affairs and Holy Places. The scheme provides cash assistance to orphans and very poor households who do not receive social assistance from the NAF (Loewe et al., 2001). In 2015, the NZF extended one-time emergency assistance to more than 30,000 families along with regular

assistance to 43,000 orphans and 30,000 poor families, mostly through its 210 local *zakāt* (Islamic religious tax) committees. However, the benefits were very low, ranging from JOD 15 to 30 per household and person (Mechado, Bilo, & Helmy, 2018). In contrast to the NAF, non-Jordanians are theoretically eligible for support if they are very poor. In practice, however, the only known case of the NZF ever having provided support to Syrians was a one-time transfer of JOD 200,000 in 2014 to the Zaʿatarī Camp, which was meant to finance food support for Syrian refugee families (Zureiqat & Abu Shama, 2015, p. 32).

- In 2015, the *Ministry of Social Development* started to open community centres serving "as a shelter for men, women and children who are victims of human trafficking, covering their basic needs and providing counselling and rehabilitation services" (Hassan, 2015). The Ministry also provides legal counselling services in cooperation with civil society organisations.

Three other institutions provide social services in parallel:

- *The Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development* (JOHUD) works through a network of 50 community development centres, mainly in rural areas. It is a foundation and considers itself an NGO. Nonetheless, it has been established by the state authorities and gets its core funding from the central government budget. That is why it makes sense to list it next to state institutions carrying out similar activities. These include awareness campaigns, vocational training and skills development, child and family health care, the promotion of productive activities of women, and micro-enterprise development as well as education and cultural programmes. JOHUD addresses women in particular (Loewe et al., 2001, pp. 38-39).
- *The Ministry of Education* is responsible for Jordan's public primary and secondary education system. It is free of charge for all Jordanians, and, in 2012, the Government of Jordan extended the free access to Syrian refugees with the financial support of the international donor community (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2018). However, in most schools, Syrian children are in separate classes and their lessons take place in the afternoon, when the Jordanian children have already left their classrooms. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that the schools cannot accommodate all Syrian and Jordanian children in a single shift.

- The *Ministry of Health* runs Jordan's public health system. It does not provide free health care but the user fees are highly subsidised, covering presumably just about 10 per cent of actual costs. Very poor Jordanians can apply for a "green card" issued by the Royal Court, which entitles them to health care totally free of charge (Loewe et al., 2001). Since recently, Syrian refugees can get similar waivers (although these exempt parts of secondary and tertiary health care) provided that they are have registered with the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) in order to get a magnetic "MoI service card" or "security card" (*biṭāqa amniyya*) (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2018). Until the end of 2019, the Jordanian health system dealt with about 328,000 medical consultations of refugees under this programme (UNHCR, 2019).

Both Jordan's public education and its public health system are chronically overstrained and of low quality, so even many lower-income families pay for private schools and private health care instead.

4.2 Social transfer programmes of foreign donors for Palestinian refugees

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) runs the oldest social protection scheme for refugees in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It acts as a quasi-public institution that offers free primary health care and basic education to registered Palestinian refugees living in official refugee camps in Jordan or in other MENA countries. In addition, its Special Hardship Assistance Programme provides regular food assistance to needy Palestinian refugee families as well as occasional cash assistance for shelter rehabilitation (Loewe, 2019; Röth et al., 2017). Since 2018, however, UNRWA has been facing increasing problems in the provision of support because the United States, formerly a major source of funding, has drastically reduced its financial support (UNRWA, 2018).

4.3 Social transfer programmes of foreign donors for Syrian refugees and Jordanians

Early on, both bi- and multilateral donors started up initiatives to support Syrians who had sought refuge in Jordan from the civil war in their country. On the one hand, they wanted to rescue the Syrian refugees

from the worst forms of poverty; on the other hand, they also wanted to prevent the destabilisation of Jordan and Syrians' continued flight towards Europe. Their favourite choice was to set up CfW programmes because these provided employment and income to the beneficiaries, could employ Jordanians together with Syrians, and were thereby expected to benefit host communities as well. We can assume that CfW programmes are currently the core of well over 40,000 Syrian refugee families' livelihood strategies (Röth et al., 2017). In addition, foreign donors are also running unconditional cash transfer, voucher, winterisation, education, vocational training, employment, and empowerment schemes for Syrian refugees (Röth et al., 2017).

Up to 2016, international aid agencies mostly provided unconditional short-term assistance in the form of ad hoc and one-time payments (Röth et al., 2017). Since then, their initiatives have shifted towards a more long-term commitment.

Most Syrian households in Jordan are currently benefitting from regular cash assistance provided by UNHCR and UNICEF for an unlimited period of time. However, UNHCR only provides between EUR 65 and 360 per month and household depending on the household size (that is, 30-160 per cent of the official minimum wage of Jordanian workers), while UNICEF grants a monthly cash benefit of EUR 25 for each child (Röth et al., 2017). For more than a half of the Syrians, these grants are their only source of income (Jones et al., 2019).

Several other donors have set up additional, but smaller, cash transfer programmes (Jones et al., 2019):

- The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) administers an emergency cash benefit programme with a fixed benefit of JOD 115 per household.
- Oxfam runs a transfer programme supporting Syrian refugees with non-food purchases.
- The World Food Programme (WFP) grants unconditional food vouchers to 95,000 beneficiaries in refugee camps and 430,000 in host communities with co-funding from the German Foreign Office. In addition, it extends school meals in cooperation with the Jordanian Ministry of Finance (298, WFP).[14]

14 All expert interviews in Amman are listed by number in Appendix A5.

- UNHCR coordinates a large-scale winterisation scheme, to which NRC and Save the Children contribute. It distributes blankets, heating equipment and clothes, and extends cash transfers during cold months.
- CARE International runs a cash-for-education-and-protection programme, which supports roughly 3,000 households with co-funding from the German Foreign Office. The programme mainly targets out-of-school children and their families with the goal of preventing early marriage. Beneficiaries receive a monthly cash transfer of EUR 90 per household for an initial ten months, provided that all children attend school regularly and do not marry before the age of 16.

It is important to note that, even though these programmes were introduced in response to the influx of Syrian refugees, Jordanian residents benefit from most of them, too. This is due to the fact that the Government of Jordan requires 30-50 per cent of the beneficiaries to be vulnerable Jordanians (Röth et al., 2017).

CfW programmes became a favourite instrument of international development cooperation in Jordan after the Jordan Compact in 2016. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) especially has become very active in the use of CfW schemes as a central element of its *Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost* ("Partnership for Prospects", BMZ [Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung], 2018). Explicitly, this initiative is meant to ease the financial stress of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians, to strengthen social cohesion between them, to reduce competition in the labour market and to promote the integration of women into the labour market (BMZ, 2018). At the same time, the WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF receive funds from other bilateral donors as well. The total budget of CfW programmes in Jordan has been about 300 million EUR over the last couple of years (see Table 1).

Typical CfW activities in Jordan include the rehabilitation, development and cleaning of "grey" and "green" infrastructure (such as streets, dams, schools and health clinics; and water reservoirs, irrigation systems, municipal parks and ecosystems, respectively), the collection and recycling of waste, and support for the intensification of agriculture (see Figure 3 and Appendix D).

Some CfW programmes, such as the Food/Cash-for-Training (FFT/CFT) programmes of the WFP, offer training courses in addition to employment so as to improve participants' capabilities on the labour market (298, WFP; and 308, AA; and 242, Najmah).

Table 1: Overview of donor-funded CfW programmes in Jordan

Name	Funding	Budget (million Euro)	Implementation	Start	Number of participants	Typical duration of employment (working days)	Geographical focus
Cash-for-Work/ Water (C4WW)	BMZ through GIZ	29	Ministries, DRC, NRC, ACTED, AAH, WVI, University of Hamburg, Jordan Valley Authority, UNESCO	2017	24,898 in all 3 projects altogether until May 2019 (overall share of women: 23%). In 2018, some 80% were in WtPE and 10% each in the two other programmes. GI alone had 2,200.	About 50 outside and about 35 inside camps	All parts of Jordan
Waste to (positive) Energy (WtPE): waste management and recycling	BMZ through GIZ	56	Municipalities, DRC, ACTED, AAH, Oxfam, Caritas Switzerland, FPEC	2016			Mainly in the north of Jordan (several communities and the two camps)
Green Infrastructure (GI)	BMZ through GIZ	16	Municipalities, DRC, NARC, VNG International, AVSI, RSCN, FPEC	2017			Mainly in the north of Jordan
Labour-intensive Maintenance at Public Schools	BMZ through KfW	8	UNOPS in coordination with the Ministry of Education	2018	About 4,000 until the end of 2021	40 (unskilled) to 120 (foremen)	All parts of Jordan (Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, Balqa, Aljoun and Ma'an)

Table 1 (cont.): Overview of donor-funded CfW programmes in Jordan							
Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP)	BMZ through KfW	49	ILO through ministries and municipalities	2016	14,200 until end of 2021	40 (unskilled) to 120 (foremen)	Mainly in the north of Jordan
	NORAD (Norway)	4	ILO through ministries	2016	3,200 in 2 years	30	Centre and south of Jordan
Food for Training (FFT)	World Food Programme (WFP)	n/a	Najma	2012	10,000 in 5 years	4 x 15	Mainly in the north of Jordan
Food for Assets (FFA)	World Food Programme (WFP)	n/a	Najma	2017 (replaced FFT)	2,650 in 2 years	6 x 15	Mainly in the north of Jordan
CfW in Refugee Camps	UNHCR and UNICEF	n/a		n/a	6,000 per month	Flexible	Camps (Zactari, Al-Azraq)
CfW	ICDF*	n/a	VDP	n/a	n/a	n/a	Centre of Jordan
Support to the Education Sector**	BMZ through KfW	6	UNICEF through NGOs and private contractors		Up to 1,350 per year	10 x 20	All of Jordan
Teacher salaries**	BMZ through KfW	60	Ministry of Education	2016	Up to 7,200 per year	10 x 20	All of Jordan

Notes:
*ICDF is the acronym for the International Cooperation and Development Fund of Taiwan. For other acronyms, see the list of abbreviations.
**The last two programmes are not covered by this report because (i) all of their immediate beneficiaries (employees) are Jordanians; (ii) they generate much higher wages than the other programmes for less vulnerable households; and (iii) they do not create infrastructure in any meaning of the word (but rather immaterial human capital). Detailed information on the teacher salaries programme is available in Roxin, Kocks, Wedel, Herforth, & Wencker, 2020.
Source: Authors, based on data provided by GIZ, ILO, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF. See also Appendix D.

Figure 3: Donor-funded CfW activities in Jordan by sector



Source: Authors, based on data provided by GIZ, ILO, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF

Most programmes are implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the KfW Development Bank on behalf of the BMZ. GIZ cooperates with Jordanian ministries, municipalities, the Jordan River Authority, the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN), the National Agricultural Research Center (NARC), and several international NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the NRC (GIZ [Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit], 2018a). KfW projects, in contrast, are typically implemented by international organisations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in cooperation with

Jordanian ministries and municipalities.[15] Only the KfW project providing teacher salaries is directly implemented by the Ministry of Education. However, the rest of this report does not deal with that programme as it is not a CfW programme in the stricter sense because (i) all its immediate beneficiaries are Jordanians; (ii) it generates much higher wages than all other CfW programmes; (iii) it does not create infrastructure; and furthermore, on a more practical note, (iv) this programme is well-studied by Roxin et al. (2020) (see Table 1).The bulk of CfW activities take place in the north of Jordan (mainly Irbid and Al-Mafraq governorate), where most Syrians live – as well as the two large Syrian refugee camps (Za'atarī and Al-Azraq). However, some activities are located in the centre and south of the country (see Table 1, Figures 6 and 7, and Appendix D).

Design features, such as the number of participants and the duration of employment, vary considerably between the projects (see Table 1). However, more recently, all donors have agreed on joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) for CfW projects in Jordan. Their rationale is to harmonise future donor-funded CfW activities in Jordan with regard to the level of salaries, the share of people with disabilities to be employed in the programmes, and numerous other issues. In addition, all KfW and GIZ projects have to follow the stipulations of the BMZ Methodology Note for the Partnership for Prospects Initiative, which indicates, for example, that all CfW beneficiaries have to be employed for at least two months. Typically, the GIZ projects employ participants for three months with about 20 working days per month. Thereafter, they are normally not employed in the same calendar year again because the BMZ would not be able to count them as *new* beneficiaries another time. In subsequent calendar years, however, they have a chance of being employed again (GIZ, 2018a). The WFP projects, in contrast, offer employment with training for at least six months with 16 working days per month (298, WFP; and 242, Najmah). KfW projects employ unskilled workers for two to four months and skilled workers for up to eight months (309, KfW).

All programmes employ both women and men. In some programmes, women do the same kind of work as male participants. In others, they do similar work (excluding the hardest kinds of physical work). In others yet

15 CfW projects of the KfW and ILO in road and highway maintenance are implemented in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing; farmland improvement projects are implemented together with the Ministry of Agriculture; and community infrastructure projects are implemented together with the municipalities. The school maintenance projects of the KfW and UNOPS, in contrast, are implemented with the Ministry of Education.

again, women assume different tasks from men, for example, cooking for the male participants who do more physical and more dangerous work in the construction or improvement of public infrastructure such as cleaning of water dams. Women account for 23 per cent of all CfW participants in GIZ programmes (310; GIZ) and for almost half of the participants of the WFP's Food/Cash-for-Assets (FFA) programme (WFP, 2018). The KfW UNOPS project of public-school maintenance does not involve hard physical work, and participants work in closed rooms rather than in the street. Because of this, it aims to reach at least 20 per cent female participation (309, GIZ). On the other hand, the KfW ILO programme only employs 16 per cent women (NAMA [NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions] & ILO [International Labour Organization, Country Office Jordan], 2019).

In a recent study on the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, one person out of five had at least once participated in a CfW programme over the last 12 months (Tiltnes et al., 2019, p. 107). Overall, more refugees living in camps had been employed in CfW programmes than Syrians living outside camps. Yet this was partly due to the fact that, until recently, CfW participants in the camps were typically employed for only two weeks rather than three months with the effect that more people could be hired (310, GIZ). Apart from that, refugees with a higher education were more likely to participate in CfW programmes according to the same study.

However, most donors expect their CfW programmes to benefit not only the participants but also the wider community through additional income circulating in the local economy, through the creation of public goods such as the building and repair of grey or green infrastructure (streets, schools, forestation, municipal parks, and so on) and through the improvement of social cohesion and gender relations. The research that we conducted in the spring of 2019 was meant to verify to what degree these expectations are fulfilled.

5 Research methodology

The aim of our empirical research was to provide evidence for the Jordanian case on the indirect effects of CfW programmes on communities hosting refugees from another country. The research question was *"To what degree and how have social cohesion and economic opportunities – in particular for women – changed within host communities due to CfW programmes?"* From the answer to this question, we tried to draw conclusions and suggestions

for the ways in which future CfW projects could be best adapted to serve contexts of flight and migration.

In the following, we present our research methodology: We begin by giving an overview of the research hypotheses that we have derived from conceptual and empirical literature to guide our research in Jordan (subsection 5.1) and then describe our research tools and sample selection (subsection 5.2).

5.1 Research hypotheses

To guide our research, we formulated 15 research hypotheses based on the conceptual and empirical literature presented in Section 2 (see Figure 4). First, we present the hypotheses relating to social cohesion – sense of belonging, horizontal trust, and vertical trust – (subsections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4). Second, we explain those relating to local economic development (LED) – quality of life, per capita income and employment opportunities (in subsections 5.1.5 to 5.1.6). Gender was the third dependent variable in our project design but we modelled it as a cross-cutting issue: we did not formulate separate research hypotheses for gender but analysed the effects of CfW on the elements of social cohesion and LED separately for women and men wherever this made sense (see the subsections below).

5.1.1 Hypotheses 1-3, related to the sense of belonging to a community

Three of our hypotheses referred to the effects of CfW programmes in Jordan on people's sense of belonging to the community (see Table 2). Sense of belonging was a subcategory of social cohesion and was our proxy to measure whether a person's social identity was anchored in, respectively related to, his or her local community.

Hypothesis 1 focused on the effects of the existence of CfW programmes as such: We assumed that the sense of belonging of people living in Jordan (both of refugees and Jordanians) increased in the moment that they learned that there were CfW programmes in their neighbourhood providing jobs and income for *both* Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians as well as useful public goods. We assumed that this hypothesis was true if all people who knew about CfW programmes – not just those participating in the programmes themselves – confirmed an increase in their sense of belonging. Of course, the hypothesis had to be tested separately for women and men in order to take account of gender-specificities in the effect.

Figure 4: Overview of research hypotheses



Notes:
*"Cooperation for the common good" was initially not included in our research design (therefore the dashed line) but turned out relevant when we analysed the data collected.
**After the pilot phase of our field study we stopped following Hypotheses 11 and 12 related to the dimension "quality of life".
***For Hypotheses 1, 2 and 15, a gender-differentiated analysis is particularly important.
Source: Authors

Hypothesis 2 was similar to Hypothesis 1 in that it assumed that CfW programmes had a positive effect on people's sense of belonging. However, it was built on the assumption that the effect goes back to the *participation* of people in CfW activities rather than the sheer existence of such activities. Evidence confirming the hypothesis would be if only CfW participants attested an increase in their sense of belonging or if their sense of belonging increased substantially more than the sense of belonging of non-participants.

Finally Hypothesis 3 purported that the sense of belonging of Jordanians and non-Jordanians alike mainly increased because of the creation of public goods, that is, that they were proud of their community and felt part of it because of improvements in street infrastructure, school buildings, dams, municipal parks, nature reserves, or other public goods.

Table 2: Hypotheses related to the sense of belonging to a community

Thesis	**Categories**
1. The existence of CfW programmes as such increases people's sense of belonging to their respective community.*	Sense of belonging of participating Syrians and Jordanians
	Sense of belonging of eligible Syrians and Jordanians who have not yet participated
2. The participation of Jordanians and Syrian refugees in CfW programmes creates a sense of belonging in the respective other group.*	Sense of belonging of participating Syrians
	Sense of belonging of participating Jordanians
3. The creation of useful assets by Jordanians and Syrians creates a sense of belonging to the community for the participants.	Sense of belonging of Syrians
	Sense of belonging of Jordanians

Note:
*For Hypotheses 1 and 2, a gender-differentiated perspective is particularly relevant.
Source: Authors

5.1.2 Hypotheses 4-5, related to the horizontal trust between people from different social groups

Hypotheses 4 and 5 focused on the effects of CfW programmes on horizontal trust. Horizontal trust is the trust of people in people from a different social group in their respective local community.

Hypothesis 4 was that the existence of CfW programmes as such increased the horizontal trust between people from different social groups who were eligible for participation in these programmes. In the specific case of Jordan, the assumption would thus be that the provision of decent income-opportunities to both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians had a positive effect on the horizontal trust of people from these two groups in each other and no effect, or possibly even a negative effect, on the horizontal trust of people from other groups (who were not eligible for participation in CfW programmes) in people from the two eligible groups. The main information sources to test both hypotheses were ideally CfW-eligible and CfW-participating people, as well as people who were non-eligible, such as non-eligible Syrians, Palestinians without a Jordanian passport, refugees from Iraq, Yemen or Somalia, and other migrant workers.

Hypothesis 5 was similar to Hypothesis 4 in the assumption that CfW programmes had a positive effect on the horizontal trust between people who were eligible for participation in CfW programmes and people from other social groups who were also eligible for participation. In contrast to Hypothesis 4, however, the belief was that this effect was due, in the Jordanian case, to the joint work of Jordanians and Syrians in the CfW activities rather than to the existence of the CfW programmes as such. The hypothesis was based on the idea that people who worked together for a number of weeks got to know each other quite well and were thus able to build trust in each other that helped them to also better trust other members of other social groups.

Table 3: Hypotheses related to the horizontal trust between people from different social groups	
Hypotheses	**Categories**
4. The existence of CfW programmes as such increases horizontal trust among CfW-eligible groups.	Horizontal trust of CfW eligible people
5. The participation of Jordanians and Syrian refugees in CfW programmes creates horizontal trust in the respective other group.	Horizontal trust of participating Syrians
	Horizontal trust of participating Jordanians
Source: Authors	

5.1.3 Hypotheses 6-7, related to people's vertical trust

Hypotheses 6 and 7 deal with the effects of CfW programmes on people's vertical trust, in other words on their trust in government institutions, such as municipalities.

Hypothesis 6 tested to what extent the existence of CfW programmes as such improved the trust of people who were eligible for CfW participation in those institutions that they believed to be responsible for the initiation or implementation of these programmes. In the Jordanian context that would mean that both Jordanians and Syrians perceived increased trust in the staff of their municipality if they believed that this very municipality had initiated or was implementing the CfW programmes – be this in fact the case, or not. Within the context of Hypothesis 6, we also wanted to find out whom CfW participants perceived as being responsible for the programmes.

Hypothesis 7 was also an assumption that CfW programmes increased vertical trust – however that they did this because of the public goods that they produced rather than because of their sheer existence. Here, the idea was that people's satisfaction in their municipality improved because they appreciated the public goods that CfW programmes created – provided that these people believed that their municipality had initiated or was implementing the respective CfW programmes.

Table 4: Hypotheses related to people's vertical trust	
Hypotheses	**Categories**
6. The existence of CfW as such leads to higher vertical trust in perceived implementing agencies among eligible Syrians and eligible Jordanians.	Vertical trust of eligible Syrians
	Vertical trust of eligible Jordanians
7. The creation of useful assets has a positive effect on vertical trust.	Vertical trust of all community members
Source: Authors	

5.1.4 Hypotheses 8-10, related to the effect of CfW programme design features on the sense of belonging as well as on horizontal and vertical trust

Just like Hypotheses 12 and 15 below, Hypotheses 8, 9 and 10 refer to the possibility that some features in the design of CfW programmes can constitute interfering variables, that is, that they can increase or decrease the possible positive effects of these programmes on communities. These features denoted whether the targeting of CfW programmes (namely the selection of participants) was perceived as fair; whether community members could participate in the design of CfW programmes; and how long participants were employed.

Hypothesis 8 assumed that people who perceived the targeting of CfW programmes as unfair experienced less increase in their sense of belonging and in their horizontal and vertical trust than people who had a positive opinion about the targeting. People often perceived targeting as unfair (i) if certain groups were not eligible to participate in the programmes; (ii) if the duration of participation varied between the programmes; and (iii) if the selection process itself was perceived as unfair (with a negative effect especially on vertical trust). Hypothesis 8 can, thus, be seen as an assumption or an interfering variable that may alter or downsize the effects of CfW programmes on social cohesion as identified by Hypotheses 1-7. Interviews with both eligible and non-eligible community members were expected to reveal to what extent the admission of CfW participants was perceived as fair.

Hypothesis 9 assumed that a lack of participation by community members in how CfW programmes functioned and what they were trying to achieve negatively impacts on their sense of belonging as well as on horizontal and vertical trust. If people were not involved in decisions on CfW activities in their respective community this might cause (i) a sense of isolation or of being left out, thus decreasing their feeling of belonging to the community; (ii) a decreased horizontal trust as there was less meaningful interaction between different groups; or (iii) a decrease in vertical trust in the implementing organisations: where project design features were not made transparent participants may feel that the implementing agency does not work efficiently or in the best interest of the beneficiaries. By interviewing local experts as well as eligible and non-eligible community members, we wanted to find out whether, and to what extent, community members were involved in any consultation process prior to the introduction of CfW programmes in their community.

Hypothesis 10 took the varying number of working days between various CfW programmes into account (see subsection 4.3), assuming that a higher number of working days raised the positive effects of CfW programmes on participants' sense of belonging as well as horizontal and vertical trust. It was expected that interviews with participants would provide information about the possible effects on their sense of belonging and horizontal trust, while interviews with local experts and non-eligible community members would serve this purpose for possible effects on vertical trust in particular.

Table 5: Hypotheses related to the effects of design features on the sense of belonging, horizontal and vertical trust	
Hypotheses	**Categories**
8. Targeting practices of CfW programmes which are perceived as unfair lower the positive effect of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging, and horizontal and vertical trust.	Effect of CfW targeting on vertical trust
9. The possibility to participate in project design increases the positive effects of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging, and horizontal and vertical trust.	Effect of participation in CfW design on the sense of belonging
	Effect of participation in CfW design on horizontal trust
	Effect of participation in CfW design on vertical trust
10. The creation of useful assets by Jordanians and Syrians creates a sense of belonging to the community for the participants.	Effect of number of CfW working days on the sense of belonging
	Effect of number of CfW working days on horizontal trust
	Effect of number of CfW working days on vertical trust
Source: Authors	

5.1.5 Hypotheses 11-14, related to per-capita income and other aspects of quality of life

Hypotheses 11-14 were the first set of hypotheses related to LED: They dealt with the effects of CfW programmes on the quality of life of community members as the core element of LED (subsection 2.3.1). Originally, we planned to use both subjective and objective indicators for changes in quality of life. However, after a pilot phase, we excluded Hypotheses 11 and 12 – which had primarily been looking at people's perceptions of their quality of life – and continued only with Hypotheses 13 and 14, which focused on the effect of CfW on per-capita income as a more objective, though very partial, indicator of quality of life.

Hypothesis 11 (eventually not used during our field survey) was the assumption that different types of public goods (created by CfW) led to changes in different dimensions of quality of life. While green infrastructure and public open spaces may not lead to direct economic advantages, they can, for example, significantly improve health, social interactions, or food security. In contrast, grey infrastructure may provide significant new income opportunities and thus lead to improved material living conditions.

Hypothesis 12 (also not used) considered the effect of a participatory CfW project design on local economic needs. We had expected different potential effects: A lack of participation might further support local business elite's choices for specific sites and sectors. Marginalised groups might experience decreased economic outcomes due to crowding out effects. In contrast, an inclusive project design might facilitate stronger connections between various different economic agents and in turn lead to economic benefits. To test this hypothesis, interviews with eligible and non-eligible parts of the community as well as local experts were informative.

Hypotheses 13 and 14, in contrast, focused on economic well-being as one major aspect of quality of life. Both dealt with the positive effects that CfW programmes can have on per-capita income in a direct or indirect way. Hypothesis 13 assumed that CfW programmes raised the average per-capital income in their vicinity because they extended additional wages to participating households. These wage payments have both a direct and an indirect effect, the latter going through the multiplier as well as investment and employment effects (see subsection 2.3.3). The focus of our own research was on the indirect effect because we expected it to be more important for the community as a whole (while for participants, the direct effect was, of course, more important) and because the direct effects were already quite well covered by another study conducted by DEval (see Roxin et al., 2020). Hypothesis 14 finally looked at income effects generated by the creation and maintenance of public goods. In order to analyse both hypotheses, we interviewed CfW participants, business people (shopkeepers, bakers, butchers, street vendors, taxi/bus drivers) and local experts.

Table 6: Hypotheses related to per-capita income and other aspects of quality of life	
Hypotheses	**Categories**
11. The creation and maintenance of useful assets increases the quality of life in the host communities.*	Perceived change of quality of life
12. Because of a lack of participation in project design, local economic needs are not sufficiently addressed and the quality of life stagnates.*	Perceived change of quality of life/ utility of assets
	Increased economic deprivation among marginalised groups
	Deterioration of economic opportunities (crowding-out effect)
13. CfW programmes have positive direct (participants) and indirect (community-level) effects on income.	Direct effects
	Investment effects
	Multiplier effects
14. The creation and maintenance of public goods increases direct (participants) and indirect (community level) income effects.	Direct effects
	Investment effects
	Multiplier effects
Note: *Hypotheses 11 and 12 were not pursued any more during the field research. Source: Authors	

5.1.6 Hypothesis 15, related to employment

Hypothesis 15 looked at changes in the employability of CfW participants. It was based on the assumption that participants might find it easier to obtain another employment when their contract with the CfW programme ended if they had acquired additional skills: this would be particularly probable if the programme included a training component. In this sense, the design of CfW programmes was decisive for their effect on the likelihood of participants finding further employment.

In addition, the hypothesis invited a particular focus on analysing gender roles because the high share of women employed in CfW programmes could represent a first point of access into employment for women in particular.

Table 7: Hypothesis related to employment

Hypothesis	Categories
15. Skills acquired through participation in CfW lead to better employment opportunities after completion (both for Syrians and Jordanians).*	Direct employment effects
	Indirect labour market effects

Note:
*For Hypothesis 15, a gender-differentiated perspective is particularly relevant.
Source: Authors

5.2 Research design

In order to test our hypotheses, we applied a predominantly qualitative research methodology for three reasons: First, we wanted to have enough flexibility and time to discuss specific issues in depth with our interviewees instead of being obliged to ask them all questions in a standard guideline. Second, we also wanted to capture "soft" variables such as opinions and perceptions. Third, we wanted to be as open as possible to new aspects and issues which had not yet been identified by the literature.

The two main sources of information for our study are the existing literature and qualitative semi-structured interviews that we conducted ourselves during February, March and April 2019 with a total of 380 people. Most interviews took place in villages where CfW activities were being implemented, others in Amman or in Germany. In addition, we conducted two focus group interviews with Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, as well as carrying out participant observations at two consultation events. All four events took place in Amman in February and provided valuable background information for later interviews at the field sites. Furthermore, we also used the results of a survey that GIZ's Green Infrastructure programme had conducted during the year 2019 among all of their CfW participants at the end of their engagement. In the remainder of this study, we will refer to this as the "GIZ Post-employment Survey".

This subsection gives an overview of our interview technique and data analysis (5.2.1); explains how we selected our research field sites and the people that we interviewed at these sites (5.2.2); portrays in more detail the goals and structures of our interviews with CfW participants, non-participants, local experts and representatives of international donor agencies (5.2.3); describes the focus group discussions that we organised and the participatory consultation events that we were able to attend (5.2.4); and outlines the GIZ Post-employment Survey (5.2.5).

Throughout, our aim has been to adopt a gender-sensitive approach wherever possible. Furthermore, we also had in mind other migrant and refugee groups in the various localities even if, in the end, we focused mostly on Jordanians and Syrians: due to the geographical distribution of migrants and refugees in Jordan, it turned out that other migrant groups only played a minor role in the selected field sites of our research.

5.2.1 Interview techniques and data analysis

Of our 380 interviewees, we spoke with 281 people in villages where CfW activities were being implemented and the remaining persons in Amman or in Germany or via Skype. The latter interviews were held with experts for the general development of Jordan or the effects of CfW programmes in Jordan in general – most of them in English, some in German, and only few in Arabic. These "experts at the national level" included government officials, representatives of foreign donor organisations, academics, and staff members of non-government organisations. Interviews in the CfW sites, in contrast, were predominantly conducted in Arabic with the support of very capable young Jordanian interpreters. Out of these interviews, 77 were with CfW participants; 97 with shopkeepers; 73 with other non-participants; and 34 with so-called "local experts", that is, people from the villages with a good overview of local development, such as mayors, tribal leaders, NGO workers, or school directors (see Figure 5).

All interviews were semi-structured by different Interview Guidelines: one for CfW participants and non-participants at the CfW sites; one for shopkeepers; one for the "local experts"; and one for representatives of donor organisations. All Interview Guidelines are included in full length in the Appendix B. All guidelines were adapted to the respective interviewee and refined over the entire data-collection process. The interviews at the

field sites were conducted in teams of three, consisting of two researchers and one interpreter.

Figure 5: Sample of interviewees



Note: The fields in black and dark grey represent interviews that were conducted at the various field sites.
Source: Authors

We are aware that our findings may be distorted by our appearance and habitus as "outsiders" to the local communities. However, we tried to mitigate this bias through being accompanied by local interpreters – yet, on its part, the fact that we needed to rely on interpreters in some situations may have reinforced the "insider-outsider" problem. Most of the time we conducted interviews in mixed-gender teams, whenever necessary the team composition was adjusted to the specific needs of the interviewees.[16]

The interviews took mostly between thirty and forty-five minutes. Given the fact that our dependent variables – social cohesion, gender, and local economic development – are very sensitive issues in Jordan, we only recorded the interviews on tape if the interview situation was appropriate, relying rather on notes taken during the interviews.

We analysed the data gathered through interviews with the help of the software programme ATLAS.ti and applied strict rules of confidentiality.

16 Having said that, we are aware that the gender composition of interviewer teams cannot fully override barriers to disclosure with regard to sexual and gender-based issues such as sexual harassment.

With few exceptions, we do not mention the names or other individual characteristics of our interviewees in this report because we have promised to treat their information and opinions with confidentiality. When we quote from field interviews, we refer to them by interview number as recorded in the programme ATLAS.ti, as well as by type and place of interview. All are listed by their number in Appendix A4 with information on the date and type of the interview (CfW participant, shopkeeper, or other non-participant), the place, as well as the number, gender and nationality of interviewees. Only very few experts are mentioned by their name.

5.2.2 Access to and sampling of field sites and interviewees

We searched for field sites with a relatively high concentration of programmes in fairly isolated communities in order to be able to trace back easily the effects to CfW programmes. We hence selected smaller communities with large-scale CfW programmes and an appropriate level of awareness about the programmes because we assumed that, in such a setting, the effects would be more apparent. The implementing agencies supported this process by providing us with access to a mapping of projects which they had developed primarily to keep track of the high and continuously evolving number of CfW projects in order to ensure better coordination and to avoid the concentration of programmes in certain localities (see Figure 6 and Appendix C).

To control against a possible selection bias, we used different points of access to our interviewees. First, representatives of international donor agencies and their local implementing partners assisted us not only in gaining access to the field sites but also in contacting potential interviewees. Second, we approached interviewees through community-based organisations, such as women's associations and charities. Third, we obtained access to shopkeepers and other non-participants through randomly approaching people at the field sites as well as through snowball-sampling, asking previous interviewees to refer us to other community members.

Figure 6: Map of selected field sites



Source: University of Texas, Libraries n.d; all rights reserved, used with permission

Tables 8 and 9 provide additional information on the selected field sites, in terms of funding agency, CfW activity and other characteristics. As they show, we conducted research not only on programmes funded through the German BMZ and German Foreign Office – which finance most of the CfW programmes (see Table 1) – but also on programmes funded by the Taiwanese International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD). Besides presenting some background information about the selected field sites, Table 10 lists the type of work done by the respective CfW programme, reflecting the fact that we took care to include CfW activities from different sectors (see also Appendix D for more details).

This is thus the first study that draws samples from all types of CfW programmes in Jordan – German ones and others; those implemented via financial cooperation as much as those set up through technical cooperation.

Table 8: Composition of interview sample			
	Females	Males	**Total**
CfW Participants			
Jordanians	19	19	**38**
Syrians	14	25	**39**
Other	0	0	**0**
Total	**33**	**44**	**77**
Shopkeepers			
Jordanians	13	72	**85**
Syrians	1	8	**9**
Other	0	3	**3**
Total	**14**	**83**	**97**
Other non-participants			
Jordanians	24	23	**47**
Syrians	11	13	**24**
Other	0	2	**2**
Total	**35**	**38**	**73**
All interviewees without local experts			
Jordanians	56	114	**170**
Syrians	26	46	**72**
Other	0	5	**5**
Total	**82**	**165**	**247**
Local experts			
Jordanians	10	24	**34**
Syrians	0	0	**0**
Other	0	0	**0**
Total	**10**	**24**	**34**
All interviewees			
Jordanians	66	138	**204**
Syrians	26	46	**72**
Other	0	5	**5**
Total	**92**	**189**	**281**
Source: Authors, based on field research			

Figure 7: Distribution of field site interviews, CfW programmes and inhabitants by region



Source: Authors

Table 9: CfW programmes included in research sample, by donor, implementing agency and programme

Donor	Implementing Agency/Project	Number of interviews
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)	GIZ/CfW Water	72
	GIZ/CfW Waste for Positive Energy	66
	GIZ/CfW Green Infrastructure	39
	KfW through ILO	28
	BMZ sub-total	**205**
Other	International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan)	20
	Norwegian Agency for Development	19
Other sub-total	World Food Programme (WFP)	**37**
Total		**281**

Source: Authors, based on field research

Table 10: Characteristics of field interview sites

Field site	Information about field sites	CfW programmes	
		Implementer	**Type of work**
Irbid Highway and Al-Mafraq	Interviews were conducted at different sections of the highway from Irbid to Amman, as well as in Al-Mafraq.	KfW/ILO with local contractors	Waste collection
Al-Azraq	Remote, small town in Al-Zarqāʾ Governorate, eastern Jordan, located where the only permanent source of fresh water existed in approximately 12,000 square kilometres of desert, now dried out because of groundwater over-use. However, there are still small wetlands, now forming a well-protected nature reserve under the administration of the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature. The city of Azraq has a northern part (8,000 Druze, originally from the Syrian-Jordanian Hawran mountain range, and 3,500 Bedouins), and a southern part (6,000 Chechens). Inhabitants complain about a loss of customers due to a new street bypassing the town, as well as border closures following the wars in Iraq and Syria.	ICDF with AAH	Waste collection and awareness raising
		*GIZ (Green Infrastructure)**	*Rehabilitation measures in the nature reserve**
Deyr ʿAllā	A small town in the Jordan Valley in Al-Balqāʾ Governorate with a population of 7,321 in 2015. Largely dependent on agriculture.	GIZ (Green Infrastructure) with NARC	Agricultural work
		GIZ (Waste to positive Energy)	Waste collection
Faqūʾa (Al-Qaṣr)	A small town in Al-Karak Governorate. Largely dependent on agriculture. The population was 7,300 in 2015. According to local experts, it hosts some 150 Syrian families. The economic situation is dire, especially for young people: The youth unemployment rate is almost 50 per cent. Also, there is no ATM in Faqūʾa, which inhibits LED through CfW programmes, as payments by aid agencies are provided via ATM machines.	ILO/Norway with Agricultural Directorate	Tree planting
		*GIZ (CfW Water) with DRC**	*Water dam rehabilitation**

Table 10 (cont.): Characteristics of field interview sites			
Kafr Ṣawm	A small town in Irbid Governorate, less than 15 kilometres south of the Yarmouk river, which constitutes the natural border with Syria. The population was 11,349 in 2015, including roughly 2,500 Syrians. Most people depend on agriculture: the village is well-known for growing olive trees and pomegranates.	GIZ (CfW-Water) with World Vision	Cooking (women); water dam rehabilitation (men)
Kafr Asad (Ḥawfā)	A small town very close to Irbid, within Irbid Governorate. The population was 14,232 in 2015. There are roughly 2,500 Syrians living in the area, with 500 living in Kafr Asad itself. Local experts mentioned protests in front of the municipality in order to raise awareness about youth unemployment and rising prices.	WFP with Najmah	School rehabilitation
		*GIZ (Waste to positive Energy) with NRC**	*Waste collection**
Tal al-Rummān	Village with 1,988 inhabitants in 2015 and a high level of unemployment. There are a few shops, but most people work in agriculture. Few Syrians actually live in the village.	GIZ (CfW-Water) with NRC	Water dam
Umm al-Jimāl	Village with 4,524 inhabitants in 2015. People depend mainly on employment in agriculture and trade. Plans to invest in the tourism sector are currently being implemented in order to fight high levels of unemployment. Umm al-Jimāl is in the proximity of the Za'atarī refugee camp, the largest camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan.	GIZ (Waste to positive Energy) with Oxfam	Waste sorting (men); collection of recycling material (women)

Note:
*Italics denote that we met some participants of a CfW programme active in the area by chance but did not visit their workplace or talk to implementers in the villages.
Source: Authors, based on information provided by local experts during field research; population numbers from Department of Statistics Jordan (2016)

In terms of sampling, we aspired to speak with an approximately even numbers of Jordanians and Syrians, CfW participants and non-participants, men and women at the different field sites. Due to practical constraints, this was not always possible. For instance, some assumed non-participants turned out to be participants of earlier CfW programmes; or some groups – for instance, female non-participants – were more difficult to access; respectively, shopkeepers in rural Jordan are mostly male. Table 8 gives an overview of the gender ratio within our sample for the different interviewee groups. As most Syrians reside in Jordan's northern region and as, thus, many projects also take place there, we focused on the north. Figure 7 compares the number of interviewees to the number of CfW programmes, total inhabitants, and inhabitants of Syrian origin by region (north, central and south). This demonstrates that our sampling is proportionate to both the number of CfW programmes per region as well as to the population of Syrian origin. Overall – for logistical reasons – accessing the north was easier for us and we also followed the recommendation of a donor agency to not conduct fieldwork in one specific southern site for security reasons. For analysing social cohesion, it might have been interesting to study a higher number of southern communities in depth.

5.2.3 Structure of interviews

Interviews with experts on the national level

We conducted 54 interviews with "general experts", that is, people with a broader understanding of CfW and development at a national level such as representatives of bi- and multilateral donor agencies, academics with a variety of research backgrounds and affiliations (universities, ministries, private research institutions), as well as representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Most interviews took place in February 2019, during the first phase of our field work; some during a preparation phase in June 2018. Where necessary, additional contacts were obtained through snowball-sampling.

For this group of interviewees, most questions were formulated in a broad and open manner and the Interview Guidelines (see Appendix B4) was adapted accordingly, so that interviewees could unfold their personal ideas and focus on their respective field of expertise. This approach also helped in order to broach sensitive topics and was combined with closed questions to

stay focused on relevant research topics and to probe previously expressed content.

Interviews with "general experts" were particularly informative in three ways: (i) they helped us to assess the relevance of our study and the interest it might find with different audiences (that is, the Jordanian and international scientific communities; Jordanian civil society actors; and the donor community); (ii) they pointed out how sensitive the topics of social cohesion, gender and LED were in the context of CfW; and (iii) they gave us practical advice on how to conduct interviews with refugees and local community members.

Interviews with local experts

We interviewed 34 local experts, such as municipality members, local authorities, NGO members and representatives of agencies implementing CfW programmes.

The interviews were based on the guideline for expert interviews (see Appendix B3) and, since social cohesion, gender and LED were sensitive topics, we adjusted or skipped questions whenever an interviewee was not ready to talk about a particular issue in an open manner. By using visualisation tools like cards, we attempted to increase interviewees' readiness to share their opinion about sensitive topics.

Interviews with local experts were best suited to gathering information about the communities in question, for instance, community life in general, particular challenges and opportunities for social cohesion, gender equality and LED in the respective community as well as participatory processes involving community members in the project design of a specific CfW programme.

Interviews with community members

We conducted interviews with 77 CfW participants, 73 non-participants and 97 shopkeepers. In total, we interviewed 247 community members. At the community level, 75 per cent of our interviewees were Jordanians and 25 per cent were Syrian. Two-thirds of our interviewees were male and one-third was female. Furthermore, we tried to interview participants of CfW programmes designed by different implementing agencies (see Appendix A4).

Since the experiences of Syrian and Jordanian CfW participants and non-participants differed, we adapted the Interview Guidelines (see Appendix B1 and B2) accordingly. As we got into contact with most of the CfW participants via the implementing agencies, it was important to conduct the interviews in the absence of the responsible field manager so as to create an environment in which the participants were able to speak freely. In order to obtain better – that is, less biased and more spontaneous – responses, we proceeded in two steps: In a first step we posed questions in a broad and open manner, so that interviewees could unfold their personal opinions and perceptions on social cohesion, gender roles and LED in their respective community. Whenever interesting topics and hints came up, we posed an additional follow-up question. Only in a second step were direct questions on the CfW programmes and their possible effects asked. Since CfW participants who had been approached through an implementing agency knew their CfW participation was the reason why they had been asked for an interview, they more often brought up the effects of the programmes themselves.

The Interview Guideline for the CfW participants and non-participants was designed to obtain detailed impressions on views and opinions held about the respective other group as well as on the effects of their CfW activities (see Appendix B1). The Interview Guideline for shopkeepers aimed at obtaining detailed information about the influence of CfW on local business activities (see Appendix B2).

5.2.4 Focus group interviews and participant observations

At the outset of the field research, we organised two focus group sessions in order to gain additional background information, especially about the topic of social cohesion. The first focus group consisted of six Syrians: three men and three women. All had come to Jordan between 2011 and 2014. In contrast, the second focus group included only non-Syrian refugees who had arrived in Amman between 2012 and 2016: three from Sudan, and one each from Iraq, Ghana and Somalia. Focused and structured discussions with both the all-Syrian and non-Syrian focus groups gave interesting insights about how these groups interacted and how they saw their relationship to one another.

We also witnessed two consultation events in East Amman. The aim of this participant observation was to get an impression about the procedure and rationale of participatory consultation in the context of CfW. One was held

by the Greater Amman Municipality with GIZ support in a quite central quarter of East Amman at the foot of Jabal an-Nasr. This consisted of a very broad and very steep footway connecting two major roads and leading to a number of houses but closed to cars, which could go only part of the way. The organisers had invited all residents to one multi-family house, where all the men gathered in the apartment of one family, while the women met in another apartment. Both groups were asked to discuss how the footway in front of their houses could be improved. Interestingly – but perhaps not surprisingly – they came up with quite distinct results. The ladies sympathised with GIZ's idea to convert part of the dusty way into a little park with trees providing shadow while at least one group of men suggested making it better accessible for cars.

The other consultation event took place at a school in Marka, the most eastern part of Amman, where most of the capital's manufacturing is located and most people are workers and quite poor. The school had been very nicely renovated and equipped with basic but pleasant furniture by a CfW project implemented by Najmah with funding from the WFP. Parents were invited to inaugurate the school and discuss what they could do to preserve the upgraded school building. It turned out that all stakeholders – parents, teachers and students – were grateful for the support and, particularly, students' appreciation had become higher, as they either knew the workers personally or had seen them there during the working hours.

5.2.5 The GIZ Post-employment Survey

The first phase of the GIZ Post-employment Survey, conducted between January and November 2019, covered 984 people who had completed their employment in GIZ's Green Infrastructure CfW projects during this time. Interviews were conducted throughout Jordan, roughly a quarter of the interviewees were women (253 interviewees) and almost half were Syrians (471 interviewees).[17]

17 Most interviewees (43 per cent) were from southern governorates (132 from Al-ʻAqaba, 192 from At-Tawfīla and 103 from Al-Karak); many (39 per cent) from northern governorates (50 from Irbid, 221 from ʻAjlūn, 113 from Al-Mafraq) and the remaining 17 per cent from central governorates of Greater Amman (51) and Al-Balqāʾ (115). 596 interviewees (61 per cent) were married, 344 (35 per cent) single, 26 (3 per cent) divorced, 13 (1 per cent) widowed, and 5 (0.5 per cent) separated. 60 (6 per cent) of them held a university degree, 19 (2 per cent) had a vocational training certificate, 185 (19 per cent) had completed secondary education, 450 (46 per cent) had completed only primary education, and 227 (23 per cent) had not even completed primary education (GIZ, 2019).

The questionnaire was comparatively short, easily answered within 15 minutes. It included questions on (i) the site of employment (municipality and partner organisation of GIZ); (ii) individual characteristics (nationality, gender, age, marital status, number of dependent family members, education, vocational qualification, and previous employment); (iii) the use of income received from the CfW programme; (iv) satisfaction with the programme (working conditions, payment, employer, workplace, safety at work, treatment by supervisors, working hours, work equipment, feedback mechanisms); (v) lessons learnt on the job; and (vi) future plans (next employment, next schooling or training measure, plans to return to Syria or migrate elsewhere).

In the context of our research, the GIZ Post-employment Survey was particularly important for testing Hypothesis 15.

6 Findings: community effects of Jordan's CfW programmes

We now turn to the outcomes of our research. In this section, we discuss first the effect of CfW programmes on social cohesion (subsection 6.1), gender roles (subsection 6.2), and LED (subsection 6.3). After doing that, we report on the various opinions voiced by our interviewees on the way the CfW programmes were designed (subsection 6.4).

Within subsections 6.1 and 6.3, we also present findings on two additional effects that we had not included in our research design but found to be too important during our field work to be neglected. Both effects were to be observed within CfW programmes active in the waste sector: first, CfW had a positive effect on community members' environmental awareness, which indicated a higher willingness to cooperate for the common good, thus strengthening social cohesion (see subsection 6.1.4). Second, CfW activities weakened the so-called shame-culture (that is, the reluctance of people to work in specific sectors considered inferior) with positive effects on LED's employment effects (see subsection 6.3.4).[18] As already explained in

18 Since these two additional effects were researched in an inductive way – in contrast to the otherwise deductive research design with pre-determined dependent variables (subsection 5.1) – the information collected did not provide conclusive evidence. However, we highlight them in order to encourage future, more intense research on these effects.

subsection 5.2.1, we do not mention the names of our interviewees because we have promised them confidentiality about the contents of our talks. The source of direct quotes is identified by the interview number, the nature of the interviewee (for example, CfW participant, shopkeeper, other non-participant, local expert) and the location where the interview took place (see Appendix A4). Where relevant, we also specify the gender and nationality of the interviewee.

6.1 Social cohesion

Our research results provide evidence that, overall, CfW programmes in Jordan have a moderately positive effect on social cohesion at the community level. In particular, they contribute to the sense of belonging of Syrians to their respective host communities and to the mutual horizontal trust between Jordanians and Syrians. This effect is, however, mainly due to the fact that Jordanians and Jordanians work together on the same activities (Hypotheses 2 and 5) and much less so to the existence of the CfW programmes as such (Hypotheses 1 and 4) or the creation of helpful and enjoyable public goods (Hypothesis 3). Probably, the main reason for the effect being only moderate is that the relations between Syrians and Jordanians are traditionally intense with the effect that their mutual trust was already at quite a high level even before the CfW programmes were launched in Jordan. At the same time, the effect of CfW programmes on vertical trust is much more ambiguous (Hypotheses 6 and 7). Unexpectedly, we also found positive effects on community members' cooperation for the common good, when it came to the area of the environment (no predefined hypothesis, see Figure 4).

In the following, we discuss separately the effects of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging of Jordanians and Syrians to their respective communities (6.1.1); horizontal trust between both groups (6.1.2); and vertical trust in local authorities (6.1.3); along with some observations about cooperation for the common good (6.1.4).

6.1.1 Sense of belonging (Hypotheses 1-3)

According to our findings, CfW programmes in Jordan clearly strengthen the sense of belonging of Syrian participants to their host community – but only to a certain degree the sense of belonging of Jordanian participants

or of people from either group not participating in the programmes. This is presumably due to the fact that Syrians have a quite strong sense of belonging to their host communities anyhow.

Sense of belonging irrespective of CfW programmes

When asked whether they felt well being part of their respective local community, the vast majority of interviewees stated clearly that they felt comparatively well integrated – both Jordanians and Syrians. Unfortunately, we could not ask all interviewees and some did not answer our question, but a total of 84 people (that is, only a third of all interviewees) responded to this question, including 53 Syrians, 30 Jordanians and 1 Egyptian, respectively 47 males and 37 females. 66 of these respondents (79 per cent) said that their sense of belonging to the local community had always been quite good; 10 interviewees (12 per cent) reported that they had not been well integrated in the past at all but half of them felt much better integrated now.

Of course, some Syrians also mentioned that they still did not feel at home as they had in their Syrian home places before their flight: "Yes, I belong here. But there is nothing like home" (22, non-participant, Ḥawfā); "Obviously, people are very friendly here. People are very welcoming. We visit each other on our special occasions. It's very natural for us to become one. But our heart is in Syria" (73, non-participant, Al-Azraq); "Not 100 per cent, but it is normal, maybe 90 per cent" (46, non-participant, Kafr Assad).

One CfW participant in Kafr Assad explicitly made a lack of interaction responsible for her low sense of belonging: "I have no contacts to other people in the village because everybody is at work at day and sleeps at night. Therefore, I do not feel to be part of it. And all my relatives live in other villages" (60, participant, Kafr Asad).

Some female interviewees stressed that life in Jordan was not always easy for their children. A Syrian CfW participant said, for example: "My girl had problems in the public school" (149, participant, Kafr Ṣawm) and added that her daughter had to change to a private school because she was discriminated against because she was not a Muslim; she was hit by a teacher and other pupils asked her why her mother was not veiled. Another non-participant mentioned: "My children sometimes get abused because we are Syrians. […] In the schools, or when they go out of them. My older son has got a broken arm because he got into a fight" (135, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

Male interviewees, by contrast, never mentioned problems that other family members had faced. Instead, they highlighted how much they appreciated the high degree of security of life in Jordan, which had helped them to settle in the host country and to feel more at ease.

Virtually all interviewees recounted that they had tried to migrate to communities where they knew someone, preferably relatives and preferably Syrians – but also where they knew at least somebody from the community. Likewise, many Syrians mentioned that they felt connected to their place of residence in Jordan because it reminded them of the environment of their previous Syrian home.

Most Jordanians stated that they had a very strong sense of belonging to their respective home communities, anyhow. Some also highlighted that many people from their communities did their best to integrate everybody – Jordanians and Syrians: "There are people going to the weddings, funerals, graduation parties, different occasions, so in the beginning they invite the new people that come to the community" (117, non-participants, Umm al-Jimāl); "There is no discrimination [between Syrians and Jordanians]" (224, shopkeeper, Al-Qaṣr/ Faqū'a); "We don't think of ourselves as Syrians or Jordanians here, we are one and we all face the same challenges" (133, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

Effects of the existence of CfW programmes as such (Hypothesis 1)

At the same time, a considerable number of interviewees commented on the CfW programmes' effect on their feeling of belonging, with most pointing towards a positive effect. 30 out of 80 respondents giving any concrete answer to this specific question said that the CfW programmes had eased their integration into local communities: 5 because they had been not so well integrated in the past and 25 even though they had always been quite well integrated. Ten respondents declared explicitly (and another 31 more implicitly) that the CfW programmes had not had any tangible effect on their feeling of belonging because it had always been good. Only 9 said that their feeling of belonging was bad or at least not so good or that it was still the same (Syrian women and men) and no respondent mentioned any negative effect of CfW programmes on their sense of belonging.

Almost all of those who confirmed a positive effect were CfW workers. This finding supports the assumption that, in a context like the Jordanian where the sense of belonging of locals and immigrants is already quite strong, only

the experience of working with people from the respective other group can still make a tangible difference. The main channel of the positive effect of CfW programmes on people's sense of belonging thus seems to have been participation in CfW programmes, supporting our Hypothesis 2 (see below).

Just 4 non-participants stated that the existence of CfW programmes as such had also had a positive effect on their sense of belonging. Evidence for our Hypothesis 1 is thus weak. One non-participant even mentioned the Arabic word for social cohesion, *at-tamāsuk al-ijtimā'i*, by himself, but it should be noted that he had been working for a while as a volunteer with NGOs and international organisations and therefore knew the buzz words that donors and researchers like to hear in an interview. Another non-participant stated: "Yes, the programmes improved the relations. They were even better for the Syrians, who became part of society" (153, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

These findings are in line with those of the survey conducted by Roxin et al. (2020). It confirms that both Jordanians and Syrians had a quite strong feeling of belonging even before the CfW programmes commenced (much more than Syrian refugees in Turkey and even their Turkish neighbours themselves). Furthermore, the survey likewise found that the feeling of belonging increased tangibly over time while the CfW programmes operated, both among participants and non-participants, Syrians and Jordanians (it diminished however in Turkey among participants and non-participants, Syrians and Turks). These results can be seen as indication that the existence of CfW programmes for refugees and locals can in itself generate a sense of belonging at least in some contexts (such as in Jordan).

Effects of participation in CfW programmes (Hypothesis 2)

The effect seems to be strongest on CfW participants themselves: 28 per cent of them acknowledged that their sense of belonging had improved – whether or not their sense of belonging had already been good.

Interestingly, the respective share was almost the same among Jordanian and Syrian cash workers. The Syrians, however, mentioned more often how important their participation in CfW programmes had been in making them feel being part of their host community even at times when we had not directly asked about this effect. The conversation with one Syrian woman was as follows:

> *Did participation in the project improve your feeling to be part of the community?* – Yes, very much! I am proud that I have helped to improve schools in the guest country. And I am happy that some children will now enjoy more going to school and that they will feel well at school. (60, participant, Kafr Asad)

Jordanians mentioned the issue only when we explicitly asked about it. For instance, one of them answered the question *"Is there anything in particular that helped you to become a member of the community?"* with "The relationships with my neighbours helped me, and the friendliness of the people there. Also, the common work helped" (43, participant, Kafr Asad). Evidence for our Hypothesis 2 was thus quite strong.

At the same time, this positive effect of having a job is not specific to the format of CfW programmes. Several Jordanian participants highlighted that work was generally a good way to make people feel integrated and part of their respective local community. A Syrian non-participant also stressed that having a job was helpful anyhow – regardless of it being sponsored by a CfW programme or being carried out side-by-side with Jordanian nationals: "At the beginning, I felt as an outsider. But now, I feel part of society. This is mainly because I have got a job. It helped me a lot" (55, non-participant, Kafr Asad).

Effects of public goods creation of by CfW programmes (Hypothesis 3)

In the course of our research, we did not find any evidence for our Hypothesis 3, that is, that the creation of assets such as clean roads, embellished municipal parks, upgraded school buildings or the like have any tangible effect on the feeling of belonging of Jordanian nationals or Syrian refugees. As we tried to disentangle three different channels of effects in our research (see Subsection 5.1.1) it seems that the cooperation of Syrians and Jordanians in joint activities by far outstripped the existence of CfW programmes as such and the creation of assets helpful and enjoyable for people living in the respective local communities.

6.1.2 Horizontal trust (Hypotheses 4-5)

Our findings also provided evidence for a positive effect of CfW programmes in Jordan on horizontal trust. Again, the effect is not very strong, mainly due to the fact that the horizontal trust between Syrians and Jordanians has

always been relatively deep. And again, most of the change can be attributed to the cooperation of Jordanian and Syrian workers in the same activities.

Syrian-Jordanian horizontal trust irrespective of CfW programmes

The majority of our respondents – both Syrians and Jordanians – highlighted that there was quite substantial horizontal trust between both population groups.

Out of the total of 247 interviewees in our sample, almost half (114 respondents) responded frankly to our question about horizontal trust in Jordan while about two-thirds of these (72 respondents) said that horizontal trust between Jordanians and Syrians was good. Yet, the share was below-average among Syrian men but clearly above-average among Jordanians as well as Syrian women. Just 20 respondents said that the horizontal trust was clearly bad, and another 22 said that it was mediocre.

This finding is in line with a survey conducted in November 2018 by NAMA, a research, polling and consultancy firm from Amman, on behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS). It asked 600 Syrian refugees to what extent they had felt welcomed in Jordan, and 67 per cent answered "to a great extent", 31 per cent said "to medium extent" and only 1 per cent chose "to a little extent", respectively "not at all". 56 per cent said that, if they could go to any country, they would choose Jordan – followed by Canada (19 per cent), the United States (4 per cent) and Germany (3 per cent). Likewise, 53 per cent did not believe that Jordan should have done more to support refugees. 67 per cent of the 1,305 Jordanians interviewed stated that they had positive or very positive feelings towards Syrians; only 3 per cent admitted having negative or very negative feelings (NAMA & KAS [Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Jordan & Lebanon], 2018).

Several factors contribute to the fact that relationships between Syrians and Jordanians are relatively harmonious. Syrians and Jordanians mentioned four prominent factors: family or tribal relationships and the historic presence of Syrians in the region; mixed neighbourhoods or the relations between neighbours; cultural proximity; and actions of solidarity after the Syrian war, such as lending money or giving in-kind aid.

Undoubtedly, the main factor is that, in many villages, Jordanians and Syrians are from the same tribes and are sometimes even relatives. The lands of the tribes living in the north of Jordan stretch far across the border into

Syria such that at least the Syrians who have come from the area between Damascus and the border belong to the same tribes as the Jordanians hosting them in their northern Jordanian villages. The inhabitants of Ḥawfā and Kafr Asad, for example, belong predominantly to the Āl-Dbābnah tribe, which has a similar number of members in Syria and Jordan (47, local expert, Kafr Asad). For this very reason, many marriages had been concluded across the border even before the civil war in Syrian broke out. Many Syrians thus migrated to their relatives. Even those who were from different tribes were quite similar to their Jordanian hosts in terms of culture, language and customs. A Syrian CfW participant therefore said:

> The people of Deyr ʻAllā are good, they are a tribal community and have the same traditions, and they are more welcoming than people in the city. The tribes are very committed to care for their neighbours. […] the relations have always been good. People invite each other and there is lots of communication between the different groups. (7, participant, Deyr ʻAllā)

And a Syrian non-participant declared:

> Oh, they are even getting married etc. It is really strong relations that have been formed since Syrians came here. At the beginning, it was a little more difficult but now it is going fine. As I said earlier, we are the same people. (177, non-participant, Al-Mafraq)

A lady from Umm al-Jimāl confirmed that she had been received quite warm-heartedly by her Jordanian neighbours but expressed also that the hard economic situation in Jordan puts a lot of pressure on the ties between Jordanians and Syrians:

> My neighbours keep lending me money but I have to pay it back eventually. I need to give it back so we have that mutual respect maintained, so we can be honest and true. I am doing my best to work and rather not to ask money from anyone, unless I am in terrible need. Until today, I have not paid the electricity bill. (101, participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

In terms of cultural proximity, both groups tend to invite all kinds of people to celebrations such as weddings, funerals, and village festivals with the effect that Jordanians and Syrians meet each other quite frequently. Likewise, children tend to play with each other in the streets.

Furthermore, we did not find evidence of substantial local tensions between Syrians and Jordanians prevailing in any part of the country, although our data may not be reliable on this specific question. Some experts interviewed mentioned that there had been clashes in the past in Al-Mafraq, Dhībān,

and other places. Some of these have also been mentioned in publications (see, for example, REACH & British Embassy, 2014). At our research sites, though, not one single interviewee admitted that substantial conflicts had ever come up in the past. One explanation for this finding could be our selection of research sites: all of them are comparatively rural and most of them (a least Kafr Asad, Umm al-Jimāl, Deyr ʻAllā, Faqūʼa and Kafr Ṣawm) had strong historical ties with Syrians. However, it is also well possible that none of our interviewees wanted to admit that clashes had ever occurred, in particular for moral and strategic reasons vis-à-vis foreigners. As a trend, interviewees tended to avoid speaking in negative terms about their home place to foreigners. But they resist even more so when researchers come from a core donor country because they are afraid that negative tones may impact on future external financial support. The presence of a translator of Jordanian nationality may have triggered strategic answers, too.

However, we also heard Jordanians and Syrians talking in negative terms about each other. Five out of 48 Jordanian respondents (10 per cent) clearly said that their relations with Syrians were bad, while four (8 per cent) said that the relations were only mediocre. 14 out of 91 Syrian respondents (15 per cent) stated that their relations with Jordanian locals were bad, while 18 (20 per cent) that the relations were mediocre.

For instance, a Syrian shopkeeper stated that "[The relations with Jordanians are] perfect, we have the same religion and the same family, families visit each other here, and we are being treated very well. Also, there are many mixed marriages now between Syrians and Jordanians" (90, Syrian shopkeeper, Al-Azraq). However, when we reiterated on the question and asked him about his experience when arriving to Al-Azraq, he admitted: "In the beginning, it was very hard. Also, for example, I couldn't open a shop. Even this shop now is registered under the name of a Jordanian and I work here" (90, Syrian shopkeeper, Al-Azraq).

Also, some Syrians reported of cases of discrimination:

> There were some problems here, but these are individuals and you cannot transfer their behaviour to the behaviour of the community. It is small things, like for example when children play in the street, they will throw a football or kick stones, but not intentionally. However, we do get into disputes with people about such behaviour. (54, participant, Ḥawfā)

Yet, first and foremost, Syrians complained mainly about accusations made by Jordanians. Syrian women in particular reported that many Jordanians were saying that Syrians were taking away their jobs, their houses and their water and that Syrians were getting better support and training from foreign donors than the Jordanians themselves. For example, a Syrian lady, working as the only woman in a team of street cleaners in Kafr Ṣawm, stated: "Syrians are sometimes blamed to earn more money. Personally, once, I experienced an incident: a lady came to say that we Syrians should leave, because we were taking away the development opportunities from Jordanians" (277, participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

A Syrian non-participant from Faqū'a confirmed this view. When asked whether there was anything she disliked about the village, she responded: "Sometimes, when you have incidents happening […], they blame us, the Syrians, for it. Also, we [as Syrians] get blamed a lot for the increases in the rents, the electricity prices, anything" (212, non-participant, Faqū'a).

Several Jordanian interviewees expressed these very accusations. A Jordanian woman said, for instance: "The Syrians have taken the jobs that should belong to Jordanians – especially in agriculture." But she admitted also: "We have to accept that they are here. And we have to accept that the CfW programmes employ Syrians as well because without the Syrians, we would never have got the programmes here in Jordan" (14, participant, Deyr ʻAllā).

Four non-participants interviewed in a group discussion in Umm al-Jimāl pointed to the same issues. One person said: "Some of them [the Syrians] are good, some of them are bad. They put their self-interest first. The point is that they are always selfish." Another person added that "we are all unemployed and the situation is really bad. The two of us here have graduated two or three years ago [and still are unemployed]". They specifically pointed to the decrease in job opportunities "since the Syrians have come" and mentioned farming as one sector that was particularly affected (107, non-participants, Umm al-Jimāl).

> Everywhere you go, there are Syrians. We have relations with Syrians, they are neighbours, rent the houses next door. […] Syrians have increased the rent. Many of them have left the [Za'atarī] camp and settled here. It is more cost-effective for employers to pay the Syrians, so they will choose them. This made unemployment go up. (107, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

In the same way, a Jordanian man argued:

> We are all humans and all have needs, but the refugees took opportunities and replaced Jordanian labour. The Syrians can live here and have their life, but there are more disadvantages than advantages. Everyone lives their life here, but they took job opportunities from Jordanians. (65, non-participant, Tal al-Rummān)

Clearly some Jordanians associate the Syrian crisis with an increase in prices, especially rents, as well as increased competition over jobs. For instance, in a group discussion with CfW participants living in a Palestinian refugee camp, people testified that Syrians work for lower wages, caused an increase in rent from JOD 50 to 120, and a priority shift of international aid from poor Palestinians to Syrians (182, participants, highway).

Finally, many Jordanians also stated that the Syrians were better off because they were receiving aid and support from international organisations (77, participant, Al-Azraq; 145, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm; 145, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm; 104, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl; 276, non-participants, Kafr Ṣawm). "Syrians can work for JOD 4-5 per day. I can't" (107, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

These accusations are a risk for Jordanian-Syrian relations and how they may evolve in the future. So far, most Jordanians differentiate between the competition for jobs and accommodation on the one hand, and their personal relations with individual Syrian neighbours, on the other hand:

> The Syrians get money without any effort. They pay rent without bargaining so the rent is going up. They would pay twice the rent if they could get the house. Now, house owners ask for JOD 150 and there are no more empty houses left. I mean, as a house owner, of course I would give the house to a Syrian. The house owners are clearly the biggest beneficiaries from the Syrian crisis. This situation can also lead to tensions – as a house owner, if I prefer to rent out my place to a Syrian instead of a close relative, this creates tensions. *So, are there tensions?* No, we are one family. We can separate between work and life. Work is one thing, but our relations in general are very good. (209, shopkeeper, Faqū'a)

But this may change. Should the economic situation deteriorate further, the horizontal trust between Jordanians and Syrians could weaken on the personal level as well.

Again, our findings are in line with those of the NAMA study mentioned above. It found that almost two-thirds of 1,305 Jordanians interviewed

believed that the presence of Syrian refugees has a negative effect on their life. In particular, 46 per cent stated that the Syrians' presence negatively affected the security situation in Jordan, 53 per cent education, 64 per cent healthcare, 67 per cent the water supply, 68 per cent the government budget, 87 per cent the labour market, and 81 per cent the economy as a whole. Even among the Syrians interviewed, 9 per cent admitted that the presence of a large number of compatriots had a negative effect on security in Jordan, 21 per cent on education, 33 per cent on healthcare, 38 per cent on water supply, 23 per cent on the government budget, 40 per cent on the labour market, and 37 per cent on the overall economy. Likewise, 87 per cent of the Jordanians and 73 per cent of the Syrians blamed the immigration of Syrians for causing prices in Jordan to rise, while 92 per cent of Jordanians and 56 per cent of Syrians stated that the immigration has contributed to an increase in unemployment rates (NAMA & KAS, 2018).

Several interviews revealed that negative feelings between Syrians and Jordanians prevailed mainly where the two groups did not have any contact. A Syrian woman said that her relationship with the Jordanians was quite bad at the beginning because she did not know any at the local level: "In the beginning, we did not know anyone; no one would come over to the Syrians, now there is interaction" (114, participant, Umm al-Jimāl; similarly 177, Syrian non-participant, Al-Mafraq).

Likewise, several Syrian interviewees said that all of their good friends were Syrians and that their interaction with Jordanians was limited to work. Again, the economic situation strongly inhibits forging new relationships and strengthening existing ones: "The social relations have deteriorated because […] they do not have the time anymore to establish relations, because they have to survive the current economic situation" (77, participant, Al-Azraq).

Unfortunately, we were not able to collect comprehensive evidence on the situation of other migrant groups such as Iraqis or Egyptians. The reason was that we mainly went to small villages with CfW activities while most Egyptians and Iraqis had settled in larger towns. Nonetheless, we were still able to make some observations and, based on these, it would seem that Egyptians in particular are not well integrated and have only a weak sense of belonging. Only one of our few Egyptian interviewees knew the CfW programmes in Jordan. He stated that he was not jealous because he was not eligible to participate, but was critical about the degree to which these programmes were in fact able to select the most vulnerable Syrians and

Jordanians: "We are not bothered that we don't get these opportunities. But we're confused about the selection criteria" (72, non-participant, Al-Azraq).

Effects of the existence of CfW programmes as such (Hypothesis 4)

According to our research, the existence of CfW programmes has limited effects on the horizontal trust between Jordanian and Syrian community members. 26 Jordanians and 34 Syrians said that their trust in the respective other group had clearly improved over time but only a quarter of these 60 people were not participating in CfW programmes. The main channel through which CfW impacts social cohesion is therefore, once again, personal participation in CfW programmes. And most of the non-participants who also reported improvements in horizontal trust because of the CfW programmes did so because relatives, friends and neighbours had told them about their positive experience. Evidence for Hypothesis 4 is thus quite weak.

Nevertheless, non-participants highly welcome the programmes. Several interviewees highlighted that these programmes were good for both Syrians and Jordanians and that they liked the idea that the two groups worked together. However, only two interviewees – both from Kafr Asad – explicitly confirmed our hypothesis that the existence of CfW as such already has positive effects on horizontal trust even between non-participants:

> The programmes had a lot of impact on the social relationships between Syrians and Jordanians. First of all, when they came, there were not many connections between the groups. Now, it got better due to the programme. Before, everyone was a bit ignorant of each other. Now the truth was revealed that the Syrians can also work for the community. Both Syrians and Jordanians have the same objective. (230, non-participant, Kafr Asad)

> As a result [of the CfW programmes], there are a lot of good relationships between people. There was a street-cleaning project. The public would come out and give them tea. So even the people who did not participate were still happy. (229, non-participant, Kafr Asad)

Some interviewees, in contrast, were quite critical about the CfW programmes. Some complained that Jordanian participants in general were not selected on the grounds of their socio-economic needs but their *wasṭa* (Arabic for "connections" or "favouritism"; see more on this issue below in subsection 6.4.3). And some disliked the fact that the programmes were employing an equal share of Syrians and Jordanians even though much fewer Syrians lived in their respective communities than Jordanians.

But none of them blamed the Syrians. For instance, when asked "*What are the Jordanians thinking about the fact that the Syrians can also work in the CfW programmes?",* a shopkeeper in Al-Azraq summarised the situation as follows:

> Some voices, of course, say that the jobs should be for Jordanians first. They feel that it is unjust that the Syrians get more money than themselves because the Syrians get also support from international organisations. This means that the Syrians can afford to work at wages far below the levels at which Jordanians would work. This creates quite a bit of frustration in town because there are also very many Jordanian families in dire need. And the Syrians are getting much more help than even the poorest Jordanians get. So, many people in town say that all the support programmes are unfair. (91, shopkeeper, Al-Azraq)

A CfW participant from Kafr Ṣawm answered our question *"Are non-participants jealous of your participation in the GIZ programme?"* as follows: "Yes, of course many people wanted the work, Jordanians as well as Syrians, and are jealous of the good chances. Many people compete because they are in need" (149, participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

Our findings are backed by the DEval evaluation conducted in 2018-2019 (Roxin et al., 2020). It also found that Jordanians and Syrians had a comparatively high trust in each other in any case (while the mutual trust of Syrians in Turkey and local Turks was much weaker). Nevertheless, the horizontal trust of the two groups in Jordan increased during the operation of the CfW programmes and, while the initial horizontal trust was stronger among participants than among non-participants, the trust of non-participants increased at least as much as the trust felt by participants (Roxin et al., 2020). This finding would mean that the sheer existence of CfW programmes employing both refugees and locals can already have a positive impact on horizontal trust. For Turkey, however, Roxin et al. (2020) found that horizontal trust had decreased over time among non-participants and had only slightly increased among CfW participants.

Effects of participation in CfW programmes (Hypothesis 5)

That said however, CfW participants confirmed across the board that CfW programmes tended to have a positive effect on horizontal trust because they brought people from different social groups together and made them work for the same goals. Three-quarters of all CfW participants interviewed stated that the horizontal trust between Syrians and Jordanians was strong

while only 8 per cent said that it is rather weak. Almost half said that CfW programmes had further strengthened horizontal trust. A fifth said that CfW programmes had not strengthened horizontal trust but with two single exceptions they argued that this was only the case because the horizontal trust between Syrians and Jordanians had always been so strong that it could not be further strengthened.

Our evidence for Hypothesis 5 is thus quite strong – in particular, if we consider that many interviewees made their statements spontaneously, that is, even before we had asked a question on the issue.

Participants mentioned various different reasons for this positive effect of CfW programmes: conversations during work to learn about each other's interests and values; the need to collaborate to succeed in the work objectives; shared meals; or leisure activities after work (such as football, invitations to celebrations, and so on). In addition, the relations improved when participants exchanged skills. "People start to exchange experience. For example, Syrians show locals how to plant" (194, participant, Faqū'a). In a cooking project in Kafr Ṣawm, participants exchanged recipes and cooking styles.

CfW is sometimes cited as the only means that brings Syrians and Jordanians actively together. "The project is the first way to interact with Syrians. Through the job I felt that I have the chance to choose to interact with Syrians" (27, participant, Kafr Asad). Several times participants pointed out that, prior to the programmes, they had not enjoyed strong interactions with Syrians, despite the fact that they shared many values, customs and traditions.

The joint activity made them connect and led to increased daily-life interaction, also beyond the programme. "I worked with Syrians and we built friendships. We were like brothers. When one of us was sick, we took care of him" (271, Jordanian participant, Deyr ʻAllā). In many instances, the relationships seem to continue. One participant from Deyr ʻAllā said that "the relationships between Syrians and Jordanians are very good. We are like brothers. Even when the programme finished" (2, participant, Deyr ʻAllā). Another person recounted: "We are still in contact via WhatsApp. At the end of the project, we made a small celebration, and everybody contributed" (128, participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

These findings are again in line with the results of the DEval study mentioned above. It found that Syrians and Jordanians get to know each other at their workplaces much better than anywhere else (Roxin et al., 2020).

Similarly, the results of a workers survey conducted among the participants of the ILO's employment-intensive infrastructure programme were very clear on this point: 93 per cent of its respondents stated that Jordanians and Syrians were able to work together as one team; just 8 per cent of the Jordanians and 4 per cent of the Syrians disagreed. 90 per cent of its respondents said that Jordanians and Syrians trusted each other, and only 11 per cent of the Jordanians and 4 per cent of the Syrians disagreed. 91 per cent confirmed that they had built a friendship with other workers including people of the respective other nationality, while only 8 per cent of the Jordanians and 7 per cent of the Syrians disagreed. Along with this, 83 per cent of all workers felt that participation in the CfW programme had contributed to a reduction in the tensions between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan, while 15 per cent of the Jordanians and 13 per cent of the Syrians disagreed (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

Finding new friends of the other nationality is a commonly cited outcome by the programme participants, as the GIZ Post-employment Survey (GIZ, 2019) demonstrates: 86 per cent of all respondents stated that they had made new friendships with people from the other nationality group. More Syrians than Jordanians (94 versus 78 per cent) and more women than men (94 versus 83 per cent) felt they had made friends of the other nationality through their CfW participation; also participants in urban project sites were more probable to have built up a friendship (see Appendix E1).[19]

Our results confirm that CfW programmes connect women to men and fellow women. "I became close friends with my female co-workers and they became like sisters to me. This is due to the site engineer who is making us all feel the same" (25, female participant, Kafr Asad).

Further, our results do not significantly vary between project sites. Interestingly, several participants in the ILO Highway project pointed out that their joint activity helped them to learn from each other and eased pre-existing tensions related to job competition.

19 However, only the finding on urban population was – at a 99.9 confidence level – statistically significant.

Another finding was that mixed nationality teams strengthened the effects. A number of times, interviewees pointed to the benefits of working in mixed groups. Interestingly, one member of a CfW-team mentioned that this important decision was to be made by the respective supervisor:

> It depends on the supervisor of the team; some supervisors mix the groups and other supervisors separate the groups, which also manifests hate between the groups. […] It is better to work in a mixed group; it is good to integrate. (53, participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

A participant pointed out that separating teams due to tensions exacerbated those tensions further and thus clearly favoured a mixed approach:

> I love that I work in mixed groups of Syrians and Jordanians. In cities, there are many mixed groups. But not so in the village. Many other workers were sceptical in the beginning about cooperating with Syrians. But the project changed their mind. All of us increased our contacts with the Syrians, and we all became good friends. (59, Jordanian participant, Kafr Asad)

Yet, there are also individual critical voices on mixed teams. According to experts, Syrians especially perceived that they had to carry out harder tasks than their Jordanian co-workers (306, CfW Coordination Group meeting). Such unequal treatment within mixed teams can weaken horizontal trust.

Getting to know each other is something rare in the context of the economic hardship of many interviewees, who said that it has become difficult to accept invitations for weddings, funerals, and so on as the cost for gifts was exceeding their household's budgets. When asked *"What are other works that should be done in the community?",* one interviewee answered: "There should be more work that supports both Jordanians and Syrians, we should work with them together so we can better understand their situation. Sometimes you feel that Jordanians are like us, they don't have income either" (114, participant, Umm al-Jimāl). A non-participant from Kafr Ṣawm added: "We don't think of ourselves as Syrians or Jordanians here; we are one and we all face the same challenges" (133, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

6.1.3 Vertical trust (Hypotheses 6-7)

Our findings suggest that CfW programmes can have a positive effect on vertical trust even though they are limited with regard to this aspect of social cohesion. We had difficulty in getting meaningful answers on our questions related to vertical trust for two reasons: First, direct questions

on this topic triggered a biased response: we had the impression that many interviewees said what they thought we wanted to hear. For that reason, after the first two weeks of research, we stopped asking direct questions. Second, we found that many interviewees indeed knew well which actors (for example, foreign donors, local NGOs) were effectively responsible for the CfW programmes. It was therefore difficult to say whether their opinions about the local authorities had really been influenced by their experiences with CfW programmes. We therefore started asking at least some of our interviewees who, in their perception, was responsible for the programmes (central government, municipality, NGOs or foreign donors) in order to better pin down whom they would see responsible for the good and the bad sides of the programmes.

The answers of this small group of people gave a quite mixed picture. Three respondents (all men) thought that their respective municipality had set up the CfW programmes. Eight insisted that a foreign donor (GIZ, ILO or WFP) was responsible for it (including an equal number of women and men and of Jordanians and Syrians). Two said that they had no idea. And even the municipalities considered many CfW projects as GIZ or ILO projects rather than their own ones (5, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā; 228, local expert Kafr Asad).

We also asked some interviewees whether the CfW programmes had strengthened their vertical trust in the local authorities and here 20 gave us clear answers: Exactly half of them confirmed this while the other half negated the question. Some even said explicitly that CfW programmes had raised their trust only in international donors.

Where local authorities were actively involved in the project design and appeared to be open to the wishes of community members (for instance, when they organised participatory events; see subsection 6.4.4) CfW programmes had a positive effect on the vertical trust in local authorities:

> The workers believe that the community centre is responsible for the programme [… and] they attribute the programme and its benefits to the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, the workers are mainly grateful to the government, and of course they feel better connected to it because they now have an open door to it through the programme. (8, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā)

Similarly, CfW participants in Kafr Asad saw the municipality as being mainly responsible, indicating that trust in it increased with the creation of CfW job opportunities (17 and 43, participants, as well as 46, non-participant) and the local procurement of building materials (27, participant).

A Jordanian woman said: "I feel that I can trust the local authorities more. They do what we asked for immediately, concerning the materials that were needed" (27, participant, Kafr Asad).

Reversely, if community members attributed the CfW programmes to foreign agencies or implementers from outside their community, vertical trust was reinforced towards those actors, rather than towards Jordanian authorities: "The people here in Deyr ʿAllā like GIZ very much. There are GIZ stickers on every fridge" (5, local expert, Deyr ʿAllā).

> I hope that we work [more] together with the supporting organisations, to solve those problems together. It is better to talk to people directly in the communities than talking only to the centre or the government. We trust you [the foreign donors] more than we trust the government. (31, local expert, Kafr Asad)

Another factor that undermines vertical trust is the fact that *wasṭa* (connections) often has an effect on decisions taken by the authorities – such as the selection of Jordanian participants in the CfW programmes or the choice of shops where building materials and machines required for the CfW activities are procured. Many community members, Jordanians and Syrians, men and women, disapproved of the fact that local decision-makers employed CfW participants on the basis of their *wasṭa* (connections): "If you don't know anyone, you can't find job opportunities. I feel that the municipalities would only announce the [CfW] opportunities, if they already had registered the people" (94, female participant, Umm al-Jimāl); "I am more angry at the municipality. There is *wasṭa* everywhere" (231, male non-participant, Kafr Asad).

Likewise, interviewees complained that decisions on local procurement were often driven by *wasṭa* (connections): "We need to ensure that all standards are implemented before handing it [that is, the created infrastructure] over [to the municipality]. Otherwise, they will just employ the usual suspects – their cousins etcetera – and do whatever they like" (111, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl).

These considerations show that, in all settings, CfW programmes are creating new structures that alter and run the risk of damaging carefully built relations within municipalities. In that vein, if the handing-over of created services and infrastructure is not well planned in advance, the temporary parallel structures of CfW programmes may even weaken local employment and social services (291, GIZ). The projects become part of local politics.

6.1.4 Cooperation for the common good through environmental awareness (no pre-determined hypothesis)

Though we had not formulated a hypothesis concerning the possible effects on community members' cooperation for the common good, we found that CfW programmes in Jordan had an effect on environmental awareness and, thus, fostered a readiness to engage for the common good.

This is especially the case for projects in the area of waste. Nine interviewees stressed that they appreciated that the streets in their community were clearer because the CfW projects were leading by example: "Other than myself, others became aware of the environment. They started using the trashcans" (20, participant, Kafr Asad).

Many interviewees said that an increasing number of people had become aware of the necessity of recycling waste (for instance, 101, participant, Umm al-Jimāl). "Many of the young men were actually affected, for example you would find someone in the group throwing a cigarette on the floor and then people would tell him to pick it up and throw it in the bin" (54, participant, Kafr Asad). Apparently, this holds true in particular for children: "You can see people working on the streets, children in school observe people cleaning and separating waste and thus also act on it and realise that putting waste in the environment is bad" (102, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl; similar: 70, participant, Al-Azraq).

Both the environmental effect and the decrease of shame culture on the labour market (subsection 6.3.4) are related: "Now, the environment is considered, and it is now okay to do cleaning" (28, participant, Kafr Asad).

6.2 Gender roles (especially Hypotheses 1-2 and 15)

All CfW programmes in Jordan aim at providing employment opportunities for both women and men. As a result, these programmes have effects on gender roles within communities. Yet, if female labour force participation rates have increased somewhat recently in parts of Jordan, the main reason has been the protracted economic crisis which forces many families to look into new options. CfW programmes play only a minor role because many Jordanians and Syrians still have reservations against women in paid employment.

In this subsection, we discuss how women are included in CfW programmes (6.2.1); how the work environment of CfW programmes is perceived by female workers (6.2.2); and in which way the participation of women in CfW programmes affects gender roles prevalent in the local communities (6.2.3).

6.2.1 The role of women in CfW programmes

CfW programmes include female participants in different ways. Some programmes let them do the same work as men in mixed teams; others also let them do similar things as men but in separate teams; some give different tasks to men and women – but let them work at the same sites. And, yet again, others have women and men do different things at different sites.

Many female interviewees reported that working in a mixed team had been a very good experience for them while others – in particular in more rural and conservative areas – preferred gender-segregation at work. One of them argued that "culturally it is not acceptable for men and women to work together" (194, CfW participant, Faqū'a). One female participant who had worked as the only woman in a male team stressed that this experience had been "weird" at the beginning, due to the fact that it was her first exposure to male strangers (277, Kafr Ṣawm). But she also highlighted that she did not have any negative experiences. Another female CfW participant even stated that male co-workers were necessary as a kind of guardianship that guaranteed the security of female workers, especially in contexts where CfW activities took place in public settings (182, highway).

Generally, the majority of female participants we interviewed perceived the type of activity they carried out as suitable for women. Our data indicated that female participants most often assumed "lighter" tasks than males. This also applied to CfW programmes in which men and women carried out similar activities, for example, where men accomplished physically more demanding tasks such as carrying stones or handling heavy machinery. This division of labour into more and less physically demanding work seemed to be appreciated by both female and male participants. Especially male interviewees are convinced that females should not carry out physically demanding tasks. But a female CfW participant from Deyr 'Allā also stressed that "women do not have to do hard work. So there is no problem for women" (237). We found female CfW participants saying that in the beginning they were sceptical about doing so-called "male-activities",

such as construction work: "At the beginning, I had myself doubts about doing construction work. But now, I am comfortable [with it]" (58, female participant, Kafr Asad).

Furthermore, men (both CfW participants and non-participants) seemed to see the role of female CfW participants as a "contribution" to the men's work. As one male participant put forward, "it is a good idea for the females to help in the workload" (210, Faqū'a). That leaves the impression that men are the ones who are doing the actual work and women only have a minor, contributing role within the overall work process. Some female interviewees, in contrast, stressed that they could do the same kind of work as their male colleagues: "Women themselves know that they can do the same jobs as men" (93, participant, Al-Azraq).

However, most Jordanians and Syrians thought that waste collection was not a suitable activity for women. This held true for non-participants and CfW participants of both genders, but particularly for men: "Women are supposed to work in something better than this [waste collection]" (30, male non-participant, Kafr Asad). Especially men working in the field of waste collection themselves made very strong statements on this issue. One CfW participant said, for example, that "it is something embarrassing for ladies to do these jobs [waste collection]" (169, highway).

Another participant stated that "it is not suitable for a woman. She cannot work in the street like this" (170, participant, highway). These findings align with the general practice of shaming people involved in waste collection and processing (see also subsection 6.3.4). This phenomenon takes on such a dimension that female municipal authorities refuse to visit waste collection/composting project sites, arguing: "I cannot come to the field because I am a woman; my husband won't accept that" (78, local expert, Al-Azraq). However, we also found inspiring examples in practice, where female participants assumed leading responsibilities in the waste sector, such as the position of a team lead at a compost dump-site. One participant expressed that she "never felt that some jobs are not good for women" (93, participant, Al-Azraq). This participant linked her point of view with the way she was raised as well as with the university education she had received.

In contrast to this, CfW activities that were meant to contribute to the awareness about waste recycling were considered suitable for women – especially because they often entailed visits to private households. Here, housewives are sometimes alone, and they are also responsible for dealing

with household waste. A local expert from Al-Azraq pointed out that "they [the female CfW participants] go door-to-door and as it is mostly women at the door it is more comfortable for our society to have women going there" (78). For male-only teams it is culturally not appropriate to visit women who stay alone in their house.

Data shows that female participants seem to appreciate learning skills such as refurbishment or agricultural techniques within the CfW programmes that can be used further after completion of the CfW programmes. Thus, there are indications that confirm that skills acquired through the participation in CfW programmes may indeed contribute to better labour market chances (Hypothesis 15; see also subsection 6.3.4). Whether a type of activity is perceived as suitable for women is closely related to the environment and location of work, as the following subsection will illustrate.

6.2.2 Suitability of the work environment in CfW programmes

Our research indicates that, to women in particular, the location of an employment opportunity is of great importance. Generally, our data showed that it is considered acceptable for women to work inside houses. Male interviewees especially pointed out that any direct exposure of women to the public was inappropriate. One male interviewee said, for example: "I think females should do 'internal' works [jobs inside houses]. And external jobs are more suitable for men" (21, non-participant, Kafr Asad). Likewise, a male participant emphasised that all forms of employment that women can carry out from home were acceptable (167, highway). Local experts of both genders from different localities highlighted that this attitude was due to the preferences of women rather than the wishes of their husbands or other male family members. They said that most women did not want to leave their houses in order to become economically active but favoured home-based activities (4, Deyr 'Allā; 78, Al-Azraq). Female and male interviewees linked this preference to the cultural norm that females were not supposed to come in contact with strangers. A female CfW participant said that "to go out and work" was her main challenge against participation in the CfW programmes (113, Umm al-Jimāl). Lenner (2020) reports that some CfW programmes initially had problems recruiting women – not because women were not interested in getting a job but because officers in the Ministry of

Labour used to be reluctant to issue work permits for women doing "road work" or similar jobs.

Having said that, many female interviewees saw CfW programmes as a "safe work environment". They said that being employed in CfW programmes was much better for women than in most other workplaces because labour rights were respected and women were better protected. For instance, a female CfW participant stated: "I tried working outside, but it did not work out. Here [in the CfW programme] it is better. Over here, the treatment is much better. We are taken care of" (1, Deyr ʿAllā).

Many mentioned in particular that they appreciated their CfW job being close to their homes. In addition, they spoke well of the fact that this and the regulated working hours within the CfW programmes allowed them to take care of household chores as well as care work. "It [the CfW programme] is suitable for me as a housewife because I can go back home to my children" (70, female participant, Al-Azraq).

6.2.3 Acceptability of female labour force participation

We found that CfW programmes contributed to raising the rate of acceptability of female labour force participation but we cannot say how strong the effect is. One reason is that there are many other initiatives and development programmes targeting female labour force participation rates in order to improve gender equality and women empowerment. What we can say, however, is that many of our interviewees, both participants and non-participants, stressed how important the creation of employment opportunities in CfW programmes was for a change in gender roles. For example, one female participant pointed out: "It has become more acceptable. In the past, it was more shameful. The opportunities specifically for women arose" (137, Kafr Ṣawm).

CfW has become a realistic point of entry into the labour market for females – and in many parts of Jordan, it is also the only one. Many female CfW participants said that this was their first paid employment ever. The CfW employment was thus for them an entry into the labour market (though of course not yet to the regular labour market). Most female interviewees also said that they had enjoyed the work experience in the formal labour context of CfW. This led some to complain about the short duration of CfW employment contracts and to make clear that they would have liked to have

worked longer in the CfW programmes. Several even declared that they were considering looking for a regular job on the formal labour market after the end of their CfW employment. An ILO representative pointed out that female CfW participants exited the labour market once their CfW contract ended, pointing not only towards the otherwise available unattractive job opportunities in the garment sector, but also implying that CfW programmes were attractive to women particularly *because of* their limited duration (256, ILO).

The GIZ Post-employment Survey reveals explaining factors for this ambiguity of findings. When asked about plans for after their participation in the CfW programme, almost three-quarters of the female respondents (73 per cent) stated that they would look for another CfW opportunity, while far fewer planned to look for a job in the formal (26 per cent) or informal (3 per cent) sector or to enrol in further training (10 per cent). This preference for the "safe" environment of another CfW programme was even more pronounced among Syrian female respondents: 84 per cent of them would like to partake in another CfW programme (as opposed to 62 per cent of Jordanian women), while only 18 per cent/2 per cent (compared to 35 per cent/4 per cent) said they would like to work in the formal respectively informal sector afterwards. Male respondents shared the preference for taking part in another CfW programme (71 per cent in total, 82 per cent Syrian and 62 per cent Jordanian men) but they were more prepared to look for work in the formal (34 per cent) and informal (5 per cent) sectors or to enrol in further training (15 per cent; GIZ, 2019, see Appendix E2). Women, in general, were, however, even somewhat more likely than men to envisage their future in Jordan.[20]

In any case, many interviewees highlighted that it is very difficult for women to find regular employment – partly because Jordan suffers from a severe shortage of jobs in general and partly because many jobs are not given to women. A Jordanian woman stated: "There are very few jobs in town; and often, these few jobs are reserved for men" (93, participant, Al-Azraq). Another pointed to the lack of mobility: "There is no work for girls and women; we would love to work and to get out, but there is no possibility

20 Women were less likely to look for formal and for informal employment (both statistically significant at a 95 per cent confidence level) but more likely to plan to stay in Jordan (99 per cent). Syrians were statistically more prone to look for another CfW opportunity (significant at a 99.9 per cent confidence level), while it was unlikely for them to look for formal employment (99.9 per cent) or partake in a training programme (95 per cent).

for us to get work" (113, participant, Umm al-Jimāl). Where they were implemented, CfW programmes thus led to a significant increase in working opportunities for women, particularly in rural areas already characterised by an extreme shortage of employment opportunities. This shortage in turn may have spurred the higher acceptability of female employment in CfW programmes not only by women themselves but also by their male relatives.

Conversely, the visible rise in female labour force participation induced by CfW programmes has apparently increased the acceptability of women in paid employment. A Syrian man phrased this acceptability as follows: "Yes [the programme encourages women to work], it removed the shame culture on working women" (148, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm). Another said: "The organisations [CfW programmes] have changed the attitudes that the woman is an active part of the society […] The project has transformed the whole community" (109, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

Furthermore, CfW programmes seem to have had an even broader effect on gender equality. Some participants stated that the existence of CfW programmes as such increased the general recognition of females as part of society because the programmes employed a relatively high share of women, let them do similar work to men, and thereby demonstrated that women could make more or less the same contributions as men (for example, 148, male non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm; 153, female non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm). One could say that CfW programmes raised not only the sense of belonging of migrant groups (Syrians) to local communities respectively society at large but also the sense of belonging of women, which supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. A Jordanian woman said, for instance:

> I felt change because they made us feel the importance of the women's role in community. We became equal with men. We are doing the same work. In the past there were plenty of taboos about women going out and working. But now this has changed. Men look at women as equals to them. I'm very happy about that. They improved our quality of lives. Now we [women] have an income. We can contribute to improve the household. (113, CfW participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

However, it goes without saying that the CfW programmes are not able to change gender roles completely. Interviews with non-participants demonstrated that their effects on the wider community depended considerably on the awareness of non-participants about the existence of such programmes. Presumably, also the duration and the size of a CfW

programme in a given location determined to what degree it could affect gender roles.

In our sample of interviewees, the vast majority of women and men considered female labour force participation as acceptable or even positive. Only 3 out of 23 male respondents and 1 out of 20 females said that women should not have paid employment. However, an additional 7 men and 2 women said that women should only work under specific circumstances: for example, if the kind of work was adequate, if the sector of activities was acceptable for women and if the work environment was safe (see also subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). On the other hand, 6 men but only 1 woman insisted that CfW programmes should employ more women. We also found evidence that the acceptance of female labour force participation depended somewhat on the age of a person. Younger people, both women and men, appeared to us more open to women in paid employment than older people. As one woman stated: "Especially old people have difficulties in accepting women in jobs like mine. But all the young people have no problems with this anymore" (93, participant, Al-Azraq).

The attitudes of CfW participants and non-participants did not differ substantially, neither did those of Jordanians and Syrians. But both groups stated that Syrians were more conservative, that is, less likely to let a woman work outside the house. As a Jordanian woman put it:

> It is very normal among Jordanians that girls work outside the house. Syrians, in contrast, think that women cannot work for pay and that they should stay at home. […] When we sit together, I try to convince the other girls that it is normal for us to work. […] I try to convince them that they have to be more educated and self-reliant. (58, participant, Kafr Asad)

Many Syrian women confirmed that, in general, women in Syria were only active in certain sectors of the labour market, such as education. But they also stated that it was more common for Syrian women to participate in the labour market in Jordan than used to be the case back in Syria, mainly because of the difficult economic situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Two Syrian women told us: "Women work here more than they did in Aleppo. […] I have told him [my husband] that you have to let me help you and work because if I do not help, we will probably [financially] break down" (136, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm); "This [increase in labour force participation among Syrian women] is also because life, paying rents, etcetera, is

very expensive in Jordan and it used to be much cheaper in Syria" (149, participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

In any case, financial hardship seems to be the main reason for women joining the labour market. Many interviewees acknowledged that it was still "culturally inappropriate" (112, female non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl) for a family to allow a married woman to work for pay and only the last step it should take if it faced a financial crisis. A Syrian woman declared: "Women should not be working outside their homes. It is the last option, really – only allowed if you do not have sons. Our neighbour is in this situation and therefore this is not a shame for him" (112, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

Likewise, several interviewees pointed out that the protracted economic crisis has forced many families to break with the traditional model of the single male breadwinner family. They decided that, in order to sustain a family, both men and women had to earn an income. A Jordanian man stressed: "I think the economic situation needs all members of a family to work. Also, the females have to contribute to the family income" (21, non-participant, Kafr Asad).

This change is not irreversible. Once the economic situation improves, some Jordanian and Syrian women might reconsider their strategy and give up their jobs again. Some interviewees emphasised strongly that they were only working because of the difficult economic circumstances and would rather stay at home and fulfil their role as housewives: "I do not like it because it is forced by the economic situation. I would prefer to stay home and care for my children" (30, female non-participant, Kafr Asad). Longer-term acceptance of female labour force participation can only be achieved if coercion is not the only driving factor.

However, some women stated that they had joined CfW programmes also because they enjoyed the work and the interaction with others at the workplace. This once again supports the notion that participation in CfW programmes can especially strengthen female participants' sense of belonging (Hypothesis 2) and horizontal trust between one another (Hypothesis 5). For many women, CfW programmes are particularly attractive because the joint activity allows them to talk with other members of the community with whom they have little contact in everyday life. A Jordanian woman told us: "I want to increase my communication with the people in the community" (123, participant, Kafr Ṣawm). Similarly, a Syrian woman said: "The programmes have many benefits. They are entertaining.

And they are bringing people together to do more productive things" (279, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

Finally, several women called attention to the fact that their participation had also strengthened their self-confidence and thereby their standing within the community. A woman from Kafr Asad said: "It [working in a CfW programme] helped to shape my personality; I became more confident. I can now be an active member of the society" (27, participant, Kafr Asad).

6.3 Local economic development (LED)

CfW programmes in Jordan likewise contribute to LED. The direct effect, through the wages paid to CfW participants, is very clear and significant. In addition, the programmes also raise the wages of non-participants through the multiplier effect and local procurement, even if the *size* of this effect remains difficult to quantify, not least because of the difficult economic situation which is another strong – yet CfW-independent – impacting factor. The same holds true for effects on LED caused by the creation of public goods. However, the effect of CfW programmes on the long-term employment prospects of CfW participants seems to be negligible with the exception of mitigating effects on the so-called "shame culture" in regard to unattractive job opportunities.

In the following, we discuss how interviewees in our sample perceived LED in their respective community at the time of the interview (6.3.1); whether the wages paid by CfW programmes had an effect on average per capita income in these communities (6.3.2); whether the public goods created by the programmes had an impact (6.3.3); and whether the programmes had long-term effects on participants through the upgrading of their soft and technical skills (6.3.4).

6.3.1 Perceptions of local economic development

Most of our interviewees – regardless of their nationality or employment status – confirmed that the general economic situation in Jordan has been increasingly difficult. Both Syrians and Jordanians mentioned the lack of jobs and the prevalence of poverty as the main problems. In addition, many talked about decreasing wages due to higher competition on the labour market, rising rents, increasing food prices, large numbers of students in school classes, transportation problems, shortages in water and electricity, and long

waiting hours in health care centres. As mentioned above (subsection 6.1.2), Jordanians often accused the Syrians of these problems, for instance, the following Jordanian woman:

> There was a great impact [of the arrival of Syrians in the region]. Job opportunities are rare for Jordanians, and […] the Syrians accepted all jobs for a lower wage. Also, there was great impact on the electricity and water, and also in many other aspects. (65, shopkeeper, Tal al-Rummān)

A local expert explicated:

> The schools are very crowded. Before, classrooms […] took 30 students. Now, the classrooms need to fit 45 students. […] Medical centres are prepared to treat 25 cases per day. Because of the […] Syrian refugees, they now have to accept 40-60 people per day. This is a lot of pressure on the health services. (3, local expert, Kafr Asad)

Some Jordanians, however, acknowledged that the arrival of the Syrians has also had some positive economic effects on Jordan. Some shopkeepers in the south of Jordan highlighted, for example, that the presence of the Syrians has led to an increase in business activities (201, shopkeeper, Faqū'a; 202, shopkeeper, Faqū'a). Some interviewees stressed that many programmes of international donors would not exist without the presence of thousands of Syrians in Jordan. Likewise, some streets and schools had been built to host the growing population. Furthermore, Syrians had brought with them certain technical skills that were very helpful for the Jordanians as well (78, local expert, Azraq).

6.3.2 Direct and indirect effects of the wages paid by CfW programmes (Hypothesis 13)

CfW programmes have raised the income of participant households by almost a quarter. Such households spent most of the additional income on basic needs and repaying debts and only invested a very small share of it. In addition, these programmes also raised the income of non-participant households through the multiplier effect and local procurement – but not the investment effect. However, we cannot say how high these indirect effects were.

Below, we discuss (i) to what extent the wages paid to CfW participants increased their income and what the participants did with the extra income; and (ii) whether the broader community had also benefitted (indirectly) from the wages through the multiplier or the investment effect.

Direct effects (income of CfW participants)

The most direct economic effect of CfW programmes is that the wages paid to participants increase their total household income during the time of their employment. The study by Roxin et al. (2020) found that participant households had on average a monthly income of JOD 376 in 2017 when they applied for a job in any of the GIZ programmes and a total monthly income of about JOD 460 during their participation. The GIZ programmes would thus raise the household income by just about JOD 85 or 22 per cent on average in net terms. This result is similar to the findings of Jones et al. (2019) that Syrian households, which tend to be poorer than vulnerable Jordanian households, had an average income of JOD 285 per month in 2018 (excluding any CfW wage but including the unconditional cash grant provided by UNHCR and UNICEF; see subsection 4.3). The abject national poverty line of Jordan is currently JOD 28 per person and month, which is – depending on household size – between JOD 100 and 250 per household (ILO, 2019). For all CfW programmes in Jordan, Roxin et al. (2020) found that the participation of women increased the monthly income of households by JOD 77 on average while the participation of men increased the monthly income of households by only JOD 33. The effect is thus clearly positive but much smaller than the wage that CfW programmes typically pay to their workers (JOD 240). Roxin et al. (2020) assumed that this is mainly due to the fact that many CfW workers give up other jobs for their CfW participation and possibly also receive less support from other households. Other studies, however, – as Roxin et al. (2020) admit – have not found crowding-in effects. Whatever the exact amount, the rise in income of CfW participant households is in any case only temporary: with the end of their employment, their income decreases again to the previous level (or even below it) unless some household member finds another job.

CfW participants spent the bulk of their wages on consumptive purposes. We asked 64 of 72 CfW participants about their spending patterns. Only a third mentioned investments in human capital (specifically the education of their children: 23 per cent) or small projects (11 per cent) as one of their top-spending priorities. In contrast, 47 per cent mentioned items related to housing (rent, electricity and water), 30 per cent food, 23 per cent household equipment, and 22 per cent debt repayment, and 20 per cent the support for children and other relatives. Other items were clothing, individual needs, health, transportation, weddings, and holidays (see Table 11). Some experts also told us that the CfW participants did not necessarily buy more, but sometimes higher-quality products.

Interestingly, the spending patterns of women and men differed significantly. We have information on the spending patterns of 26 female and 38 male CfW participants and both groups spent in similar ways on household equipment, support for children or other relatives, and investments. But while men often spent more significant parts of their CfW wages on housing (rent, electricity and water), food and debt repayment than women, women spent much more often on education and somewhat more often on health (see Table 12). Possibly, the CfW wage is more often the largest income source if the worker is a male, while, when females work in CfW programmes, their husbands often have another income from which they pay for the most basic items like housing or food. Women can therefore more easily afford to use their wage for "second order" items (health, transportation, education).

Table 11: Spending patterns of CfW participants (N=64)

Item	Number of answers	Share of respondents (multiple answers possible)	Share of answers given
Housing (rent, electricity, water)	30	47%	23%
Food	19	30%	15%
Household equipment	15	23%	12%
Education of children (school items, university, etc.)	15	23%	12%
Debt repayment	14	22%	11%
Support children or other relatives	13	20%	10%
Investment in small projects	7	11%	5%
Health	6	9%	5%
Personal needs	5	8%	4%
Clothes	3	5%	2%
Transportation	2	3%	5%
Holidays	1	2%	0.5%
Sum	130		100%

Source: Authors

Table 12: Spending patterns of CfW participants – gender differences			
Women		**Men**	
Items named	*Count*	*Items named*	*Count*
Education	13	Housing (rent, electricity, water)	19
Housing (rent, electricity, water)	11	Food	13
Household equipment	7	Debt repayment	10
Support children or other relatives	7	Household equipment	8
Food	6	Support children or other relatives	6
Debt repayment	4	Health	2
Health	4	Investments	2
Investments	3	Education	2
Other	4	Other	6
Source: Authors			

These divergencies can be due to various factors. One explanation is that men are more interested in hardware (housing, household equipment, food, and the like) while women give the software a higher weight (especially education, but also health). Another, more probable, explanation is that within the families, men's wages are considered the main source of income and therefore used mainly for core items (housing, debt repayment, food, and so on) while women's wages are much more a windfall profit which can be used for occasional or additional needs such as health treatments and the costs of education.

Some responses indicated that failures may have occurred in the targeting of vulnerable households. For example, a Jordanian man told us "I used the salary from the first month to go to Turkey for holidays" (13, participant, Deyr ʻAllā), and another one said that he would use his wage to buy work gear (26, participant, Kafr Asad). However, only Jordanians made such statements. Some Syrians, by way of contrast, mentioned that they were sending money to their family back home in Syria (149, participant, Kafr Ṣawm; 73, participant, Al-Azraq).

These findings are very similar to those of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted in 2019. Here, participants were asked to tick the three main uses of their income and the largest share of respondents ticked house rent (45 per cent of all respondents), followed by debt repay (34 per cent), the paying of open bills (32 per cent), food (31 per cent), health (22 per cent), household items (20 per cent) and transportation (17 per cent). Just 4 per cent of the respondents ticked education and 5 per cent ticked items related to leisure (see Table 13).

The GIZ Post-employment Survey also discovered that female and male CfW participants had, on average, different preferences in the use of their wages. Some of these differences were quite significant (some even at the 99 per cent confidence level) but possibly largely due to another factor: The relative share of female participants was much larger in the north of Jordan than in the south, where people had quite different consumption preferences. We ran endogeneity tests alluding to the fact that the impact of the regional factor was by far dominant, and the direct effect of gender became insignificant in regressions with interaction terms.

Spending patterns of Syrians and Jordanians also differ according to the GIZ Post-employment Survey from 2019. Syrians more often spend a particularly high share of their CfW wage on house rent and health, while Jordanians more often spend a particularly high share of their income on leisure. Both findings are statistically significant at 1 per cent, respectively even at the 0.1 per cent level according to regressions run with different probit models. Possibly this is due to the fact that a higher share of Jordanians live in their own house (and hence do not have to pay a rent), have access to a form of health insurance (covering all medical treatment costs), have a longer history of making debts (now to be paid back) or extra income (that allows the CfW wage to be used for leisure activities).

Table 13: CfW-income spending and saving patterns (results of GIZ Post-employment Survey, 984 respondents)

	Number of answers	Share of all answers	Share of all respondents				
	All	All	All	Females*	Males*	Jordanians*	Syrians*
Among top three spending items							
House rent	**446**	26%	45%	48%	44%	24%	68%
Debt repay	**336**	19%	34%	45%	30%	38%	30%
Paying open bills	**319**	18%	32%	42%	29%	28%	37%
Food	**305**	18%	31%	28%	32%	30%	31%
Health	**217**	12%	22%	27%	21%	17%	28%
Household items	**197**	11%	20%	24%	19%	29%	10%
Transportation	**167**	10%	17%	21%	15%	17%	17%
Education	**75**	4%	8%	9%	7%	9%	6%
Leisure	**46**	3%	5%	3%	5%	8%	1%
Other	**65**	5%	7%	6%	7%	8%	6%
Among top three savings items							
Personal items	**139**	13%	14%	18%	13%	18%	10%
Health	**126**	11%	13%	15%	12%	13%	13%
Education	**89**	8%	9%	12%	8%	10%	8%
Small business	**29**	3%	3%	3%	3%	4%	1%
Other	**36**	3%	4%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Could not save at all	***684***	*62%*	*70%*	*69%*	*69%*	*64%*	*75%*

Note:
*While differences from the average are statistically significant (regressions with different probit model specifications), in some of the cases, this may actually be due to regional factors as endogeneity tests show.
Source: Results of GIZ Post-employment Survey (GIZ, 2019)

Another interesting finding is that CfW workers pay significantly more on house rent, bills and food and less on debt repayment when they are married rather than single (statistically significant at the 95 per cent (food), respectively 1 per cent (house rent, bills) confidence level). Possibly, they live in larger houses and less often with their parents. This would explain why an above average share of married CfW participants stated in the GIZ Post-employment Survey that their CfW wage did not cover all of their daily needs (statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level).

Statistically more often, CfW participants with a university degree spent a high share of their wages on education and their house rent (statistically significant at the 95 per cent (house rent), respectively 99.9 per cent (education) confidence level). In contrast, participants who had not even completed primary school spent a high share of their wages statistically more often on repaying debts and less often on transportation (both statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level).

Finally, the GIZ survey also reveals that CfW participants in the south of Jordan more often used a high share of their wages for their house rent, due bills and food than those in the north of Jordan but less often on transportation, health and repaying debt (these regional differences are all statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent confidence level). Participants in urban areas more often used a relatively high share of their CfW wage on transportation and repaying debts (statistically significant at the 95 per cent (transportation), respectively 99.9 per cent (debt repay) confidence level).

At the same time, our findings were also in line with the results of a study conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on the effect of UNHCR cash assistance extended to Syrian refugees in Jordan. According to this study, Syrian households spent 69 per cent of their total income on housing and just 11 per cent each on health and food. The UNHCR cash assistance allowed them to raise their monthly spending on rent from JOD 120 to 130, utilities from JOD 20 to 35, health from JOD 15 to 29, education from JOD 9 to 25, and transport from JOD 10 to 20. On average, the Syrian households spent JOD 285 per month, which is equal to USD 5-6 per person per day on average in purchasing power parities (Jones et al., 2019).

Another study reports on the spending patterns of participants in the KfW and ILO's CfW programme, with similar figures. 83 per cent of its respondents listed "daily consumption" among the three main targets of use of their CfW wages, while 31 per cent listed repaying debt. 14 per cent mentioned housing

(rent, water, electricity), 8 per cent the education of their children, 7 per cent medical expenses, and another 7 per cent the renovation of their houses. Just 3 per cent said that they were able to save or invest a part of their wages. However, 0.7 per cent reported that they used part of their wage to buy a car (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

All these studies demonstrate just how important the income from CfW programmes is for covering the most basic needs of participants. This is further corroborated by the fact that just 27 per cent of those responding to the GIZ survey stated that they were able to save at least a small part of their CfW income. Most of them (15 per cent of all respondents) undertook savings for future personal wishes or for possible future health care costs (13 per cent), while some (9 per cent) undertook savings for future spending on education and only a few (3 per cent) for future business investments (see Table 13). The share of people who could not undertake any savings during CfW employment was particularly large among (i) married people (supporting the assumptions made further above); (ii) those who had not even completed primary school; and (iii) people in urban areas (statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent (i-ii), respectively at the 95 per cent (iii) confidence level).

Debt repayment was a recurring issue in our interviews (as it had been in the other studies cited). Fourteen out of 72 CfW participants (5 Syrians and 9 Jordanians) told us that they had used their CfW wage to repay debts. Because of this, we also asked other interviewees and discovered that many Syrians and Jordanians alike were indebted to local shops, neighbours, relatives, friends or their landlord. Most debts were thus informal rather than formal credits though banks. And yet: the CfW wages did not make much of a change for the debtors. *"How do you pay for these expenses?"* we asked. "I'm living on debts." *"Do you think that with this new job you can pay them back?"* "No, I don't think that I can pay back the debt; I plan to spend the money on food, drinks, living expenses" (84, Syrian participant, Al-Azraq).

Twenty-five out of 97 shopkeepers interviewed brought the topic up as well. Grocers especially complained that a large share of their clients were not always able to pay for what they were buying and some showed us the book in which they kept a record of all the people that owed them money. One shopkeeper explained: "Loans play a big role in the bad economic situation. All people take loans. I have not had a lot of customers recently. People cannot afford the loans they are taking" (9, shopkeeper, Deyr 'Allā).

One interviewee blamed tensions among people in his community on the high level of outstanding debts: "Tensions would start between people who owe each other money. But these were just personal feuds. It did not happen on a larger scale, really" (177, non-participant, Al-Mafraq).

However, the high number of credits given between individuals on a private, informal basis can also be seen as something positive. The phenomenon shows that there is a degree of horizontal trust between the members of the respective communities, which involves Syrians as much as Jordanians.

Multiplier effects

The indirect income effects of the CfW programmes are difficult to quantify. We can assume that there must be a multiplier effect because all CfW households spend most of their additional income locally and because a substantial share of the procurement takes place in the same region as well. Yet we could not find evidence for its size. Furthermore, the investment effect of CfW programmes is negligible because CfW participants consume almost all of their wages instead of investing them.

In interviews with CfW participants, we noticed substantial evidence for our hypothesis that CfW programmes must unfold a meaningful multiplier effect on the local community as a whole. They spent large shares of their additional income on items with a substantial part of the payments flowing to other households in the same area: 30 per cent of respondents spend most of their income on food, which is normally purchased in local shops (in contrast to, for example, clothes; see below). 47 per cent spent most on renting their accommodation, and this is also locally spent as many landlords live next door to their tenants (even though, of course, some others live far away and, for example, rent out the house where they used to grow up before they migrated to Amman or another town). 22 per cent spent their additional income mostly on repaying debts where, as detailed above, the debts were mostly informal and the creditors were neighbours, landlords or local shopkeepers. Of course, other parts of their wages flow out of the municipality: for example, the shares spent on health care, education, building material for the improvement of dwellings, water, electricity, and clothes (see above). Considering that male and female respondents reported different spending patterns and priorities, the multiplier effect of CfW programmes employing a large share of women will likely be weighted differently between the sectors of the local economy than a multiplying effect of programmes with mostly male beneficiaries.

Many CfW participants explicitly told us that they spent most of their additional income within the local community. The reason for this is simple: Most of the villages that we visited are so remote that it would be too expensive and too time-consuming to buy daily items in another place. Still, some households also said that they preferred to go elsewhere if they wanted to buy something more expensive, such as furniture or clothes, because these items were cheaper in urban areas.

If we assume that all households spent on average half of their additional income within their own community, we could say that the multiplier effect is just as large as the direct income effect of the CfW wages. This is because half of the wages are spent again in the community, thereby raising the income of the CfW participants' neighbours who again spend half the additional income locally, and so on. This adds up to 1/2 in the first round plus 1/4 in the second round plus 1/8 in the third round, and so on… resulting in a total of 1, that is, the same as the direct effect. Or in more general terms, if the households in the community spent 1/x of any additional income on average, the result of the infinite series would be:

$$\frac{1}{x}+\frac{1}{x^2}+\frac{1}{x^3}+\ldots+\frac{1}{x^\infty}=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\frac{1}{x^n}=\frac{1}{x-1}$$

However, the multiplier effect is distributed over a much larger group of people: all households in the community, rather than just those of participants in the CfW programmes. The direct effect of CfW wages per household is thus always larger than the multiplier effect as long as the share of households that participate in the CfW scheme remains limited.

In addition, we do not know the size of the multiplier effect for sure. To know better, we would need to have much more detailed spending reports from CfW participants and also non-participant households – or an explicit confirmation of non-participant households that they received substantial benefits from the extended spending possibilities of participants' households.

We tried our best in this regard by focusing on the perceptions of local shopkeepers. Our assumption was that local shopkeepers would be the first to benefit from the second-round effect of wage payments executed by CfW programmes. If participants spent 30 per cent of their wages on food, there must be a second-round benefit of CfW wages at least for local grocers. To this end, we asked 61 shopkeepers in the sites of our field research if they had noticed from their sales that some people from their neighbourhood

were spending substantially more than in the past on purchases in the shop of the interviewee. In addition, we asked shopkeepers whether they knew about the CfW programmes being implemented not far from their shops, who participated in these programmes, and whether they had noticed that these participants were spending more money in their shop since they started working for the programmes.

However, only 6 shopkeepers told us that their sales had increased significantly because many of their customers had become employed by a CfW programme. Of the shopkeepers, 28 had noticed that some of their customers spent at least a bit more money in their shop because they were participating in a CfW programme – which did not, however, have much impact on the total sales of the shopkeepers. Fourteen said that they knew at least one CfW programme in the area but did not believe that any of their customers spent more money in their shop than before. Another 13 respondents stated that they had never heard about the CfW programmes (see Figure 8). Possibly, the multiplier effect was too widely distributed over a large number of households and shops in most places, and therefore too small for each of them to notice it (Figure 8).

When we asked shopkeepers whether CfW participants spent more money at their shops, some were very positive: *"Do you think that these programmes have a positive impact?"* "Yes, not only on me, the whole *souk* [Arabic: market] benefitted from the programmes. People come here and spend their money and will buy more goods than before" (214, shopkeeper, Al-Qaṣr); "Obviously […] also other shops benefit. Because the money is always spent locally" (18, shopkeeper, Kafr Asad).

Some put a number on their increase in sales: "It [the amount gained through the sales] increased from JOD 350 to 400" (90, shopkeeper, Al-Azraq). Another shopkeeper estimated his income had increased by JOD 19 (155, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm).

Figure 8: Perception of shopkeepers interviewed about multiplier effects

Answers to the question: *"Have you realised from your sales that some people in your neighbourhood generate additional income from CfW programmes?"*



Source: Authors

Two people from Kafr Ṣawm told us that a local chicken restaurant had increased its sales because of the CfW programmes: "One place […] used to sell 50 chickens, now it can sell 70" (133, non-participants, Kafr Ṣawm).

Some local experts confirmed that CfW participants spent the bulk of their income locally. One of them said: "[The positive effect on the local economy] is noticeable, because people are spending their money in the community" (102, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl). Another local expert argued in a similar way:

> Of course, the CfW programmes also help the neighbours because CfW workers spend their income in town. I know this because I can see this every day. I am from this community and I know all people here. And I can see how the CfW workers consume and spend their new income on food and clothes. (8, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā)

A CfW participant who was asked *"Do you think that the CfW project has a wider effect on the community?"* answered: "Yes, at the end of the month, everyone goes and spends the money, pays the loans and debts, and the money is spent" (54, CfW participant, Hawfa).

Most shopkeepers said, however, that the existence of CfW programmes only had a marginal impact on their sales. In addition, they stressed that everybody knew that the CfW activities were only temporary. "[I]n those three months [when the programme was running], I noticed an increase in sales. But when the programme ended, the increase also stopped" (90, shopkeeper, Al-Azraq). A shopkeeper whom we had asked if the CfW participants were coming to his shop said: "Yes, but they are saving the money. The little bit they buy here, it is not enough for us" (74, shopkeeper, Al-Azraq). In Kafr Ṣawm, a shopkeeper pondered: "They [CfW participants] also came here before they worked in CfW, so there was no big change" (159).

Some shopkeepers highlighted that the CfW participants did not spend more money but at least repaid their debts: *"Do these people buy in your shop?"* "Most people pay their debt with it, so people are mainly repaying their debt" (144, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm); *"Did some of the participants buy here?"* "Yes, they paid their debts and some bought some new gas" (196, shopkeeper, Faqū'a); *"In a nutshell, what do you think about the CfW programmes?"* "It is a good project in general. They provide cash and it helped a lot of people to pay back some of their debts" (209, shopkeeper, Faqū'a).

Local procurement

Another relevant indirect effect of the Jordanian CfW programmes is local procurement, yet it is also difficult to trace or quantify it. Only few interviewees were able to say where the CfW programmes bought new machinery and building materials that were needed for the projects. Nevertheless, some confirmed that the programme managers tried to purchase as much as possible in the community in order to support it through this channel as well: "We do promote local procurement wherever possible" (111, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl).

Donor representatives are aware of the importance of local procurement. A GIZ representative explained:

> We try to buy all materials and intermediate products locally, which in turn benefits the local economy. [In one of our projects], women are trained to produce tent sheets in the traditional way, which are then set up in the parks as sun sails. Men are also trained to manufacture brick blocks themselves in a specific way. (285, GIZ, Amman)

Likewise, the programmes of the WFP and World Vision buy all ingredients that they need for cooking in worksite kitchens from the local market, if at all possible: "The local market of Kafr Ṣawm saw development because they are providing us with the food for the programme" (263, World Vision, Amman).

The ILO projects also purchase all materials that they need for road construction and maintenance locally: "This should also have an effect [on local economic development]" (255, ILO, Amman).

Other interviewees said it was not always easy to procure locally because the local products sometimes fell short in terms of quality and were sometimes more expensive than those available elsewhere and thus would not meet procurement regulations to choose the best-priced offer (306, CfW Coordination Group meeting).

Several shopkeepers complained spontaneously that the CfW programmes had not bought their equipment at a local shop. For example, a shopkeeper from Kafr Ṣawm mentioned that the equipment of the kitchen, where food for the workers was cooked, could have been bought in his shop instead of a shop in Irbid (155, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm). On the other hand, while a shopkeeper in Faqū'a told us that his compressor had been used on the tree-planting side, his profit had been rather small:

> So, […the CfW implementer] made a contract with me. The compressor was needed for the stony soil. They used it for five days. I got JOD 100 per day. JOD 50 was for the Egyptians [operating the machines] plus JOD 25 for diesel and transport. (196, shopkeeper, Faqū'a)

Investment effects

The investment effects of the Jordanian CfW programmes appear to be small. Some experts said that the CfW programmes had a positive effect on investment: "Also, there is impact on the local economic market and there is more investment in communities" (264, Oxfam, Amman). Similarly, a

shopkeeper stated: "I have heard that the people invest more because of the programmes. It has affected our markets" (227, shopkeeper, Kafr Asad). Yet, as CfW wages are too low to be invested rather than consumed, this is most likely a minor spin-off of the multiplier effect, for which we could not, however, find conclusive evidence.

During our own field research, only 7 CfW participants told us that they were planning to invest part of their CfW wages. This is understandable because the wages are not very high and are only paid for three months. In addition, many Jordanians and Syrians have debts to be repaid first while others are also struggling with the costs of their everyday needs (162, participant, highway; 27, participant, Kafr Asad). In other words, none of the CfW participants had much financial flexibility for investments. Two out of the 7 participants with concrete investment plans interviewed also admitted that the CfW wages would probably not suffice to finance their investment ideas.

If these investments are ever made, they will predominantly be in subsistence farming with some minor additional earnings. Two interviewees had the idea to plant some crops in the garden and sell them later on the local market; two wanted to buy cattle; one planned to keep bees for honey; one intended to open a bakery; and one wanted to set up a household repair shop.

These findings are in line with the workers survey conducted in 2019 among the participants of the ILO employment infrastructure programme. Only 0.9 per cent of the households interviewed reported investing part of their CfW wages in private business. Another 0.5 per cent bought animals as an additional source of income while 1.4 per cent planned to save part of their wages (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

Likewise, the GIZ's Post-employment Survey found that only 30 per cent of the respondents were able to make any savings at all (see above) and, of those, most saved for personal items, that is, future consumption. Just 13 per cent reported having made provisions for future health care spending, 9 per cent for future spending on education, and only 3 per cent for small business investment (GIZ, 2019, see also Table 13). Interestingly, the share of people who saved for small business investment was particularly high among divorced people and particularly low among CfW participants in the south of Jordan. CfW participants in urban areas were particularly rarely able to make any savings at all but, quite surprisingly, more prone to save for investment rather than for education, health, or personal items. At the same time, the share of CfW participants who had made savings mainly

for individual future consumption needs turned out to be particularly high among women and particularly low among married people.[21]

6.3.3 Effects of the creation of public goods (Hypothesis 14)

It remains, however, unclear to what extent the assets created by CfW programmes in Jordan had secondary effects on LED as well (Hypothesis 14).

Most infrastructure or services provided by CfW projects are unlikely to have tangible income effects. For example, the collection and recycling of waste, the embellishment of public parks, and the planting of trees and rehabilitation of nature reserves are definitely positive for the quality of life of people in the community but not important for any income-generating activity. Likewise, the renovation of schools and health clinics is very important for the well-being of students and patients but presumably without measurable income effect. Even the construction of rural roads in Jordan has probably no major economic importance because the Jordanian road network does not suffer from major gaps.

In contrast, other CfW projects can have a very substantial economic pay-off but the size of this effect is difficult to estimate. This applies to the rehabilitation of dams, water reservoirs and irrigation systems, support for the intensification of agriculture, and protective measures against soil erosion. However, our methodology proved inadequate to produce any estimations.

Despite that, numerous interviewees stressed how much they appreciated the public goods that CfW programmes had created in their communities. When we asked a young Jordanian man *"Has there been an effect on the community?"*, he answered: "The infrastructure has been improved; they have computers in the schools now; there have been developments; it has helped the community" (116, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl). An elderly Jordanian woman noted: "There was an improvement of the streets and

21 Both findings regarding savings for investment are statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level and the findings regarding urban participants at the 99 per cent confidence level. Both findings on groups most probably saving for future consumption are statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent (gender) and 99 per cent (marital status) confidence level, respectively. All confidence levels were computed through regressions run with different probit model specifications.

also in electricity. Streetlamps have been installed, also communication techniques, cables and so on improved" (23, non-participant, Hawfa).

These statements are in line with the results of qualitative interviews conducted by Roxin et al. (2020), who found that CfW participants, other community members, and the representatives of the municipalities consider the local infrastructure built by the CfW programmes useful to everybody.

6.3.4 Direct and indirect labour market effects

It is difficult to draw conclusions on the overall effects of CfW programmes on the labour market from our own research as we did not focus on that topic. Yet, we found indications for both negative and positive effects, corroborated by accounts from the literature.

In the following subsections, we will first consider the direct effects of CfW programmes on the employability of participants who go through (i) technical skills upgrading; and (ii) the improvement of soft skills and higher psychological resilience. Second, we will briefly discuss the more ambiguous indirect effects that are due to (iii) an increased willingness to work in less attractive sectors (in other words: a diminished shame culture), and (iv) competition over suitable labour induced by CfW wages and working conditions.

Direct effects through technical skills upgrading

The most interesting question concerns the long-term employment effect for former CfW participants: When CfW programmes end, will more or less workers have a job than before? Of course, the answer depends on many aspects, but the main one is the direct employment effect, that is, whether CfW programmes have bettered or worsened the employability of their participants. The dominant way to improve the employability of CfW participants is via skills upgrading, which was the focus of the initial Hypothesis 15. As our interviews provided only little evidence on this, we also drew complementary data from other surveys.

Several of our interviews revealed that, at the local level, many CfW participants, non-participants and local experts thought that most CfW projects in Jordan did not provide enough training and hence did not prepare participants well in looking for follow-up employment. At the same time, our interviews showed that national and international experts were just as well

aware of the potential employability effect but also of the related difficulties: "The MOL has understood [...] that CfW programmes are not only crucial for the creation of infrastructure but also for the creation of employment" (256, ILO) but it is problematic for CfW programmes to provide skills development "according to the needs of the labour market" (245, Caritas). Even if skills training provided by CfW programmes opens up access to labour market segments, this may often be in theory only, and not in practice, as several sectors are not open to migrant workers (see subsection 3.5.3). In that case, CfW could raise expectations that cannot be met.

The DEval evaluation report (Roxin et al., 2020) suggests that, all in all, the CfW programmes had no positive impact on the employability of their participants. It reports that 40 per cent of the participants had a job before they started working for the programmes while the respective share was only 28 per cent among those who applied for a CfW job but were not accepted. In the course of their employment, of course, most CfW participants give up their previous job. However, even afterwards, only 25 per cent – and hence less than before – had any employment. This finding was similar for Syrians and Jordanians, for women and for men (Roxin et al., 2020).

The results of the workers survey conducted in 2019 among participants of the ILO's Employment-intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) were similar. It revealed that 57 per cent of men and 43 per cent of the women had a job before they started working for the programme but that only 32 per cent, respectively 13 per cent, had a job right afterwards. These shares do not differ substantially between Jordanians and Syrians. However, while 47 per cent of the Syrians had been working in construction, agriculture or basic services before they became engaged in the CfW programme, but only 1 per cent in commerce or manufacturing, the respective shares were 31 per cent against 6 per cent for Jordanians. The majority of those who had had a job before their CfW participation had a wage of between JOD 7 and 14 per day, while the majority of those who had found a job right after their CfW participation received somewhat lower wages (mostly between JOD 5 and 12 per day) (NAMA & ILO, 2019). The employment situation immediately after the CfW placement thus looked dim; unfortunately, no data was available to check what share of former CfW participants found better job opportunities after a search period.

Interestingly, 7 per cent of all female participants and 4 per cent of all men had actually worked in a skilled worker's or skilled employee's position

before they were hired by the ILO's CfW programme (NAMA & ILO, 2019). This can be seen as a sign that the ILO programme in some instances crowds out existing employment, that is, that it attracts people from good jobs but with only a limited chance of getting the same kind of jobs again after the end of the CfW labour contract.

Even more so, most CfW participants who found a new job after the end of their respective CfW project did not believe that their CfW employment had helped them obtain the new job. Only 11 per cent of all men and 4 per cent of all women believed that the CfW employment had been helpful while 35 per cent of them said that this was because they had learned a new skill and 2 per cent because it has provided them with the seed capital to start their own project; 63 per cent said that the CfW employment had only been helpful because it built *wasṭa* (relations) with other employers or other workers (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

However, the GIZ Post-employment Survey produces a much more positive picture. Possibly, the difference is due to the fact that the ILO and the GIZ survey covered only the participants of the programmes run by the respective organisation. While the GIZ survey included the entirety of participants in the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme in 2019, the ILO workers survey only covered a sample of those who were working in the organisation's Employment-Intensive Investment Programme – and any sampling produces biases. In any case, it is possible to say that the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme did not crowd out workers in large numbers from residual occupations. 60 per cent of the participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure programme had been without work before the programme started, and just 11 per cent had been in formal sector jobs (GIZ, 2019).

In regard to their post-CfW employment, 74 per cent of the participants in the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme longed for a new CfW job, while 31 per cent were looking for a different job and 12 per cent wanted to participate in a more systematic training programme (whereby double answers were possible). Respondents previously unemployed were likely to look for another CfW opportunity; those previously in informal employment likely to consider another informal job opportunity; while respondents previously employed, whether formally or informally, were likely to seek formal employment.[22] Educated respondents were more likely to look for a

22 The first and the last finding at a 99 per cent; the two findings in the middle at 99.9 per cent confidence level.

formal job afterwards.[23] Interestingly, there was also a correlation between respondents' spending patterns of their CfW income and their post-CfW plans[24]: those spending their income on rent tended to look for another CfW job; those spending their income on bills tended to look for informal employment; and those spending on debt repayments, as well as those not able to save CfW income, tended to look for formal jobs (GIZ, 2019).

Direct effects through soft skills, attitude changes and networking opportunities

In addition to technical and vocational skills, participation in CfW programmes can foster time management skills and better discipline through the regularity of the activity – soft skills, which not only affect employability in a positive way but also create networking opportunities.

A Syrian women stressed these aspects next to the positive effects on social cohesion:

> How does it help the community as a whole? They [the people] help each other with their needs; the programme brings people together; it helps them to manage their time more efficiently, and it helps them to regulate spending their income. (119, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

"This [additional income] has a good impact and effect and has a good impact on the psychological factors of the person" (31, local expert, Kafr Asad).

Likewise, most respondents to the GIZ Post-employment Survey also considered soft skills rather than technical skills as their main takeaway from participation in the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme: 55 per cent stated that they had learnt to work in teams; 35 per cent said that they had improved their commitment; 25 per cent believed that they had become more patient; while 18 per cent perceived they were now better in their time management. At the same time, 24 per cent thought that they had acquired new technical skills and 1 per cent felt that they had gained entrepreneurial skills (interestingly, all percentages for both hard and soft skills are even much higher for female participants, see Appendix E2).

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23 Respondents with a BA degree at 95 per cent confidence level, those with secondary education or vocational training both at a 99 per cent confidence level.

24 These findings are statistically significant at 95 per cent (first two) or 99.9 (last two) confidence levels.

Another benefit gained from participation in CfW programmes was the opportunity to build networks. Although we found hardly any concrete evidence that this opportunity had been used Roxin et al. (2020) revealed that most CfW participants established new contacts to people who might be helpful for their future employment: 63 per cent of their interviewees mentioned helpful contacts to employees of the municipality and 25 per cent to GIZ staff members but only 0.6 per cent to employees of private firms.

Indirect effects through a decreased shame culture

CfW programmes have a mitigating effect on what many people in Jordan call "the shame culture" (see subsection 3.5.2). We gathered accounts on this aversion to "disreputable" work in the waste sector but similar effects for CfW programmes in the agricultural or construction sectors are conceivable, too.

Eighteen of our interviewees raised the issue (2 participants, 5 local experts, 6 non-participants, 3 shopkeepers, and 2 general experts) stressing that CfW programmes had reduced people's reluctance to work in the waste sector. In many sites, side-events of the CfW programmes such as lectures and awareness campaigns were mainly responsible for this change in attitudes:

> Shame culture was eradicated, the municipality terminated the idea that work in waste collection is shameful. *How did you achieve that?* Many lectures were held. We pointed out that they (waste collectors) are working for the municipality. The head of the municipality held speeches with important stakeholders. By combined efforts of municipalities and the local community itself. (5, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā)

In some cases, the staff of the CfW programmes visited private houses one by one in order to talk on the issue of working in the waste sector (29, GIZ, Kafr Asad).

What also played a role was that "large numbers of people [were] looking for jobs. They changed their perception about what is shameful" (70, participant, Al-Azraq). Many workers just had to accept working in a sector without a good reputation because of economic pressure and the need to seize any opportunity to generate income:

> Before this, the idea was that you would work as an engineer. Working with waste would not even be on your radar. People do need the work, the situation is difficult and prices are rising. This helped to get rid of the shame. (106, participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

While, in the past, it had sometimes been difficult to recruit workers for the work on waste (29, GIZ, Kafr Asad) now there was "a growing trend that people participate in waste collection. Before, people looked down on people collecting waste. Even shopkeepers now tell us that they wished they had a job like ours, where we collect the waste" (106, participant, Umm al-Jimāl). People have got just accustomed to working in the sector:

> In the beginning, there was this stigma about collecting waste. But now, it got ingrained in their own mentality. *What is the reason for this mind shift?* The way how they approach people. They came in a different way, they told us about the reasons for collecting waste. Many people shifted from working on farms because they pay more here [but] the people work here not only because of money. The people love working here. […] They tell us that waste in nothing to be ashamed of. They made working with waste as something that is not shameful. (94, participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

Yet, among non-participants, the shame culture is sometimes still quite present: *"What do you think about the programmes where Syrians and Jordanians work with each other?"* "These programmes are run by GIZ or foreigners. Jordanians would not want to work in such occupations" (50, shopkeeper, Kafr Asad).

In general, the association of shame culture and waste is nothing to "be solved in one round of CfW" but will take time. Yet, it is worth doing "in a country that has a huge problem with waste" (259, expert interview, AAH).

Indirect effects through wages and working conditions

There are, however, also signs of distortionary effects. In some areas at least, CfW programmes crowd out private employment because the wages paid by the CfW programmes exceed the average level of wages for unskilled workers (for instance, 256, ILO; 305, GIZ). A government official said that when CfW programmes start, "workers leave their [previous] jobs in order to take part in more lucrative CfW programmes for 4-6 months" (248, Ministry of Labour). And a donor representative seconded:

> Syrians work for JOD 1 per hour in private farms, which means that they do not earn more than JOD 8 per day. Offering them JOD 12 or 14 [in CfW projects] means thus that crowding-out is not unlikely to happen. (256, ILO)

In the long run, competition over Syrian workers can of course have positive effects. If the demand for workers by CfW programmes remains large, private employers may feel at some point in time that they have to adjust their wages in order to withstand the competition. But this scenario is not very probable because international donors are likely to reduce rather than increase their spending on CfW programmes in Jordan over the coming years and the offer of cheap workers on the Jordanian labour market will probably continue to increase rather than decrease.

A more positive effect of CfW programmes is the establishment of labour standards at least in an "artificial", that is, donor-funded segment of the Jordanian labour market. The CfW programmes carefully observe ILO norms regarding income levels, safety at the workplace, social protection for families, prospects for personal development, social integration, and freedom to express concerns, to organise and participate in the decisions that affect work. Some experts emphasised that CfW programmes provide formal jobs, namely that they bring with them social security (102, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl; 259, AAH) and an "aware[ness] of specific working standards" (259, AAH). This may, in the long term, have an effect on the attitudes of workers and employers in other parts of the labour market, either improving working conditions in the formal sector or even making the formalisation of informal jobs more likely.

6.4 Effects of the way CfW programmes are designed

With regard to the design of CfW programmes, three issues were mainly raised by our interviewees: the duration of employment; skills development during participation; as well as the targeting mechanisms and application procedures. In addition, some CfW participants criticised that their wages were too low or paid too late, that their work equipment or safety provisions were insufficient, that it was difficult for them to commute to the sites of CfW projects, or they complained, more generally, about the CfW setup (as opposed to other supporting mechanisms) and management choices (see Table 14).

Table 14: Feedback of CfW participants on the design of the programmes			
Negative issues	*Count*	*Positive issues*	*Count*
The **duration of employment** is too short	21		
The **selection of participants** is unfair	5	The **selection of participants** is fair	13
		The application procedures are good	8
CfW does not improve the **skills** of participants	2	CfW does improve the **skills** of participants	8
Sometimes, **wage payments** are delayed	4		
The **safety provisions are insufficient**	4		
The work **equipment** is insufficient	1	The programmes offer good work **equipment**	1
Transportation to the sites is insufficient	1		
Wages are too low	1		
Donors should rather give **loans** for start-ups	1		
Donors should rather give **one-time payments**	1		
The work is **not well planned**	1		
People from outside the villages should manage the programmes	1		
Source: Authors			

The Post-employment Survey of the GIZ Green Infrastructure project produced a different picture but this is mainly because it did not enquire about the interviewees' satisfaction with the duration of their CfW employment or the procedures of participant selection. Instead, it included questions on eleven other aspects of CfW employment (see Table 15). According to the answers, the participants of GIZ's CfW Green Infrastructure Programme were quite satisfied with their participation in the programme. 92 per cent of *all* participants of that programme confirmed that they would recommend it to their friends (see Appendix E2).

However, the overall satisfaction of participants in the GIZ Green Infrastructure project seemed to also depend on their marital status and working hours. The share of married participants who stated that that they would recommend the CfW programme to friends was significantly above average, while it was significantly below average for widowed participants (statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level).

On average, 86 per cent said they were satisfied or even very satisfied with the different aspects, while only 11 per cent said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, but the result differed between genders, nationalities, education levels, geographical areas in Jordan, and marital status. On average, the share of dissatisfied or very dissatisfied respondents was highest with regards to the meals provided at the CfW sites (28 per cent) and the payment (22 per cent) and significantly lower for the other aspects of the GIZ Green Infrastructure CfW programme. Respondents were particularly often satisfied or even very satisfied regarding "employer", "supervision", "safety at work" and "workplace" with shares between 92 and 95 per cent (Table 15). Interestingly, female participants of the GIZ green infrastructure CfW programmes were more often dissatisfied with the workplaces than men, which may be due to the fact that women in the region are more sensitive to this issue than men. At the same time, men expressed dissatisfaction with work equipment and safety at work more often. Participants with university degrees were more often dissatisfied than others with virtually all rated aspects of the CfW programme.

Table 15: Feedback of CfW participants on the design of the programmes				
	Not satisfied at all	Not satisfied	Satisfied	Very satisfied
Meals provided by CfW programmes	16%	12%	23%	45%
Payment (level of wages)	7%	15%	31%	45%
Transportation to sites	6%	8%	31%	53%
Working hours	3%	9%	30%	57%
Work equipment	4%	5%	33%	56%
Feed-back mechanisms	5%	5%	32%	56%
Training	4%	4%	30%	53%
Workplace	3%	4%	33%	59%
Supervision	3%	4%	26%	66%
Safety at work	3%	3%	29%	64%
Employers	1%	2%	30%	65%
Average	*5%*	*6%*	*30%*	*56%*

Note: N=984.
Source: Results of GIZ Post-employment Survey (GIZ, 2019); all rights reserved, used with permission

This may be because more educated people are more critical in general or because they adjust their expectations downwards when applying for a CfW programme because they are accustomed to more comfortable working conditions. Finally, a particularly high share of CfW participants from urban areas criticised the wages paid, the respective supervisor, meals provided at the CfW sites, and transportation. Married CfW participants criticised the working hours of the programmes more often than others.[25]

25 Econometric analysis with different probit models showed that the difference between males and females is statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level, while differences for university graduates are statistically significant at the 99 per cent (employer, transportation), 99.9 per cent (supervisor, workplace, meals at workplaces, training) and 95 per cent (wage, working hours, feed-back mechanisms, safety at work, work equipment) respectively. Both findings on differences between rural and urban areas and the impact of the marital status on satisfaction with working hours are statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.

Yet, when the workers interviewed were asked how the GIZ programme could be improved, 13 per cent suggested extending the length of the employment contracts, while only 4 per cent suggested higher wages and 2 per cent suggested a decrease in working hours or an increase in training, respectively. The number of all other suggestions was very low (GIZ, 2019).

The results of NAMA and ILO's (2019) workers survey among 572 participants of the ILO's employment intensive infrastructure programme were similar to those of the GIZ survey: 93 per cent of the interviewees stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the programme. Just 6 per cent said that they were not satisfied. Asked for the reasons of their dissatisfaction, 27 per cent said that the wages were too low; 24 per cent said that the working hours were too long; 8 per cent said that the training on the job was not sufficient; and only 14 per cent said the duration of the employment was too short. In addition, 8 per cent said that Jordanians should have priority in becoming employed, 17 per cent criticised issues related to payments (delays, deductions, etc.) and 7 per cent said that the work environment was unpleasant (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

The following set of questions, however, also revealed that 22 per cent of the Jordanians and 33 per cent of the Syrians were not registered with social security; 59 per cent of all female workers had no separate toilets; and 39 per cent of the Jordanians and 27 per cent of the Syrians were not paid in time. 2 per cent of the Jordanians and 3 per cent of the Syrians (that is, 12 workers in absolute terms) even stated that the representatives of the respective implementing agency (municipality, contractor, farmer, and so on) had asked them to pay back part of their wages for transportation (5 workers), for better treatment (3), for social security (1) or for other reasons (3) (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

While different programme designs of implementing agencies and insufficient information policies continue to cause uncertainty and sometimes frustration among participants, this has not often been referred to in the interviews and ameliorated as compared to accounts by Lenner (2017). While in earlier CfW phases, participants were selected and paid in different ways or given different information about the duration and conditions of their employment (Lenner, 2017), the coordination between differing implementers through the CfW coordination group has helped to adapt standards and decrease feelings of being misinformed. Yet, apart from different strategies, shortcomings in coordination and communication also stem from the fact that many projects

are based on very short-term funding and the prolongation of budgets is often uncertain (Lenner, 2017) – a fact that has not changed since.

In the following, we elaborate in more detail on the four most discussed elements of CfW programmes' design: the duration of employment (6.4.1); skills development (6.4.2); the targeting of CfW programmes (6.4.3); and, particularly discussed by CfW implementers, the participation of community members in the design of the projects (6.4.4). In this context, we also weigh up how much evidence we have for or against our Hypotheses 8-10 and 15 referring to the intervening effects of the CfW design features.

6.4.1 Duration of employment (Hypothesis 10)

The most frequent complaint by CfW participants was that the term of their employment was too short. Along with that, all kinds of interviewees stressed that the CfW programmes would have more substantial effects on the livelihoods of participants and on their vertical trust in the local government as well as foreign donors if their term of their employment was longer. This finding is evidence for Hypothesis 10.

Of course, it is not astonishing at all that the participants themselves would prefer longer term employment. Eighteen out of 72 participants mentioned the issue: "I hope they make the programme longer; this would help to improve my living conditions. Also, then we would have the opportunity to learn more and this contributes to improve[ing] our living standard" (1, participant, Deyr ʻAllā).

However, many non-participating community members also criticised the short duration of the jobs: "Most organisations hire only for three months. We want more stable opportunities" (96, shopkeeper, Umm al-Jimāl). One shop assistant stopped his informally and precariously working son from applying because CfW was "too temporary" (156, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm).

The representatives of CfW implementing agencies also expressed their discontent with the frequent rotation of CfW participants. As Lenner (2017) noted already, the lengthy process required to get work permits is cumbersome and costly in relation to the short CfW contracts. At the same time, implementers argued that they had two reasons for issuing short-term contracts only (for example, 286, 255, both ILO). The main one was that foreign donors wished to report high participation figures, so the budget was used in a way that allowed for the creation of as many jobs as possible

– even if this came at the cost of short employment terms. The other – much less important – reason is that some participants prefer ultra-short employment contracts of two times ten days per month because they are afraid they might otherwise lose their National Aid Fund (NAF) benefits (264, Oxfam). However, during 2019 – namely after our fieldwork ended – the implementers concluded an agreement with the NAF saying that the NAF would not any longer interrupt the payment of social assistance to households even during their employment in CfW programmes (email exchange with GIZ representative).

CfW participants with longer-term employment contracts (such as 6 months) seemed to be more satisfied with their jobs. For instance, a participant in Kafr Asad, who had at the time of the interview been working in a CfW programme for 6 months, could not think of any possible enhancements: "I feel it [the programme] does not need more improvement, it is already quite perfect" (26; similar 218, participant, Azraq). One shopkeeper (120, Umm al-Jimāl) perceived this difference as tied to neediness: "The people who got long-term contracts really deserved them, they worked very well, others who just wanted to spend time and worked not as hard did not get the long-term contracts". A participant in Kafr Ṣawm objected: "People are not motivated very well. Because it is so short it makes no difference whether they work well or badly" (149).

Overall, though, the short duration severely hampers the programmes' sustainability. "When short-term aid is not linked to sustainable development opportunities, it raises expectations that cannot be met by public authorities" (240, 286, JOHUD; similarly: 245, Caritas; and 248, MoL; and 247, 251, GIZ; and 260, UNDP). Participants should be employed for a longer period so that wages will be used not only for consumption but also for investment (251, 309, GIZ), children's education (155, shopkeeper, Kafr Ṣawm) or medical costs (168, participant, highway). Nevertheless, as some interlocutors pointed out (for instance, 259, AAH), CfW creates by definition a limited-term employment, so significantly expanding the period of employment would create a different type of programme.

These findings are confirmed by Roxin et al. (2020) who also found that participanats and non-participants consider the duration of employment contracts as too short.

6.4.2 Skills development (Hypothesis 15)

Likewise, many interviewees stressed how much more CfW participants benefit from the programmes if these also help to upgrade the skills of the participants. Most CfW programmes in Jordan do not focus on this effect and only very few have an explicit training component. Still, it is evident that the participants of certain programmes do indeed learn something new that may help them get another job in the future. Our evidence to this effect is not ample but some statements of interviewees support our initial Hypothesis 15 to some degree saying that the skills acquired during participation in CfW programmes improve opportunities in finding new employment after the end of the CfW programmes. This question is all the more important in light of the complaints about the lack of sustainability of CfW.

Most CfW programmes in Jordan have no explicit training component[26]; but still, the participants of some of the programmes confirmed that they had earned some useful skills. Knowing that the GIZ, the ILO and DEval were conducting much more systematic and comprehensive surveys among CfW participants all of which included questions on the skills development of the interviewees, we did not systematically ask for this topic in our own survey. And yet we heard enough about the potential of skills upgrading in CfW programmes and its possible effect on the employability of CfW participants to conclude that training should be more systematically integrated into the design of new projects.

Many CfW participants emphasised the importance of acquiring new skills. They understood that they needed better skills to improve their job opportunities. The prospects of acquiring new skills was also a major motivation for many participants to apply for participation (161, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm; 276, non-participant, Kafr Ṣawm).[27]

Yet, several community members also highlighted the importance of skills development: "They [the CfW programmes] are good because they provide the Syrians with additional skills, which help them master difficult situations

26 Some interviewees cite skills training as an aim of CfW while others do not on the grounds that "CfW programmes are meant to provide short-term economic opportunities for participants. They are thus responding to short-term needs but they are also willing to achieve longer term effects" (259, Action Against Hunger).

27 Strictly speaking, this may distort the self-selection of the most vulnerable persons into CfW. Yet, local implementers see the need to develop criteria through which to select people for the programmes who can use the newly developed skills afterwards.

and get new jobs more easily so that the Syrians do not have to rely any more on society" (92, shopkeeper, Al-Azraq).

In particular, they appreciated skills in farming (255, ILO) and domestic repairwork (120, shopkeeper, Umm al-Jimāl) but also – and perhaps surprisingly – in sorting, recycling and composting waste (114, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl; 85, local expert, Al-Azraq). Two CfW participants said: "I learnt a lot. Now, I can deal with electricity, fix things in the house, paint and much more. Now I can do it alone without external help and repair my own house" (58, Jordanian female participant, Kafr Asad); "I have already learned a lot about modern farming techniques. It is more efficient" (270, Syrian male participant, Deyr ʻAllā).

Only a small number of interviewees in our survey stated explicitly that they had not learnt any new skills. Some participants complained that the CfW programmes were much too short to provide participants with the useful skills needed later for opening up new employment opportunities (Hypothesis 15): "We wish the time period was more than two months, so that we learn more […], so that we can do our own projects with other people" (140, female participant, Kafr Ṣawm).

Likewise, 83 per cent of the workers covered by the GIZ Post-employment Survey stated that they were satisfied or even very satisfied with the training provided during their employment with the Green Infrastructure programme. Only 8 per cent said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (see Table 15), with a share significantly higher among university graduates (21 per cent, confirmed at a 99.9 per cent confidence level).

Interestingly, the respondents of the GIZ Post-employment Survey did not mention technical skills in the first place when asked what main lesson they had learnt from their participation in a CfW programme. Instead, the largest share said that they had learnt to "cooperate in teams" (55 per cent), followed by "friendship" (41 per cent), and "commitment" (35 per cent). Only 24 per cent stated that they had learnt "new technical skills" and 18 per cent "time management". Yet, the share of those who had learnt "new technical skills" was higher (28 per cent) among Jordanians than among Syrians (19 per cent) and above average among married participants (both findings statistically significant at the 99 per cent confidence level). It was also somewhat higher among women than among men, but this difference was not statistically significant. 6 per cent of all participants – amongst them, in particular,

Jordanians (at a 99.9 per cent confidence level) – maintained that they had not learnt anything (see Appendix E).

Roxin et al. (2020) also found that many CfW participants highly valued the skills acquired during their employment in the programmes. Most notably Syrians and those who had worked in the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme stated that, after the wage itself, what they have learnt was the second most important benefit of their participation. The examples they gave included not only technical capabilities but also soft skills such as communication with others and the ability to work in teams.

In stark contrast to this, the findings of the second round of the ILO workers survey indicated that only a minority of the participants of the organisation's employment-intensive infrastructure programme had learnt new skills that would help them in finding a new job after the end of their employment in the programme. Only about one-fifth of the participants interviewed were able to find a follow-on employment and just 8 per cent of these said that their CfW participation had helped them find that new job. Even in these few cases, the CfW participation was mostly helpful because of the *wasṭa* (connections) that the workers had built during their CfW employment (5 per cent) rather than the skills they had acquired (3 per cent) (NAMA & ILO, 2019).

For this reason, many experts emphasised that explicit training modules should be integrated into the design of future CfW programmes (189, local expert, Faqū'a; 248, MOL; 252, MOPIC; 259, AAH). Having said that, there is a discussion about how the skills-sustainability nexus should be addressed: on the labour demand or on the labour supply level; that is, either through supporting employers with employment-intensive business plans – an approach supported more by the ILO and KfW – or through certifying skills at the level of the participants – an approach mostly favoured by GIZ. Under the first approach, concentrating on the labour demand side, contractors implementing CfW programmes (for instance companies responsible for road construction and local resourcing) learn "how to work in a labour-intensive way" (255, ILO; 256 ILO) while respecting working standards and certifying acquired skills. By focusing on labour-intensive employment, this approach would thus create additional jobs and provide a pool of possible contractors, also for government-run programmes, even when the CfW programmes finish.

By contrast, within the second approach, experts argue for a better skilled labour supply, debating whether skills could be certified according to the

national qualification framework. There are two conditions for such a certification of developed skills: first, workers in fact acquire new skills (264, Oxfam) as opposed to fulfilling completely unskilled job placements; second, skills training must be in line with the needs of the labour market, which are often not sufficiently mapped (245, Caritas). In relation to Syrian refugees, our interviewees called for skills for possible home-based businesses (252, MoPIC) or for eventual reconstruction in Syria (253, MoPIC).

6.4.3 Targeting (Hypothesis 8)

Several interviewees told us that they perceived the selection of workers for participation in CfW as unfair and intransparent, and these same interlocutors also expressed that this perception was one of the reasons why they had only weak vertical trust in the implementing agencies and in local authorities. Other interviewees, however, saw the selection of participants as fair and just and, in turn, felt much higher vertical trust in the implementing agencies and the local authorities that were responsible for the CfW programmes. Our findings thus support Hypothesis 8 saying that targeting that is perceived as unfair lowers the positive effect of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging in addition to lowering horizontal and vertical trust.

Below we discuss how (i) the dissemination of information on CfW programmes; (ii) the procedure of participant selection; and (iii) the targeting results were perceived by our respondents.

Information on CfW programmes

Apparently, the dissemination of information on new CfW programmes was not a problem. All interviewees reported positive experiences in finding out about CfW job opportunities and how to apply for them. They learnt about the programmes from advertisements on Facebook or other websites, printed flyers, or advertisements in local supermarkets – but, most often, by word-of-mouth communication from friends or family members. A Syrian man said: "Everybody in Dayr ʻAllā is talking about it" (7, participant, Dayr ʻAllā). Another one told us: "[I found out about it] *can Ṭarīq an-Nās* [via the people]" (181, participant, highway). Often, participants knew someone who was working for the implementing organisation and therefore decided to apply.

The selection process

The procedure of participant selection seems to vary from one CfW programme to the other. At the beginning, some implementing agencies selected applicants on the basis of "first come, first serve". Later, they started using information on the applicants provided by the National Aid Fund to check their neediness (31, local expert, Kafr Asad). In the meantime, most programmes have local committees at each field site to decide on the applicant acceptance on the basis of an elaborate list of criteria of vulnerability and, sometimes, qualification. In Al-Azraq, for example, the committee consists of representatives of the municipality, the implementer, and local charity organisations (85, local expert, Al-Azraq). Likewise, in Kafr Asad, "there is a participatory committee from the municipality, with also a Syrian representative, somebody from the local youth, a women representative. They select three out of them for the selection committee that will select the cash workers" (29, local expert, Kafr Asad).

Non-participants in Umm al-Jimāl stressed that they were glad about the fact that the foreign donors were overseeing the recruitment process because "if organisations ask people to apply through the municipality, *wasṭa* will become a problem. Then from the same household there are many people working, but sometimes in other households no one would find work" (116, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

In Faqū'a, by way of contrast, the selection seems to be done by people from that place only. A Jordanian participant criticised this practice and requested that "outsiders should manage the programmes. It is not good when locals manage it. The money is lost due to corruption" (204, participant, Faqū'a). A local expert was similarly sceptical about the process:

> We had one single application day… [They] used some sort of questionnaire and gave grades to the answers [for example] if you have a family member with a disability. But […] there was no fact-checking. And the decisions on who is allowed to participate was taken the very same day. Also, there was no equality in the areas, they did not include the place [of living of applicants] in the questionnaire. Then, they took a lot of people from Faqū'a [itself] and few people from the surroundings. The distribution was not fair. (189, local expert, Faqū'a)

A local implementer from Deyr 'Allā admitted that: "Of course, some people perceive the selection process as unfair. They believe that some people need the jobs more than those who have been selected." And he added: "We

suggest applicants to the NRC. But they select. I am afraid that there are a lot of problems because we know so much better than them who is good for the programmes. So, we should choose. They know the candidates just on paper" (8, local expert, Deyr 'Allā; similarly: 31, local experts, Kafr Asad). Striking the right balance between local knowledge on the situation of individual applicants and locals exploiting their role through favouritism (*wasṭa*) is, however, daunting, as our data on targeting results show.

Targeting results

Opinions on the targeting results differ substantially among participants, non-participant community members, and experts.

They are particularly positive where the nature of the CfW activities (for example, road maintenance and waste collection) brings about self-targeting. A participant of the KfW/ILO Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme said, for instance: "Nobody would work so many hours if they were not in need. We walk two to three kilometres per day. People wouldn't walk so far if they did not need the money" (168, participant, Irbid Highway). A Jordanian colleague stated: "If anything, the person who is in charge knows the people who are working; the person knows that the people are in need" (167, participant, Irbid Highway). Another, Syrian colleague seconded: "I don't know how people get selected [but] it is obvious that people here are in need of work" (181, participant, Irbid Highway). Likewise, participants of the GIZ's Waste to (positive) Energy programme also had no doubts that the programme was employing only people who needed the work. A local expert (29, Kafr Asad) stressed that only Jordanians in desperate need of any kind of income would ever apply for jobs as "shameful" as those in the waste sector (see subsection 6.3.4 on the so-called "shame culture").

Nonetheless, we also heard positive comments from other projects, where self-targeting was less effective. For example, a Jordanian man from Faqū'a was quite satisfied: "They choose the right people; it is a good way, an appropriate selection" (210, participant, Faqū'a). Sometimes, however, such contentedness stemmed from rumours nurturing a wrong understanding of the selection procedures: "All Syrians were told that at some point, they would receive a job and therefore, everybody accepted the selection process as fair" (218, participant, Al-Azraq).

At all field sites, other interviewees were more critical, though, and participants, non-participant community members and local experts

complained about favouritism on the basis of *wasṭa* (connections). A local expert from Kafr Asad stated:

> The names were chosen by *wasṭa*, the selection process was very unfair. I'm saying that it is not the fault of [the implementing agency]. When I register to sign my name with the *baladiyya* [Arabic: municipality], to be employed by a CfW project, the *baladiyya* gives other names to it [that is, prioritises it according to criteria that are not publicly available]. If I work in the *baladiyya*, I can tell my friends to apply for the programme. (228, local expert, Kafr Asad)

Some people said that *wasṭa* was playing a role in the selection of both Jordanians and Syrians: "The […] project is running through *wasṭa*; I know people that have been working there for years. […] Yes, both Syrians and Jordanians have *wasṭa* to be able to do that [that is, doing more than one rotation]" (48, Syrian participant, Kafr Asad).

More often, however, we heard that targeting errors happened mainly in the selection of Jordanians because the Syrians were all vulnerable anyhow. For example, a Syrian man said: "The Syrians […] were selected in a fair way but for the Jordanians it was mainly by *wasṭa* [namely, connections]" (147, participant, Kafr Ṣawm). Similarly, a Jordanian participant complained:

> I know that Syrians are in bad conditions, but [at least] they are treated equally: a Syrian individual gets the same treatment as other Syrians. For us [Jordanians], when we get support from the government it is by luck whether you get any assistance, and usually *wasṭa* and connection play a role. (211, Faqū'a)

Though the influence of *wasṭa* was perceived as more decisive for Jordanian applicants, this different treatment seemed not to affect community members' trust in the respective other national group (horizontal trust). Rather, the perception of pervasive *wasṭa* negatively affected trust in the authorities (vertical trust).

As preliminary research by Lenner (2017) suggests, we found no indication that very vulnerable Syrian refugees were excluded from CfW programmes because they lacked the necessary official documents and thus could not obtain the mandatory work permit. Neither implementers nor applicants reported such problems to us, so the application procedure seems to have taken account of this in the meantime.

6.4.4 Participation in project design (Hypothesis 9)

The CfW programmes in Jordan let the members of local communities participate in the design of their various projects in different ways and to different degrees. Some programmes plan their activities in a completely top-down and centralised manner without any possibility of community participation while, at the other extreme, some programmes even hold open councils inviting all community members to participate in the discussion on the shape of future activities. Unfortunately, we were not able to analyse the different forms of citizen participation systematically but we nevertheless asked our interviewees their opinions on them. The answers provide some support – at least in regard to vertical trust – for Hypothesis 9, which suggests that community participation in project design increases the positive effects on social cohesion.

Both CfW participants and non-participants confirmed that they knew which CfW programmes had given what kind of opportunities to community members to participate in the planning of their local activities, and they appreciated all attempts made by the programmes in this regard. For example, a Syrian man in Kafr Asad remembered well that "the municipality came and asked, 'What is your opinion if we should get a German firm to open job opportunities?' [… They] informed some of us, and then the news spread around the village" (46, non-participant, Kafr Asad). A Syrian woman confirmed: "Many meetings were held where everything was explained. We have heard from Najmeh, have heard about another project in Irbid" (25, participant, Kafr Asad).

In the example of Al-Azraq, the cooperation between the implementing agency and the donor began early on:

> We [a committee of representatives from the municipality, the implementing agency and local charity organisations] planned together. Our unit had developed a strategic plan that we presented to AAH [Action against Hunger]. We had learned from USAID [the United States Agency for International Development] how to strategise. That is why we succeeded in the collaboration. (85, local expert, Al-Azraq)

The same committee was later also responsible for the organisation of participatory events and the recruitment of CfW participants (85, local expert, Al-Azraq).

In other places, such as Deyr ʻAllā and Kafr Ṣawm, all key decisions on CfW project design were taken by a small groups of representatives of the municipality, the responsible ministry, and the donor agency (6, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā). Participatory events were held but could only discuss options "to improve and develop the [existing] programmes" (5, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā). The director of the implementing agency of CfW programmes in Deyr ʻAllā explained:

> There is a way of communicating with the municipality. But only with a small group of people. I pick these people myself. They can speak up and then tell what kind of infrastructure they want. These seven representatives of the community meet and all of them talk about what they need. Thereby, these people provide the municipality with the information that it needs. (6, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā)

And in some places, the local authorities were heavily criticised for not providing more possibilities for citizens' participation in project design. A local expert from Faqūʼa said, for example:

> We wish to have more say in where the projects take place. It was not clear to me what power we have. It was not even clear who was the decision-maker. We did not know whom to contact to ask for changes. Some decisions were taken on WhatsApp; I was not sure about the legal status of these decisions. Were we breaking the law, if we did not accept the decisions? (189, local expert, Deyr ʻAllā)

The range of experiences can be explained by the fact that specific CfW activities offered different starting points for participatory processes. CfW creating public spaces or other public goods that can be shaped according to people's wishes are suited best for participatory events as people can connect to the infrastructure created (282, GIZ; focus group East Amman). Other CfW activities, such as road maintenance or waste collection, offer hardly any design choices that the public could be consulted on.

7 Policy recommendations

The findings of our research show that, in addition to their direct/individual effects, CfW programmes can have noticeable positive indirect/community effects. Many other studies have shown that CfW programmes, if well designed, are able to reap a triple dividend: They can (i) generate employment and income for refugees and other vulnerable groups; (ii) help

fill gaps in infrastructure; and (iii) extend the skills, the self-esteem and the motivation of their beneficiaries. However, as our evidence also shows, CfW programmes can also contribute to another triple dividend at the community level, fostering (iv) social cohesion; (v) local economic development; and (vi) gender equality in addition, and perhaps in particular, in the context of flight and migration.

In this section, we discuss policy recommendations specifically in relation to the following questions:

- Are CfW programmes generally recommendable as an instrument of support in the contexts of migration and conflict? Are other instruments recommendable alternatives?
- Are there trade-offs between indirect and direct effects of CfW programmes?
- Who should implement CfW programmes?
- How can the CfW programmes in Jordan be optimised in the short term?
- How should the CfW programmes in Jordan be dealt with in the medium to long term?

The following four subsections offer answers to these questions, based on the findings of our research with its said limitations. These can be summarised as follows:

- CfW can also work in the contexts of flight and migration. In such contexts, the instrument may even be particularly recommendable because of its more indirect effects. Often, when social cohesion and local economic development are threatened by crises such as flight and migration, communities in conflict-affected countries can benefit from carefully designed CfW interventions (subsection 7.1). Thereby, the known trade-offs between the direct effects of CfW programmes are more profound than those between their indirect effects; thus, adding community-related targets to the list of desired outcomes is not a zero-sum game (subsection 7.2).
- The international donor community may consider drawing up new CfW programmes, but it could also be recommendable for national governments to set up CfW programmes themselves – possibly with co-funding from external donors – and thereby safeguard the coherence of social policies targeted to nationals and immigrants (subsection 7.3).

- For Jordan itself, we recommend that CfW programmes are continued, but slightly refined in their design (subsection 7.4). Sooner or later they will have to be carefully transformed from being a humanitarian aid to a development policy instrument. Possibly, the government of Jordan can play a more active role in this process in the future (subsection 7.5).

7.1 Are CfW programmes generally recommendable as an instrument of support in the contexts of migration and conflict? Are other instruments recommendable alternatives?

We recommend the use of CfW programmes in contexts where social cohesion between different population groups is under strain and needs to be strengthened, as the programmes contain the potential to reconcile groups or to integrate people into a (host) society. This holds for situations of international and internal migration, rising tensions between resident population groups, and other contexts. However, of course, violent conflict should not be imminent because the effectiveness of CfW programmes requires a reliable administration, a minimum of safety and some trust for the unfolding of more indirect effects. In Jordan, the fact that Jordanians and Syrians already had strong ties before the war in Syria considerably eased the setting up of CfW programmes.[28] Nonetheless, we believe that CfW programmes can also be used in countries with less favourable conditions. Here, CfW programmes would have to be carefully designed, for instance with regard to employing mixed teams, in order to make sure that they do not have adverse effects (Cherrier, in press).

Just as in in Jordan, implementing CfW programmes may also be recommendable for political goals in other contexts. Foreign donors have set up CfW programmes (and also some cash transfer schemes) in order to protect the livelihoods of Syrian refugees and their Jordanian neighbours in the host communities through employment. Implicit secondary goals have been (i) to improve the acceptability of Syrians refugees being hosted in

28 As our sampling focused on smaller, semi-rural field sites (see subsection 5.2.2) our study cannot provide conclusive evidence as to whether the presence of other refugee and migrant populations in Jordan (see subsection 3.2), also working mainly in unskilled and labour-intensive sectors, has any (adverse?) impact on CfW programmes' community effects. On this issue, more research is required.

Jordan; and thereby (ii) to lower the number of Syrians having reason to continue their flight towards Europe.

Of course, there are alternatives to CfW programmes. For example, the primary goal – protecting the livelihoods of refugees and their neighbours – can also be pursued by

- *active labour market policies (ALMPs)*, which are meant to help specific groups of workers find a job on the primary labour market through training, job placement services, or incentives given to employers (for example, wage subsidies and tax holidays),
- *social in-kind transfers* (such as the provision of food rations, public transportation vouchers, and social housing), and
- *social cash transfers* (conditional or unconditional).

Active labour market policies (ALMPs) can be hard to implement in conflict-affected countries for several reasons. For instance, in the Jordanian context it was clear that they would have little effect because the Jordanian government only allowed a small number of Syrians to work officially (that is, in formal employment) – and also only in a few economic sectors. In addition, unemployment and underemployment rates are so high in Jordan that Syrians have hardly any chance to get a sufficiently well paid job anywhere in the formal or informal sector in any case. The situation is likely to be quite similar for refugee populations in most other contexts of flight and migration.

Social in-kind transfers have their own challenges because, though feasible and effective, they are often highly inefficient. There is broad consensus now among researchers and practitioners that the transportation of in-kind goods to the target group is too expensive. UNRWA has experienced these challenges as it has been delivering packages of goods every month to Palestinian refugee families in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon since 1948.

Social cash transfer schemes may be an interesting alternative to CfW programmes in terms of achieving the primary goal of donors for three reasons:

- Their overhead costs are lower than those of CfW schemes because they do not require infrastructure gaps to be identified, work schemes to be designed, building material to be provided, and work to be monitored by project managers and engineers.

- If a country already has an effective cash transfer scheme – as Jordan does – it may find it easier to extend it to additional population groups rather than to set up parallel structures. Through this the results could become more coherent, which may be the reason why in 2018 the UK Department for International Development (DFID) stopped its CfW engagement in Jordan and considered supporting the NAF financially and technically in the inclusion of Syrians as a target group in its cash transfer scheme.
- And, most importantly, social cash transfers can also be given to people who are work-disabled for whatever reason (for instance because of age, bad health or care duties), while they are excluded by definition from the benefits provided by CfW programmes.

At the same time, *CfW programmes* have several advantages:

- Social cash transfer schemes do not contribute to the building of infrastructure or the upgrading of skills, self-esteem, or motivation among beneficiaries. And even if CfW programmes make no major contribution to the building of infrastructure, they can still make a difference, such as the waste collection programmes in Jordan which generate important awareness for cleaner streets and the recycling of waste.
- Conditional and unconditional social cash transfer schemes provide purchasing power without work. For various psychological and psychosocial reasons, this is objectively a disadvantage: The provision of work is sometimes just as important as the provision of cash because (i) many recipients want to give back something in exchange for the support they get as a matter of dignity (even if the work they do does not make much sense at all); (ii) the employment keeps people busy, distracts them from their day-to day worries, and guards against feelings of boredom, frustration or anger; (iii) the employment brings people together and helps them against feeling lonely, isolated and useless.
- Cash transfer schemes perform less well on targeting. While cash transfer schemes mostly rely on proxy means-tests which always involve large errors of inclusion and exclusion, CfW programmes benefit from the in-built self-targeting mechanism: only poor and vulnerable households apply because better-off households are not willing to do the hard work that CfW programmes offer. (Admittedly, this mechanism functions less well for refugees who are almost by definition poor and, even if they

are highly qualified, willing to accept whatever work is available. But the self-targeting mechanism works quite well for the national resident population – in our case the Jordanians.)

- CfW programmes have very comprehensive positive community/ indirect effects in addition to their individual/direct effects, as has been demonstrated by our research. Cash transfers can also have positive effects on local economic development through multiplier and investment effects, but they cannot compare with CfW programmes in the improvement of social cohesion. This is because cash transfer schemes do not bring people together to one place and do not create a joint product that all population groups may in the end consider as a common good which different population groups have built together.

7.2 Are there trade-offs between indirect and direct effects of CfW programmes?

While our methodology did not allow us to assess possible trade-offs in much detail, aiming at CfW programmes' additional, indirect effects seems not to be at the direct expense of their direct effects. Thus, already well-known trade-offs between the three direct dividends need to be taken into account, although our evidence does not point toward further trade-offs between CfW programmes' indirect effects.

The Jordanian experience gave some insights as to the critical question of how to weight the three direct dividends. Expecting a true triple dividend is not always realistic. Instead, it might often be wise to focus on just two aspects – for example wage employment and the creation of sustainable public goods; or wage employment and training – but achieve as much as possible in both of them. In our research, the water reservoir projects in Jordan seemed a very good example of the first option, while the CfW projects in agriculture seemed a good example for the second one. But the Jordanian experience has also shown that it is also sometimes possible to make achievements in all *three* dimensions: for example, in the context of the renovation of schools in Najmah projects or the upgrading of public parks in AVSI (Association of Volunteers in International Service) projects.

As for the direct effects of CfW projects, there are clear trade-offs between the three components. For example, if CfW activities are meant to employ as many very poor people as possible, there is a risk that the infrastructure

created is not sustainable because the workers lack the necessary skills and experience to produce high quality goods. In addition, there is little incentive to train the workers because adding an additional training component – unrelated to the actual, simple work task – would be expensive and reduce the number of workers that can be hired. If the main idea is to produce useful public goods, it might be important to mainly employ well-trained workers even if they are less poor than others, have alternative employment options, and do not learn new skills during their employment because they have the necessary ones already.

Our impression from the interviews is that small organisations in charge of only few CfW projects are better able and more innovative in bridging this trade-off and hence making a tangible contribution to all three potential dividends of CfW programmes: wage employment, sustainable infrastructure, and training. What we do not know, of course, is if this advantage is bought by higher administration and overhead costs, meaning that we would not be surprised if large organisations implementing many similar CfW projects had lower costs because of economies of scale.

In any case, we suggest that all organisations involved in CfW activities in Jordan reconsider how the third possible dividend – namely the promotion of the skills, the self-esteem, and the motivation of participants – can be further exploited (even if this renders the self-targeting mechanism of CfW projects less effective which would, however, be less relevant when humanitarian aid is turned into development cooperation). This is particularly important if gender is a major issue in the goals of CfW programmes because the promotion of women in economic and social life is particularly linked to this aspect.

A trade-off that also needs to be taken into account is the psychological one: CfW programmes can be a useful tool in contexts with high unemployment or underemployment as they provide short-term jobs that ease financial stress, offer preoccupation, and thus discourage public unrest. However, we do not recommend the use of CfW programmes if strong negative psychological effects for the participants may result, as may be the case if people rely solely on participation in CfW programmes and have difficulty in developing coping strategies once their participation in the programme has come to an end.

As for the indirect effects of CfW programmes, we did not find signs of such trade-offs. For instance, CfW measures can foster both social cohesion by

targeting Syrians and Jordanian participants while at the same time promoting more equitable gender roles by employing female and male participants. Neither does the size of the multiplicator effect, stimulating local economic development, seem to depend on a particular composition of participants – in our sample, CfW participants of all backgrounds predominantly spent their income at the local level. Solely the direction of the multiplicator effect may differ slightly as men and women have different spending priorities. Yet we did not find any evidence for spending patterns that could put social cohesion at risk: not a single Syrian or Jordanian interviewee stated that they preferred to spend their money in shops owned by compatriots or blamed community members of the other nationality for doing so (in contrast, some interviewees even pointed towards a positive competition and a better range goods now available since Syrians had opened shops). Yet, these observations may not be transferrable to other conflict-affected countries; hence the possible effect of different target groups' spending patterns should be assessed on a case-to-case basis when considering whether to implement CfW.

Plainly for budgetary reasons, there may be a slight trade-off between CfW programmes indirect and their direct effects. Designing CfW activities for different target populations – distinguished by gender, nationality, or any other characteristic – incurs some extra administrative costs, possibly at the expense of coverage in terms of additional employment contracts, units of infrastructure, or skills training sessions.

In sum, taking a holistic view of the direct and indirect effects of CfW programmes may open up new opportunities by combining direct and indirect effects that go particularly well together, such as a focus on renewing infrastructure and facilitating local economic development; or skills training and promoting social cohesion.

7.3 Who should implement CfW programmes?

The question of whether CfW programmes should be set up by foreign donors – as in the case of Jordan – or by national governments is anything but trivial. In Jordan, the role of the national government has been restricted so far to allowing the engagement of donors more or less automatically and easing the implementation of CfW within the local context. The advantage of such a strategy for the national government is that it does not need to take any responsibility: it does not have to contribute to the funding, it cannot be blamed for any possible mistakes, failure or adverse effects, and it cannot

be accused by citizens of caring too much about immigrants rather than the local population.

At the same time, by choosing this easier route national governments miss several opportunities. If instead, they take the initiative themselves by setting up CfW schemes on their own, they can demonstrate that (i) they are capable of mastering the game themselves; (ii) they are prepared to accept responsibility for all inhabitants, thereby legitimising their rule; and (iii) they are willing to coordinate and structure the field of social policies in a coherent, efficient and equilibrated way.

Donors, on the other hand, must decide whether they want to claim responsibility for programmes informed by international best practice or whether they support – and thereby legitimise and stabilise – national governments, which can in turn claim legitimacy through successfully operating CfW programmes.

7.4 How can the CfW programmes in Jordan be optimised in the short term?

In Jordan, CfW programmes should be gradually transformed from being an instrument of humanitarian aid to being a development policy tool. The host communities have more or less absorbed the first shock caused by the arrival of large numbers of Syrians and the refugees have settled in, finding ways to survive at least. Thus, the country is not anymore in a situation where refugee-related decisions and actions must be taken very quickly. Instead, all planning should take a more long-term and development perspective. For the CfW programmes, this means that the creation of short-term employment and income is still important but should no longer have priority at any price over possible long-term effects such as the building of long-term infrastructure, the promotion of skills, women's empowerment, or the strengthening of social cohesion and local economic development. In detail, this means considering the following:

(i) Raise the number of working days in CfW programmes: Many respondents, CfW participants and experts told us that an extension of working contracts from three to six months would already make a big difference in order to leave more impact on beneficiaries (skills, experience, improvement of the financial situation) and to create a more stable setup for communities. The wages that are currently paid for three months of employment are

sometimes not even sufficient to allow CfW participants to pay back their debts. Of course, for a given budget, a trade-off exists between the length of employment and the possible number of beneficiaries. However, at least in the north of Jordan, a large share of Syrian households already seem to have had the chance of benefitting from at least one three-month's employment in a donor-funded CfW programme. It might thus be justifiable to employ less workers for a longer period from now on and to try to select them on the basis of their development potential in terms of skills upgrading. (GIZ's CfW-plus schemes already seem to be going in this direction but have the disadvantage of having to transfer promising CfW participants to a new programme). An alternative could be to issue short-term contracts at the beginning but extend them for a limited number of particularly motivated workers. However, such a step would most probably not make much difference in terms of the investment effects. Evidence from CfW schemes elsewhere shows that investment effects only materialise if the provision of benefits is very reliable, regular and quite long-term or if they come with eased access to credit (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2015, pp. 15ff.).

(ii) Optimise the quality and transparency of targeting: A substantial number of interviewees stated that the selection of applicants for participation in CfW programmes was unfair (at least for Jordanian applicants). Our methodology does not allow us to assess whether these allegations are justified and, admittedly, it is probably impossible to establish a completely fair selection process. However, the donors should still work hard in cooperation with their local partners to ensure that the selection process is as fair as possible. Even more importantly, they should communicate well the selection criteria, the list of applicants, and the reasons why certain applicants have been selected. According to our findings, gaps in the perceived fairness or transparency of the selection process may have substantial negative effects on social cohesion (vertical *and* horizontal trust) within local communities.

(iii) Control of timely wage payments: CfW participants complained about irregularities in procedures much more than about the design of CfW schemes in general. In the interest of social cohesion, it is thus very important that donors and their local partners fulfil their part of the work contract in a timely manner, thus leading by example and enabling CfW participants to plan ahead and gain autonomy over their spending.

(iv) Make sure that CfW programmes create infrastructure with long-term pay-offs: CfW programmes in Jordan differ substantially in their second

dividend: the development of public goods. Our subjective impression was that some programmes created important and beneficial infrastructure with substantial and long-term pay-offs while the product of others was less essential for the people in Jordan, less useful for social cohesion and economic development, and less sustainable. While our methodology did not allow us to fully assess which programmes did better or worse in this regard, we think that the programmes should try to learn from each other about how to produce more long-term changes. As detailed above, there is a trade-off in general between CfW projects being highly labour-intensive (that is, spending a large share of their budgets on wages) and creating valuable and sustainable public goods (that is, spending on engineering services, high-quality building materials, and well-trained workers). Yet, the experience of other countries has shown that some sectors can bridge this trade-off, for instance in creating employment for large numbers of unskilled workers in addition to building up sustainable infrastructure. According to Gehrke and Hartwig (2015, p. 35f.), these sectors include the construction of rural roads, water conservation and irrigation, flood control, and the development and rehabilitation of land.

(v) Let local stakeholders participate in the fine-tuning of CfW programme design: To the limits that we could find out, CfW participants and non-participants highly appreciate being asked about the final design of CfW schemes in their neighbourhoods. Apparently, participatory processes in project design have significant positive effect on social cohesion (vertical trust and the feeling of belonging). Furthermore, this triggers closer co-operation with local municipalities, who need to take over and maintain the created infrastructure (such as waste-sorting sites) after the end of CfW programmes. Given that such processes – which involve at best community members, representatives of all local groups, and local businesses – come with only limited costs, we think that they can be seen as a good investment.

(vi) Prioritise local procurement: Buying inputs locally (that is, in the villages where CfW activities take place) raises the effect on local economic development. Of course, there is a trade-off in effectiveness because products bought locally are sometimes more expensive and of cheaper quality than those bought from international markets; nonetheless, donor agencies should check whether regulations pushing for low-price procurement can still be waived in order to promote social cohesion and local economic development.

(vii) Let CfW participants work in mixed teams: Our findings show that the close cooperation of workers of different nationality (Jordanians, Syrians, but also others) increases horizontal trust. The close cooperation of male and female workers is good for gender emancipation and should be considered wherever possible.

(viii) Give tasks to women that are close to their homes and in their traditional fields of activity: Our findings confirm assumptions that have been raised by others before (see, for instance, Kabeer, 2011) with regard to the willingness of women to get involved in CfW projects in conservative settings such as Jordan: women's motivation can be pushed by (i) equal wage levels being conceded to male and female workers in one and the same CfW project; (ii) CfW activities proximate to the homes of female participants; (iii) jobs similar to those that women would usually do as parts of their lives outside the CfW projects; and (iv) day-care facilities next to the CfW sites for mothers with children.

(ix) Put more emphasis on the development of skills of CfW participants: As has been detailed above, there is once more a trade-off between this and the two main dividends of CfW programmes: creating large numbers of jobs and building useful infrastructure. Focusing on activities that promote technical skills can limit the possibilities of CfW programmes to sectors that provide only a limited number of jobs or do not create the most important kinds of public goods. Moreover, the experience of other countries shows that it does not pay off to deliver expensive training within CfW programmes unless these build technical skills that are highly needed on the labour market (Estache et al., 2013, p. 71; Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 115). However, CfW programmes can also contribute to the building of soft, entrepreneurial and economic skills. In addition, our impression was that several projects also contributed to the technical skills of participants, especially in farming, the upgrading of public buildings and parks, and reforestation. But perhaps this was also due to the fact that many projects in these areas are being implemented by smaller local partners who are more flexible, creative and ambitious with regard to skill promotion, while larger partners tend to create "one-size-fits-all" kinds of activities in order to reach the aspired high number of jobs.

7.5 How should the CfW programmes in Jordan be dealt with in the medium to long term?

Foreign donors will not – and should not – continue setting up the same kind of CfW projects in Jordan again and again, and forever – even if large numbers of Syrians stay much longer than initially expected. Most Syrians now living in Jordan have little incentive to return back home. Even if the majority are suffering from many kinds of poverty, most do not have any possessions to return to (since much was destroyed or expropriated). At least, in Jordan, they are safe from war and persecution. However, the CfW programmes were initially designed as an instrument of rapid emergency response. During the next years, donors will wish to replace this approach or convert it into a more development-oriented strategy.

It would be possible for the government of Jordan to anticipate this shift. While the current situation may be of considerable advantage to the Jordanian government in many ways – in that, firstly, the responsibility for anything going wrong with the CfW programmes lies with foreign donors and, secondly, foreign doners rather than the government are the targets of populist claims by Jordanians displeased with aid being provided to Syrians – there are also significant disadvantages: not only does the government not have full control over CfW activities but these activities are entirely disconnected from the rest of Jordan's social protection system. What is more, the *merits* of the CfW projects are also attributed to the foreign donors rather than to the government of Jordan. This means that the government is missing out on the chance to improve the vertical trust felt towards it by its citizens as well as Syrian refugees and thereby to raise its own legitimacy. Instead, Jordanians and Syrians develop vertical trust in the foreign donors, thus diminishing the legitimacy of the government of Jordan. For this reason, we recommend that the government of Jordan consider setting up its own CfW programme, creating essential infrastructure and employment for vulnerable Jordanians and Syrians and other refugees before the foreign donors withdraw from this field of activities. In doing so, the government of Jordan could show that it sees CfW as a useful tool to support vulnerable households from whatever origin. As an alternative, it could attempt to acquire funding from foreign donors to cover just the wage payments for refugee participants in order to avoid populist "Jordan First" claims. Such a step would definitely contribute substantially to increasing vertical trust – and hence to both social cohesion and government legitimacy. In addition, it would allow the Jordanian government to design the CfW programme according to its

own preferences and criteria and to coordinate and harmonise it with other elements of the country's social protection system, in particular the three social cash transfer schemes (see subsection 4.1). Such a programme could be inspired by the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) of India which entitles vulnerable sections of the population to 100 days of paid work per year. At the same time, donors could still bear some of the costs – at least perhaps the wages paid to non-Jordanian citizens – while the new programme could also benefit from the technical support given by international donors and the experiences they have already gained through their CfW programmes in Jordan.

If the government should prefer not to take such a step, the donors will have to decide how the support of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians is to continue. On the one hand, the Syrians cannot be left alone once more without any support from one day to the next. On the other hand, donors cannot continue their current strategy forever. One exit strategy would be to withdraw gradually, although this, in itself, is not a very humanitarian option. Another solution would be to envisage the shift to more development-oriented forms of support such as active labour market policies, though the success of such a strategy would depend greatly on the willingness of the government of Jordan to admit larger numbers of Syrians to the formal Jordanian labour market. A final strategy might be to make future development cooperation with Jordan dependent upon the government of Jordan taking over the existing CfW programmes as described above. However, all three exit strategies are not without considerable risks.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Lists of interviewees

A1 – List of interviewed experts on the national level

Abuobeid, Zein, Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), 14 February 2019, Amman.

Al Azab, Farah, Communications, Community Development and Monitoring Officer, Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan, International Labour Organization (ILO), Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.

Al-Awamreh, Mohammad, Deputy Programs Director, CARE International in Jordan, 28 June 2018 and 12 February 2019, Amman.

AlDamen, Yasmin, Director of the Relations and Services Department, Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, 28 January 2019, Bonn.

Aldhabbi, Assia, International Development Consultant, Amman, 26 June 2019, per email.

Al-Madi, Dr. Badr, Assistant Professor, University of Jordan, 13 February 2019, Amman.

Al-Majali, Lama, Programme Policy Officer/Nutrition Specialist, Jordan Country Office, World Food Programme (WFP), 24 June 2018, Amman.

Al-Mubarak, Rawan, Director of Investment and International Cooperation, Ministry for Public Works and Housing (MoPWH), 20 February 2019, Amman.

Al-Shakhshir, Tahani, President, Jordanian Women's Union, 18 March 2019, Amman.

Al-Rawabdeh, Ahmad, GIZ Project Manager, Jordan Office, World Vision International (WVI), 21 February 2019, Amman.

Al-Rawashdeh, Samer, Agricultural Consultant, International Labour Organization (ILO), Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.

Al Saket, Rand, Jordan Office, World Vision International (WVI), 21 February 2019, Amman.

AlShoubaki, Dr Wa'ed, Assistant Professor, University of Jordan, 13 February 2019, Amman.

Amat Amoros, Gunda, Country Desk Officer for Jordan, Division 301 (Middle East II), German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn, 16 September 2020, Bonn.

Andraschko, Dr Frank, Hara Foqa-Projekt, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut (DAI), Amman und Institut für Archäologie der Universität Hamburg, 19 February 2019, Amman.

Aqilan, Hanan, Project Lead Change Engagement/Capacity Building, iMMAP MENA Regional Office, 28 June 2018, Amman.

Arar, Rawan, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of California San Diego, 28 June 2018, Amman.

Baessler, Dr Judith, Head of Programme Psychological Support for Syrian and Iraqi Refugees and IDP, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 February 2019, Amman.

Baur, Michaela, Director of Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 20 June 2018, via Skype, as well as 10 February 2019, Amman.

Bigio, Andrea, Food and Livelihoods Head of Department, Jordan Office, Action Against Hunger (AAH), 19 February 2019, Amman.

Buffoni, Laura, Senior Livelihoods Officer, Country Office Jordan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 25 June 2018, Amman.

Caris, Tobias, First Secretary, Head of Press and Cultural Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Amman, 11 February 2019, Amman.

Chaix, Jessica, Field Support Specialist, Country Office Jordan, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 26 June 2018, Amman.

Daradkeh, Hussam, Head of European Relations, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), 27 June 2018 and 11 February 2019, Amman.

Daru, Patrick, Country Coordinator Jordan, Senior skills specialist, International Labour Organization (ILO), Jordan, 26 June 2018, Amman, as well as 29 January 2019, via Skype.

de Groot, Jacqueline, Head of Programme, Jordan Country Office, World Food Programme (WFP), 24 June 2018, 24 June 2018, Amman.

Dumaq, Nader, Jordan Office, Caritas Switzerland, 12 February 2019, Amman.

El-Samarneh, Bashar, Project Manager, International Labour Organization (ILO), Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.

El Wer, Reine, Business Development Advisor, National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (Najmah), 11 February 2019, Amman.

Frank, Lukas, Project Manager, KfW Development Bank, Frankfurt/Main, 26 June 2019, per email.

Gaunt, Anna, Senior Livelihoods Officer, MENA Director's Office in Amman (DOiA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 11 April 2019, Amman.

Ghauri-van Kruijsdijk, Maria, Team Leader, Protection of Water Dams Through Labour Intensive Activities (Cash for Work), Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018 and 12 February, Amman.

Goneimat, Bashar, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (Najmah), 11 February 2019, Amman.

Griebenow, Carsta, Division S09 (Implementation of humanitarian aid, humanitarian mine clearance, regional programmes, regional humanitarian aid), Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 May 2018, Berlin.

Helyar, Will, Humanitarian Adviser, UK Department for International Development (DFID) Jordan, British Embassy, 12 February 2019, Amman.

Hlaing, Htun, Chief Technical Advisor, Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure Programme, International Labour Organization (ILO), Jordan, 29 January 2019, via Skype, and 17 February 2019, Amman.

Hollmann, Diana, Team leader, Employment-oriented MSME Promotion, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Jordan, 21 February 2019, Amman.

Ismail, Muhammad, Programme Officer, Jordan Country Office, World Food Programme (WFP), 24 June 2018, 24 June 2018, Amman.

Issa, Eman, Livelihood and Labour Lead, Jordan Compact Project Management Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), 14 February 2019, Amman.

Kafaween, Ahmed, Brigadier, Director of Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), Ministry of Interior, 14 February 2019, Amman.

Katami, Maha, Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), 14 February 2019, Amman.

Kattaa, Maha, Regional Resilience and Crisis Response Specialist, International Labour Organization (ILO), Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.

Kimathi, Victor, Area Manager, iMMAP MENA Regional Office, 28 June 2018, Amman.

Kuzmits, Dr Bernd, First Secretary, Deputy Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Amman, 11 February 2019, Amman.

Lechner, Johanna, Junior Advisor, Psychological Support for Syrian and Iraqi Refugees and IDP, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 February 2019, Amman.

Lenner, Katharina, Prize Fellow, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath, 12 December 2018, via Skype.

Lockhart, Dorsey, Researcher Human Security, West Asia - North Africa (WANA) Institute, Royal Scientific Society, Amman, 25 June 2018, 25 February 2019 and 11 March 2019, Amman.

Madi, Hakam, Programme Manager, Working with Refugees Programme, The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), 16 March 2019, Amman.

Mauerer, Franz Xaver, Country Desk Officer for Jordan and Arab League, Division 310 (Near East and Arab League), Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 13 April 2018, via telephone.

McGrath, Siobhán, WASH Programme Manager, Oxfam Jordan, 13 and 25 February 2019, Amman.

Meier, Sarah Christin, Project Manager and UNOPS Key Account, Employment and Education Near East, KfW Development Bank, Frankfurt/Main, 26 June 2019, per email.

Metz, Thorsten, Programme Director, Employment Promotion Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Jordan, 27 June 2018, Amman.

Mhaidat, Hussain, Minister's Advisor for Solid Waste Management, Director of Solid Waste Management Department, Director of Project Implementation Unit (PIU), Deputy Chairman of the Technical Committee to Follow up the Implementation of the NS for MSWM, Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA), 12 February 2019, Amman.

Morgenroth, Dr Silvia, Head of Division 321 (Reducing the causes of flight, supporting refugees, employment initiative Middle East), German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Berlin, 10 April 2018, Berlin.

Morisse, Monique, Division S09 (Implementation of humanitarian aid, humanitarian mine clearance, regional programmes, regional humanitarian aid), Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 May 20918, Berlin.

Mubarak, Ammarah, Emergency Coordinator, International Organization for Migration, 15 April 2019, Amman.

Muhareb, Samar, CEO, ARDD Legal Aid, Arab Renaissance for Democracy & Development (ARDD), 28 June 2018, Amman.

Muhareb, Sozan, ARDD Legal Aid, Arab Renaissance for Democracy & Development (ARDD), 28 June 2018, Amman.

Musa, Insherah, Country Director, Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), 18 February 2019, Amman.

Mustafa, Abdulkarim, Programme Officer, Livelihoods and Employment, Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Vulnerable Jordanian Host Communities, Jordan Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 19 February 2019, Amman.

Neumann-Silkow, Frauke, Cluster Manager, Management of Water Resources Programme, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018, Amman.

Petschulat, Tim, Resident Director, Office Jordan and Iraq, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), 18 February 2019, Amman.

Porter, Barbara, PhD, Director, American Center of Oriental Research (ACOR), 28 June 2018, Amman.

Qatamin, Hadeel, Media and Research Assistant, West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 11 March 2019, Amman.

Reintjes, Carolin, Desk Officer for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, HelpAge Germany, 24 June 2018, Amman.

Ressel, Dr Gerhard, Desk Officer for Employment promotion and labour market policies, Division 321 (Reducing the causes of flight, supporting refugees, employment initiative Middle East), German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Berlin, 10 April 2018, Berlin.

Ranko, Dr Annette, Resident Representative Jordan, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), 21 February 2019, Amman.

Rieken, Jakob, Forced Displacement Specialist, Middle East Division, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Frankfurt, 21 June 2018, Bonn.

Roxin, Helge, Head of Evaluation Team, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn, 21 June 2018, Bonn, as well as 14 January 2019, Bonn

Roy, Nicole, Project Advisor, Impact Monitoring - Livelihoods and Cash for Work, Waste Management Portfolio, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018 and 12 February 2019, Amman.

Sabbagh, Amal, Former Secretary General, Jordanian National Commission for Women, 11 March 2019, Amman.

Sadoun, Jasmin, Head of Administration, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 24 June 2018, Amman.

Salem, Ghada, Economic Justice Policy Advisor, Oxfam Jordan, 13 and 25 February 2019, Amman.

Sandler, David, Project Manager, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Jordan Office, 13 February 2019, Amman.

Santos-Jara y Pardon, Francisco, Team Leader Inclusive Growth, Humanitarian Development and Resilience Advisor, Jordan Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 19 February, Amman.

Schaub, Christian, Director, KfW Office Jordan, 24 June 2018 and 11 February 2019, Amman.

Schicklinski, Dr Judith, Monitoring and Reporting Advisor, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 10 February 2019, Amman.

Schimmel, Volker, Senior Regional CBI Coordinator, Office of the Director to the Middle East and North Africa Bureau in Amman, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 11 April 2019, Amman.

Schmid, Jürgen, Country Desk Officer for Jordan, Division 211 (Near East I, Turkey), German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn, 25 January 2018, Bonn.

Schmid, Mario, Development Advisor, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 10 February 2019, Amman.

Schmidt, Dr des Katharina, Director, German Protestant Institute of Archeology (GPIA), Amman, 25 June 2018, Amman.

Schumann, Professor Dorit, Vice President for International Affairs, German Jordanian University, Madaba, 28 June 2018, Amman.

Senzel, Ralf, Project Manager, Protection of Water Dams Through Labour Intensive Activities (Cash for Work), Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 30 May 2019, per email.

Sha'ban, Maram, Technical Advisor, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 10 February 2019, Amman.

Sheyyab, Dr. Ali, Colonel, Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), Ministry of Interior, 14 February 2019, Amman.

Shteiwi, Professor Musa, Director, Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, 25 June 2018, Amman.

Smalley, Katherine, Programme Officer, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 15 April 2019, Amman.

Speer, Dr Johanna, First Secretary, Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Amman, 24 June 2018 and 11 February 2019, Amman.

Tzannatos, Professor Zafiris, Independent Analyst and Researcher, 23 June 2018, Amman.

Ulmasova-Olive, Irina, Regional Head of Programmes, Eurasia and Middle East, Helpage International, 24 June 2018, Amman.

van Diesen, Arthur, Regional Social Policy Adviser for MENA, MENA Regional Office in Jordan, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 26 June 2018, Amman.

von Felbert, Leontine, Project Manager, Jordan Office, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), 21 February 2019, Amman.

von Fircks, Gabriele, Director, DAAD Jordan, University of Jordan, 18 February 2019, Amman.

Wälde, Dr Helke, Senior Country Manager Middle East, KfW Development Bank, 16 January 2019, by telephone.

Wehinger, Franziska, Deputy Head of Country Office Jordan and Iraq, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), 18 February 2019, Amman.

Weltzien, Julie, Project Manager, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018, Amman, as well as 14 January 2019, Bonn.

Woods, Elizabeth, Project Director of Urban Refugee Support, Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), 18 February 2019, Amman.

Yacoub, Hamdan, Head of Syrian Refugees Unit, Ministry of Labour (MoL), 12 February 2019, Amman.

Yaghi, Rayan, Livelihoods Project Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 13 February 2019, Amman.

Zoch-Özel, Bettina, Sector Economist, Social Protection, KfW Development Bank, Frankfurt/Main, 6 August 2019, per email.

A2 – List of interviewed experts on the local level

Al-Azraq

Representative of Governorate, Al-Azraq District, 5 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Technical Advisor, Action Against Hunger, Al-Azraq Office, 3 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Food Security and Livelihood Programme Manager, Action Against Hunger, Al-Azraq Office, 3 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Head of local charity organisation, 3 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Head of community centre, 3 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Head of the development cooperation department in the municipality, 5 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Principal of a school, 25 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Deyr ʻAllā

President of Deyr ʻAllā Local Council, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Head of local municipality, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Export Researcher, Plant Protection, Regional Center Deyr ʻAllā, National Agricultural Research Center, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Field Advisor, Deyr ʻAllā, Programme Irada, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Vice president of local municipality, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Treasurer of local municipality, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Director of the Agricultural Directorate of the Jordan Valley, 24 February 2019, Deyr ʻAllā.

Senior Researcher in Plant Physiology and Post-Harvest, Regional Center Deyr ʻAllā, National Agricultural Research Center, 25 February, Deyr ʻAllā.

Faqūʼa

Director of the Agricultural Directorate, 19 March 2019, Faqūʼa.

Kafr Ṣawm

Head of local municipality, 13 March 2019, Kafr Ṣawm.

Head of local women's organisation, 13 March 2019, Kafr Ṣawm.

Head of local agricultural cooperative, 10 March 2019, Kafr Ṣawm.

Principal of a school, 21 March 2019, Kafr Ṣawm.

Kafr Asad

Member of the Local Council of Kafr Asad, 27 February 2019, Kafr Asad.

Project Officer, Waste to (Positive) Energy, GIZ Jordan, 14 March 2019, Kafr Asad.

Member of the Reform Committee of the Local Council of Kafr Asad, 27 February, Kafr Asad.

President of the Local Council of Kafr Asad, 27 February 2019, Kafr Asad.

Principal of a school, 26 February 2019, Kafr Asad.

Head of the association for rehabilitation for handicapped and retarded *[sic]* persons, 17 March 2019, Kafr Asad.

Al-Mafraq

Principal of a school, 26 March 2019, Al-Mafraq.

Tal al-Rummān

Head of the women's cooperative, 28 February 2019, Tal al-Rummān.

Member of the women's cooperative, 28 February 2019, Tal al-Rummān.

Umm al-Jimāl

President of the Jordanian Association for orphans and widows care, Al-Mafraq Governorate, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Head of a local community-based organization, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Representative of local charity, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Local Project Manager, Oxfam, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Local Project Assistant, Oxfam, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

A3 – Other sources of interview information

CfW donor coordination group meeting, 13 February 2019, Amman.

CfW donor coordination group meeting, 17 April 2019, Amman.

Focus group discussion with six Syrian refugees (four persons from Damascus, one from Dar'a and one from Homs; all have come to Jordan between 2011 and 2014), 20 February 2019, Amman.

Focus group discussion with seven refugees from countries other than Syria or Palestine (three persons from Sudan, two from Somalia, one each from Iraq and from Ghana; all had arrived in Jordan between 2012 and 2016), 20 February 2019, Amman.

Participatory community discussion on the design of a possible GIZ project, 19 and 21 February 2019, Jabal Al-Nasr, Amman.

Participatory community discussion in public school recently renovated by an Al-Najmah project, 20 February 2019, Marka, Amman.

A4 – Overview of all field interviews

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
1	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
2	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participants	Syrian	males	2
3	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
4	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
5	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	local experts	Jordanians	males	2
6	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	local experts	Jordanians	1 male, 1 female	2
7	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
8	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
9	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
10	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
11	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
12	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
13	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
14	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
15	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
16	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
17	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
18	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
19	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
20	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
21	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
22	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
23	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
24	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
25	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
26	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
27	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
28	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
29	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
30	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
31	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local experts	Jordanians	males	2
32	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
43	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
44	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeepers	Jordanians	2 males, 1 female	3
45	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
46	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
47	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	1 male local expert and 1 female other non-participant (both Jordanians)			2
48	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
49	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeepers	Jordanians	males	2
50	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeepers	Jordanians	males	2
51	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
52	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
53	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
54	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
55	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
56	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
57	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
58	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
59	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
60	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
61	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
62	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
63	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
64	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	local expert	Jordanian	female	2
65	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
66	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
67	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
68	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
69	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
70	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
71	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local expert	Jordanian	female	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
72	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participants	Egyptians	males	2
73	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	1 female CfW participant and 1 male other non-participant (both Syrians)			2
74	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
75	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Syrian	male	1
76	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
77	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
78	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local experts	Jordanians	1 female and 1 male	2
79	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
80	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
81	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
82	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
83	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
84	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
85	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
86	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
87	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
88	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
89	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	1 CfW participant and 1 other non-participant	Syrians	males	2
90	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
91	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
92	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
93	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
94	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
95	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
96	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
97	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participants	Jordanians	females	2
98	07.03.2019	Za'atari	shopkeeper	Syrian	male	1
99	07.03.2019	Za'atari	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
100	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 Syrian CfW participant and Jordanian other non-participant		female	2
101	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
102	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	local experts	Jordanians	2 females and 1 male	3
103	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
104	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
105	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 CfW participant and 1 other non-participant	Jordanians	males	2
106	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
107	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participants	Jordanians	males	4
108	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
109	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
110	07.03.2019	Za'atari	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
111	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	Local Expert	Jordanian	male	1
112	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
113	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
114	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
115	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
116	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 CfW participant and 2 other non-participant	Jordanians	males	3
117	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participants	Jordanians	females	3
118	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
119	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
120	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 CfW participant and 1 other non-participant	Jordanians	males	2
121	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
122	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
123	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
124	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
125	14.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	local experts	Jordanians	1 female and 1 male	2
126	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
127	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
128	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
129	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
130	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeepers	Jordanians	females	2
131	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
132	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
133	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
134	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
135	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	1 female Syrian other non-participant and 1 male Jordanian shop-keeper			2
136	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
137	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
138	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
139	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
140	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
141	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
142	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
143	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
144	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
145	26.03.2019	Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
146	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
147	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participants	Syrians	1 female and 1 male	2
148	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
149	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
150	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
151	10.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
152	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
153	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
154	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
155	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	2
156	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	3 Jordanian shopkeepers, 1 Syrian CfW participant		males	4
157	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
158	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
159	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
160	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	2
161	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
162	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
163	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
164	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
165	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
166	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
167	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
168	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
169	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
170	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
171	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
172	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
173	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
174	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
175	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
176	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
177	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
179	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
180	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
181	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
182	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
183	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
184	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
185	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
186	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
187	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeepers	1 Syrian, 1 Jordanian	male	2
188	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
189	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
190	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
191	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
192	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
193	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
194	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
195	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
196	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
197	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
198	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
199	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
200	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
201	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanians	males	1
202	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
203	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanians	2 females	1
204	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
205	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
206	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
207	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	2 to 3 females	1
208	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
209	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
210	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
211	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
212	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
213	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
214	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
215	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
216	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Egyptian	male	1
217	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
218	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
219	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
220	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Egyptian	male	1
221	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
222	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Syrian	male	1
223	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shopkeeper	Egyptian	male	1
224	24.03.2019	Al-Qaṣr	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
225	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
226	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanians	male	1
227	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
228	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
229	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
230	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
231	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
232	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Syrian	female	1
233	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	female	1
234	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
235	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
236	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shopkeeper	Jordanian	male	1
237	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local expert	Jordanian	male	1

Interview number*	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
270	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
271	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
272	25.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
273	26.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
274	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
275	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
276	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
277	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
278	12.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
279	13.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
280	21.03.2019	Kafr Ṣawm	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
281	24.02.2019	Deyr ʻAllā	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1

Notes:
*The interview number refers to the running document number in the software used (ATLAS.ti). However, in total, this list contains fewer entries than the number of field interviewees (281), because some interviews have been conducted with more than one person (see seventh column). At the same time, some document numbers are missing in the list because they refer to documents with the minutes of interviews with experts interviewed in Amman.
Source: Authors

A5 – Overview of expert interviews in Amman

Interview number*	Interviewee
239	CfW coordination group meeting
240	JOHUD
241	MoPIC
242	Najmah
243	British Embassy
244	Care
245	Caritas
246	GPIA
247	GIZ
248	MoL
249	MoMA
250	MoI
251	GIZ
252	MoPIC
253	MoPIC
254	WFP
255	ILO
256	ILO
257	ILO
258	JRS
259	AAH
260	UNDP
261	NRC
262	Unaffiliated expert
263	World Vision
264	Oxfam
265	WANA

Interview number*	Interviewee
266	GIZ
267	GIZ
269	WANA
282	GIZ
283	UNHCR
284	GPIA
285	Care
286	ILO
288	CSS
289	ARDD
290	iMMAP
291	GIZ
292	KfW
293	GJU
294	UNICEF
295	UNICEF
296	GIZ
297	MoPIC
298	WFP
299	KAS
300	Helpage
301	German Embassy
302	WANA
303	GIZ
306	CfW Coordination Group meeting

Notes:
*The interview number refers to the running document number in the software used (ATLAS.ti) containing the minutes of interviews with experts interviewed in Amman. Some document numbers are missing in the list because expert interviews in Germany are not included.
Source: Authors

Appendix B: Interview guidelines

Table B1: Guideline for interviews with CfW participants and non-participants (eligible and non-eligible people)
Introduction
*Hello. (Small talk about the weather; the family) *I am X. *We are independent researchers working for a German institute. *This is Y, doing the translation. That is Z taking notes. *We are doing a study on the development of your community. Most interesting for us is your personal opinion on the economic situation and the social relations between people in this community. *[Would you be available for a conversation with us? We can also come back later.] *We do not write down names. And all information will be treated confidentially. *And, of course, you may always say if you do not want to answer one or another question. *Duration: 30-40 min
Demographic information (to be checked or asked during the interview)
• Sex • Nationality • Who is the head of household in your family? • Place of living (Neighbourhood/City) • How long have you been living in this community? • What is your current employment? • Educational Background • How old are you?

Table B1 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with CfW participants and non-participants (eligible and non-eligible people)
First part
Sense of belonging [1] How long have you been living in this community? [2] If not from here, where are you from? (How did you end up here?) [3] Where do you live? Can you describe us your neighbourhood and how is life there? (many shops? Do you like it there? Do you know your neighbours?) [4] Do you take part in community events/events organised by the municipality? [5] Do you have the feeling to be a member/part of the local community? [6] Is there anything you don't like about your community? [7] Are there separate groups within the community of your town/village? [e.g. are some people of the same group living in the same area of the village] [8] Only Syrians: What is done to make you feel welcome in the community? [9] Have you observed any major changes in the community since... • 2011/2012? (ask Jordanians) • you live here? (ask Syrians)
Wages/LED [10] **What are your main income sources?** *[wages/LED]* • Please tell us about your main income sources in the last two years. [11] *(If CfW participant):* How do you spend your income? • Did you invest more or less than before? *[wages/LED]* • In which assets? *[wages/LED]* • **What do you buy? Where do you buy it?** [12] What has changed over the last five years? *[wages/LED]*

Table B1 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with CfW participants and non-participants (eligible and non-eligible people)
Horizontal trust [13] **Did your work help you to feel as part of the community?** *[sense of belonging]* [14] **Are you working/have you worked with Syrians/Jordanians?** [15] Have you got Jordanian/Syrian friends? Where and how did you meet them? • And what about your children? *[horizontal trust]* • Do they get along well with the other children in school? (We have heard that in XY Syrian and Jordanian children are in different shifts?) [16] Have you already been invited by Syrians/Jordanians? [17] *Only Jordanians*: Is a lot being done for making Syrians feel welcome in the community? [18] As a part of the community, do you have the same opportunities as all other men and women? *[sense of belonging, but in particular role of women]* [19] Have your relations to Syrians/Jordanians recently become closer? Can you give us an example?
Second part
Sense of belonging Please have a look at the following cards *[Sense of belonging]* • CfW programme [adapted to the local name of CfW, e.g. "work programme"] • Cleaner streets • Community events • Access to educational services • Access to training • Improved sanitation • Improved transportation • Green spaces • Better school • *Other: please mention* [20] Did any of these factors make you feel a part of this community? • Please rank the cards you have selected *[Sense of belonging]* [21] Which of these factors have changed your opinion about Jordanians/ Syrians in your community? • Please rank the cards you have selected *[Horizontal trust]*

Table B1 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with CfW participants and non-participants (eligible and non-eligible people)

[22] **Do you participate in CfW programmes?**

Participants:

- What were the main reasons why you applied for CfW? (If answer is income: Anything else?) *[possible distortion of self-targeting because of skills development]*
- Are other people jealous of your participation in the CfW program?

Non-participants:

- Do you know what these programmes are? (If no, skip rest of the interview)
- If yes, do you know people who participate?
- If yes: Are people participating in CfW projects better off?

[23] **What is your opinion about these programmes?**

[24] What could be improved? (e.g. in terms of participation, length of employment, etc.)

Horizontal trust

Only non-participants:

[25] In CfW programmes Syrians and Jordanians are working together, does this make you feel closer to each other?

[26] Did CfW programmes affect your relations with Syrians/Jordanians? *[horizontal trust]*

- If yes, for what reasons? *[horizontal trust]* (potential answers: existence, participation)

Participation in project design

[27] **Do you feel that the created infrastructure fits/suits your needs?** *[LED]*

- If yes, how? *[participation/targeting/LED]*
- If not, for what reasons? *[participation/targeting/LED]*
- What kind of infrastructure would you have preferred? *[participation/LED]*

[28] **Did CfW increase your feeling of being a member of the community?** *[participation/targeting/sense of belonging]*

- How? *[participation/targeting/sense of belonging]*
- If not, for what reasons? *[participation/targeting/sense of belonging]*
- How would CfW programmes need to change so that you would feel more as a member of the community? *[participation/targeting/sense of belonging]*
- Was CfW/this change particularly important for you as a woman?
- Male participants: Would you let your wife also work in this programme? (If yes: And in general?)

[29] **Has there been any consultation process you are aware of before CfW programmes were introduced in your community?** *[participation/sense of belonging/vertical trust]*

Table B1 (cont.):	Guideline for interviews with CfW participants and non-participants (eligible and non-eligible people)
Debriefing	
*This was our last question. *Thank you so much for your time *We will write a scientific report with all interviews conducted that we will present in Amman (and/or other communities) in April. In this report, we seek to give answers about the effects of CfW programmes, in order to improve them in the future and to increase the benefits for this community. *Do you have any questions for us?	
Source: Authors	

Table B2: Guideline for interviews with shopkeepers (Shop owners, taxi drivers, hairdressers, bakers, butchers, street vendors…)

Introduction

*Hello. (Small talk about the shop)
*I am X.
*We are independent researchers working for a German institute (name no institution or ministry!);
*This is Y, doing the translation. That is Z taking notes.
*We are interested in the development of your community over the last few years. Most interesting for us is your opinion on the economic situation (and the social relations) between people in the community
*Would you be available for a conversation with us? We can also come back later.
*And, of course, you may always say if you do not want to answer one or another question. You can also interrupt the interview at any time.
*We would like to take some notes if you agree…
*But we do not write down names. And all information will be treated confidentially.
*Are there any questions you would like to ask or know about us or the project?

First part (not mentioning CfW programmes)

[1] How long have you been in this business/have you been working as (e.g. taxi driver, hairdresser…)?
[2] Did you notice any changes in your business within the last 5 years?
- If yes, can you tell us what has changed?
- What do you think are the reasons for this change?

Local consumption/change of demand

[3] (*If applicable*) Which products do you sell most? (for business owners, bakers, butchers)
- Which of these products are produced within this community? (Where do you get your supplies from? (Baker: eg. wheat; butcher: meat etc. // *Women cooperatives; goods produced by women?*)

[4] Did people buy different products 5 years ago? What are the reasons?
[5] (*If applicable*) What is the most demanded service? (for taxi drivers, hairdressers)
- Has this changed over the last 5 years?
- What are the reasons?

Table B2 (cont.):	**Guideline for interviews with shopkeepers** (Shop owners, taxi drivers, hairdressers, bakers, butchers, street vendors…)
Additional income [6] Do you own the business? [7] *(If yes)*: Did your business profits change during the last 5 years? • Why do you think they changed? (higher revenue, less costs?) [8] *(If yes):* Did your costs of running the business change? • Why do you think they changed?	
Multiplier effect [9] How do you spend the additional profits? [10] Did you invest the additional profit? • If yes, in what did you invest? • If no, do you think about expanding your business? • Did you employ more persons? (If yes, whom? (gender?)) [11] How many people depend on the income from your business activity?)	
Crowding-out effect/creation of assets [12] Do people now have better access to your shop? (in case of creation of roads through CfW) [13] Did other shops (same business form as interviewee) open or close in the neighbourhood in the last 5 years? • Do you know why? • Where in town are business activities strongest? (Was this different 5 years ago?)	
Second part (mentioning CfW programmes)	
Awareness of CfW existence [14] Have you heard of the CfW programmes? [15] What is your opinion on them?	
Change of demand [16] Do you know people who participate in the CfW programmes? • How do you think they spend their money? [17] Are some of the participants customers of your shop/business? • Do they buy more goods/ask for more services at your shop, than some years ago? • What kind of products do they buy? • Do they buy locally produced goods?	

Table B2 (cont.):	**Guideline for interviews with shopkeepers** (Shop owners, taxi drivers, hairdressers, bakers, butchers, street vendors…)
Outlook [18] What do you think is going to happen when the CfW programmes end? • Do you think that would have an effect on your business? • Do you think people would buy less? • Would you sell different products?	
Other business people [19] Do you know other businesses and persons that benefited from the effects of the CfW programmes? • In what way did they benefit? [20] Have you heard from any businesses that have opened due to income earned through CfW?	
Debriefing	
*This was our last question. *Thank you very much for your time. *We will write a scientific report with all interviews conducted that we will present in Amman in April. *Do you have any questions for us?	
Source: Authors	

Table B3: Guideline for interviews with representatives of organisations involved in the implementation of CfW or similar programmes (donor agencies, government organisations, NGOs)
Information required before the interview starts
• Number and location of CfW programmes • Duration • Role of interviewed organisation (implementer, donor...)
Statistical information on interviewee
• Name of interviewee • Affiliation (name of her/his organisation: university, research centre, international organisation, NGO, government agency, ministry…) • Function within the organisation • Area of activity • Interest and willingness to talk about the subject (our impression during interview)
Introduction
*Hello. *We are researchers from the German Development Institute (describe a bit the tasks and role of DIE) *We are in Jordan to conduct research on the effects of CfW programmes.
Activities of the organisation (implementing CfW or similar programmes)
Programme design [1] For how many programmes are you responsible? • Where are they located? [2] Since when do they exist? [3] For how many (working) days do people participate in the programmes on average? • Is this the official length? [4] How many men and women have participated? • Do you have different conditions of participation for men and women? (regarding length of participation, provision of child care, etc.)

Table B3 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with representatives of organisations involved in the implementation of CfW or similar programmes (donor agencies, government organisations, NGOs)
Effects of the programmes (in general) [5] What are the programmes to achieve? (What are their intended effects?) [6] To what extent have these effects been achieved? • Do you see differences in the achievements for female and male participants? [7] What would you see as your main challenges in achieving the intended effects? [8] Have there been unintended effects? [9] Do you think that the programmes also have indirect effects, i.e. effects that go beyond the creation of employment and assets? [10] Do you think that people who do not participate in the programmes themselves benefit from them as well? • To what degree? • In which way? [11] Do you think that some groups of people benefit more from the programmes than others? • Are any groups disadvantaged by the programmes?
Effects on LED [12] Would you be aware of any economic impacts that the programmes have on the community? • And the effect of infrastructure? • And the effect on income? [13] How important is the economic effect of local procurement?
Effects on social cohesion [14] Are Jordanian and Syrian participants working together? [15] What do you know about their interactions? • Have they started forming friendships? *If programme take place in communities where people are living:* [16] Does the existence of the programmes make people feel better included in their communities? [17] Do you think that particularly participants who have been working for a longer time in the programmes feel better included in their communities?

Table B3 (cont.):	**Guideline for interviews with representatives of organisations involved in the implementation of CfW or similar programmes (donor agencies, government organisations, NGOs)**

Participation of communities

[18] What does the decision-making on the type of activity and location of the programmes look like?
- Are there specific criteria that you follow in the project design process?
- Who is involved in the decision process?
- How?
- How are the local municipalities involved?
- How is the government of Jordan involved?

[19] Do you think that the existence of the programmes or the way decisions on programme design are taken has an effect on the trust of Jordanians and Syrians in the authorities?

[20] Have you heard of any criticism about the decisions on the type of activity and location of the programmes?
- If yes: what were the major issues?
- If yes: who was particularly critical?

[21] Do you think that the existence of the programmes or the way decisions on programme design are taken has an effect on the trust between the people living in the different communities?
- If yes: in which way?
- If yes: has the trust between Syrians and Jordanians been changed?

[22] Do you think that the existence of the programmes or the way decisions on programme design are taken has an effect on the sense of belonging of people to their respective community?

Table B3 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with representatives of organisations involved in the implementation of CfW or similar programmes (donor agencies, government organisations, NGOs)
Targeting [23] [23] In which way do you select applicants for participation in your programmes? • Do participants have to undergo a vulnerability assessment? [24] Have you heard of any complaints regarding the fairness and transparency of the process of participant selection? [25] Do you think that the process of participant selection has an effect on the sense of belonging of participants to their respective community, … [26] … to their trust in the authorities or … [27] … to the trust between members of different groups? [28] Have you heard about any tensions in the community that have been caused by negative feelings about the process of participant selection? [29] Do you think that the process of participant selection has an effect on the sense of belonging of non-participants to their respective community, … [30] … to their trust in the authorities or … [31] … to the trust between members of different groups?
Reforms [32] Are you planning to change the programme design? [33] How could the existing programmes be improved?
Debriefing
*This was our last question. *Are there points we have not covered and that you would like to mention? *Do you have any suggestions about what other people we should also talk with? *Thank you very much for your time.
Source: Authors

Table B4: Guideline for interviews with other experts (academics, government officials, NGO representatives)
Information required before the interview starts
• Function and position of interviewee • Role of interviewee • Her/his context, background
Statistical information on interviewee
• Name of interviewee • Affiliation (name of her/his organisation: university, research centre, international organisation, NGO, government agency, ministry…) • Function within the organisation • Area of activity • Interest and willingness to talk about the subject (our impression during interview) • Personal commitment (our impression during interview)
Introduction
*Hello. *We are researchers from the German Development Institute (describe a bit the tasks and role of DIE) *We are in Jordan to analyse the effects of CfW programmes.
First part (open questions)
[1] How much do you think CfW programmes affect the local communities in which they are active? [2] In which way?
Second part (social cohesion)
*We are analysing social cohesion from the angle of three dimensions: 1. Sense of belonging, which we understand in the context of our research as the degree to which Syrians for example are accepted and feel accepted within the community, to what extent they feel that they are part of the host community, and vice versa, etc. 2. Horizontal trust, which we understand as to which degree different groups trust each other. For example, we would look at a Jordanian family whether they would let their kids play with Syrians. 3. Vertical trust, which we understand as the degree to which Syrians and Jordanians trust the institutions.

Table B4 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with other experts (academics, government officials, NGO representatives)

Sense of belonging to the community

[3] How much interaction is happening between Syrians and the local host communities?

[4] Do Jordanian host communities welcome Syrians in a different way now in comparison to five years ago?

[5] Have you observed that the attitudes of Syrians to their host communities have changed?

[6] Have you observed that the participation of Jordanians in CfW programmes has changed their attitudes towards their respective local community?
- If any of these are yes: Can you say for what reasons?
- What is the impact of CfW?

[7] What is being done in Jordan to strengthen the sense of belonging within local communities?

[8] Which of these measures has the largest possible impact?

[9] What do you think is more important for the effect of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging to local communities: (1) the fact that CfW programmes exist at all, (2) the fact that Syrians and Jordanians work together in the same activities, or (3) the creation of public assets that are helful and nice for the members of local communities?

[10] Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future development of sense of belonging within Jordanian local communities?
- Why?

Horizontal trust

[11] To what degree do Syrians and Jordanians trust each other?

[12] Did CfW programmes have an impact on the relationship?
- In which way? Do CfW programmes impact on horizontal trust mainly just because they exist and provide opportunities for different groups – or because Syrians and Jordanians work together and get to know people from the respective other group?
- What about people who do not participate in the programmes themselves? Has their trust in other groups been affected as well?

[13] What about people who *cannot* participate in the programmes – such as e.g. Yemenites, Palestinians without Jordanian ID card, Iraqis or Somalis? Have they been impacted by the programmes as well?
- If so: in which way?

[14] What about migrant workers, e.g. from Egypt? Have they been impacted as well?
- If so: in which way?

Table B4 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with other experts (academics, government officials, NGO representatives)
Vertical trust [15] To what degree do Syrians, respectively Jordanians, trust local government authorities? [16] Do you think that CfW programmes have had an impact on their respective opinions about the local authorities? • In which way? Do CfW programmes impact on vertical trust mainly just because they exist and provide opportunities for different groups – or because they create useful and enjoyable public goods? [17] What about the opion of other groups who cannot participate in CfW programmes, such as e.g. Yemenites, Palestinians without Jordanian ID card, Iraqis or Somalis? Have they been impacted as well? • If so: in which way? [18] What about migrant workers, e.g. from Egypt? Has their opinion been affected as well? • If so: in which way?
Third part (LED)
*****If we are talking about LED, we are mainly interested in the possible effects that CfW programmes can have on the respective local community as a whole. This includes both changes in average income and the overall quality of life.
Quality of life [19] Did the creation and maintenance of public goods due to CfW increase the quality of living in the respective local communities?
Multiplier effect [20] To what degree do local communities benefit in economic terms from CfW programmes? [21] Do you have the impression that people who do not participate in CfW programmes also benefit from them? • Would you say that there is evidence for a multiplier effect (second and third round effects on income and consumption? • Would you say that there is evidence for an investment effect (CfW programmes triggering and enabling private investment in the respective local community)? • Would you say that there is evidence for an employment effect (CfW programmes raising average per-capita income in such a way that entrepreneurs employ additional people? • Do you know how CfW participants spend their additional income? Do they increase their investment expenditure, start investments, or repay debts? • Do participants spend their additional income locally?

Table B4 (cont.): Guideline for interviews with other experts (academics, government officials, NGO representatives)
Summarising question [22] Overall, would you say that Jordanian communities with and without CfW programme activities have developed in different way? [23] Did Jordanian communities with CfW programme activities change with regard to LED or social cohesion?
Debriefing
*This was our last question. *Are there points that we have not covered and that you would like to mention? *Do you have any suggestions about what other people we should also talk with? *We will present our results in April in Amman. Would you like to attend this presentation? *Thank you very much for your time.
Source: Authors

Appendix C: Numbers of interviews conducted by DIE by locality, function, gender, and nationality

	Jordanians	Syrians	Egyptians	Total	Females			Males			
					Jordanians	Syrians	Total	Jordanians	Syrians	Egyptians	Total
All interviewees											
Deyr ʻAllā	16	8	0	**24**	4	3	**7**	12	5	0	**17**
Kafr Asad	44	15	0	**59**	11	4	**15**	33	11	0	**44**
Tal al-Rummān	6	0	0	**6**	3	0	**3**	3	0	0	**3**
Al-Azraq	20	11	4	**35**	9	1	**10**	11	10	4	**25**
Umm al-Jimāl	31	13	0	**44**	10	7	**17**	21	6	0	**27**
Kafr Ṣawm	42	13	0	**55**	17	9	**26**	25	4	0	**29**
Irbid Highway	6	4	0	**10**	2	0	**2**	4	4	0	**8**
Faqūʼa	24	5	1	**30**	6	2	**8**	18	3	1	**22**
Al-Mafraq	15	3	0	**18**	4	0	**4**	11	3	0	**14**
Total	204	72	5	**281**	66	26	**92**	138	46	5	**189**
CfW participants											
Deyr ʻAllā	5	5	0	**10**	3	2	**5**	2	3	0	**5**
Kafr Asad	6	9	0	**15**	3	2	**5**	3	7	0	**10**
Tal al-Rummān	1	0	0	**1**	0	0	**0**	1	0	0	**1**
Al-Azraq	5	6	0	**11**	3	1	**4**	2	5	0	**7**
Umm al-Jimāl	6	7	0	**13**	1	5	**6**	5	2	0	**7**

	Jordanians	Syrians	Egyptians	Total	Females			Males			
					Jordanians	Syrians	Total	Jordanians	Syrians	Egyptians	Total
Kafr Ṣawm	7	5	0	**12**	6	4	**10**	1	1	0	**2**
Irbid Highway	5	4	0	**9**	2	0	**2**	3	4	0	**7**
Faqū'a	3	3	0	**6**	1	0	**1**	2	3	0	**5**
Al-Mafraq	0	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**	0	0	0	**0**
Total	38	39	0	**77**	19	14	**33**	19	25	0	**44**
Shopkeepers											
Deyr 'Allā	4	0	0	**4**	0	0	**0**	4	0	0	**4**
Kafr Asad	21	1	0	**22**	3	1	**4**	18	0	0	**18**
Tal al-Rummān	4	0	0	**4**	2	0	**2**	2	0	0	**2**
Al-Azraq	7	3	2	**12**	1	0	**1**	6	3	2	**11**
Umm al-Jimāl	6	2	0	**8**	0	0	**0**	6	2	0	**8**
Kafr Ṣawm	16	1	0	**17**	2	0	**2**	14	1	0	**15**
Irbid Highway	0	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**	0	0	0	**0**
Faqū'a	15	0	1	**16**	2	0	**2**	13	0	1	**14**
Al-Mafraq	12	2	0	**14**	3	0	**3**	9	2	0	**11**
Total	85	9	3	**97**	13	1	**14**	72	8	3	**83**
Other non-participants											
Deyr 'Allā	1	3	0	**4**	0	1	**1**	1	2	0	**3**
Kafr Asad	7	5	0	**12**	4	1	**5**	3	4	0	**7**

Tal al-Rummān	0	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**	0	0	0	**0**
Al-Azraq	2	2	2	**6**	2	0	**2**	0	2	2	**4**
Umm al-Jimāl	14	4	0	**18**	6	2	**8**	8	2	0	**10**
Kafr Ṣawm	16	7	0	**23**	9	5	**14**	7	2	0	**9**
Irbid Highway	0	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**	0	0	0	**0**
Faqū'a	5	2	0	**7**	3	2	**5**	2	0	0	**2**
Al-Mafraq	2	1	0	**3**	0	0	**0**	2	1	0	**3**
Total	47	24	2	**73**	24	11	**35**	23	13	2	**38**
Local experts											
Deyr 'Allā	6	0	0	**6**	1	0	**1**	5	0	0	**5**
Kafr Asad	10	0	0	**10**	1	0	**1**	9	0	0	**9**
Tal al-Rummān	1	0	0	**1**	1	0	**1**	0	0	0	**0**
Al-Azraq	6	0	0	**6**	3	0	**3**	3	0	0	**3**
Umm al-Jimāl	5	0	0	**5**	3	0	**3**	2	0	0	**2**
Kafr Ṣawm	3	0	0	**3**	0	0	**0**	3	0	0	**3**
Irbid Highway	1	0	0	**1**	0	0	**0**	1	0	0	**1**
Faqū'a	1	0	0	**1**	0	0	**0**	1	0	0	**1**
Al-Mafraq	1	0	0	**1**	1	0	**1**	0	0		**0**
Total	34	0	0	**34**	10	0	**10**	24	0	0	**24**
Source: Authors											

Appendix D: Number of cash for cash-for-work programmes in Jordan outside camps by donor, implementing agency, responsible ministry, sector, and governorate

Donor	**BMZ**			**BMZ**	**NORAD**	**WFP**	**Other**	**Total**
Implementing agency	GIZ with local partners			KfW with ILO	ILO	Najma		
Programme	Green Infrastructure (GI)	Waste to Positive Energy (WtPE)	Water (C4WW)	Employment Intensive Investment (EIIP)		Food for Assets (FFA)		
Total	**24**	**15**	**33**	**295**	**26**	**7**	**2**	**402**
Governorate								
Irbid	4	7	4	233	0	5	0	**253**
Al-Mafraq	5	4	1	47	0	0	0	**57**
Al-Zarqāʾ	3	1	2	0	2	0	1	**9**
Jerash	2	0	1	4	4	0	1	**12**
ʿAjlūn	1	0	0	7	3	0	0	**11**
Al-Balqāʾ	3	1	1	0	5	1	0	**11**
Amman	2	0	0	4	0	1	0	**7**
Mādabā	0	1	11	0	2	0	0	**14**
Al-Karak	1	1	13	0	4	0	0	**19**
At-Tawfīla	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	**6**
Maʾān								
Al-ʾAqaba	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	**1**

Sector								
Road works	0	0	0	186	0	0	0	**186**
Waste collection	1	14	1	8	0	1	2	**27**
Water and sanitation	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	**2**
Green infrastructure	19	0	1	1	0	0	0	**21**
Municipalities	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	**30**
School and health centre maintenance	0	0	0	14	0	5	0	**19**
Soil erosion	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	**5**
Nursery	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	**3**
Hydroponic	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	**1**
Forestry	0	0	4	8	8	0	0	**20**
Farming	0	0	5	45	6	0	0	**56**
Irrigation	0	1	7	0	8	0	0	**16**
Other agriculture	2	0	4	1	2	0	0	**9**
N/a	2	0	3	0	1	1	0	**7**

Donor	**BMZ**			**BMZ**	**NORAD**	**WFP**	**Other**	**Total**
Implementing agency	GIZ with local partners			KfW with ILO	ILO	Najma		
Programme	Green Infra-structure (GI)	Waste to Positive Energy (WtPE)	Water (C4WW)	Employment Intensive Investment (EIIP)		Food for Assets (FFA)		
Responsible ministry								
Public Works & Housing	0	0	0	209	0	0	0	**209**
Agriculture	0	0	13	55	0	0	0	**68**
Municipal Affairs	0	13	2	31	0	0	0	**46**
Environment	20	1	0	0	0	0	0	**21**
Water and irrigation	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	**2**
Jordan Valley Authority	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	**4**
N/a	4	1	12	0	26	7	2	**52**
Implementing agency								
Municipality	2	8	0	31	0	0	1	**42**
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	1	1	24	0	0	0	0	**26**
Royal Society for the Conversation of Nature (RSCN)	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	**7**

Najma (group of NGOs led by JOHUD)	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	**7**
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	**5**
Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement (ACTED)	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	**3**
National Agricultural Research Council (NARC)	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	**4**
Action Against Hunger (AAH)	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	**4**
World Vision International (WVI)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	**1**
VNG International*	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	**3**
Oxfam	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	**3**
AVSI	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	**2**
N/a	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	**3**

Note: Number of programmes, but size of programmes can differ substantially
*VNG is the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)
Source: Authors

Appendix E: Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019

Table E1: Bivariate correlations between selected variables (t-test)

	Ability to save				Main lessons learned						
	Could not save at all	Saved for education	Saved for health	Saved for small business	Commitment	Team-working	Friendship	Patience	Time management	Technical skills	Environ-mental awareness
Gender											
Female	–0.01	–0.01	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.08
Nationality											
Jordanian	0.04	–0.12	0.11	0.00	–0.02	–0.05	–0.06	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.09
Site											
ʿAjlūn	0.17	–0.06	–0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	–0.05	0.04	–0.12
Al-Baqaʿah	0.01	0.00	–0.01	0.06	0.01	0.13	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.18
Al-Mafraq	–0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.12	–0.02
Al-Quwayrah	–0.06	0.09	–0.06	–0.04	0.01	0.14	0.06	0.21*	0.16	0.04	0.13
Balʿamā	–0.04	–0.01	0.01	0.02	–0.03	0.10	0.09	–0.01	0.01	0.06	0.00
Ḍānā	–0.09	–0.38**	0.15	0.20*	0.03	–0.08	–0.07	–0.16	–0.09	–0.10	–0.19
Deyr ʿAllā	–0.02	–0.03	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.01	0.05	0.17	0.02	–0.04	0.12
Fayfā	0.22*	0.19	–0.11	–0.11	–0.06	–0.17	–0.16	–0.21*	–0.16	–0.13	–0.16

Table E1 (cont.): Bivariate correlations between selected variables (t-test)											
Khaldiyyah	–0.05	–0.02	–0.01	–0.01	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.11
Marū	–0.06	0.04	0.09	–0.02	–0.02	0.10	0.14	0.06	0.04	0.11	0.19
Mūjib	–0.09	0.11	–0.04	–0.11	–0.07	–0.18	–0.20*	–0.15	–0.06	–0.10	–0.03
Saḥāb	–0.06	0.13	–0.09	–0.09	–0.02	0.00	–0.05	–0.03	–0.01	–0.06	–0.09
Umm al-Jimāl	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.04	–0.02
Wādī al-Gharaba	–0.05	0.07	–0.02	–0.06	–0.04	–0.04	0.03	0.07	–0.02	0.00	0.07
Marital status											
single	0.05	–0.12	0.11	–0.06	–0.01	–0.01	–0.12	–0.01	–0.01	0.02	–0.05
married	–0.04	0.10	–0.08	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	–0.02	–0.04	0.04
divorced	–0.02	0.03	–0.03	–0.01	0.04	0.01	0.02	–0.01	0.05	0.04	0.00
separated	–0.02	–0.01	0.01	0.02	–0.01	0.01	0.06	–0.03	0.03	–0.03	0.03
widowed	0.04	0.04	–0.05	0.01	–0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.02
Highest level of education											
Less than pre-secondary	–0.05	0.05	–0.08	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.10	–0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05
Pre-secondary	0.05	0.10	–0.02	–0.12	0.00	–0.08	–0.05	–0.12	–0.05	–0.10	–0.12
Secondary	0.06	–0.06	–0.03	0.14	–0.09	–0.06	–0.06	–0.04	–0.02	0.03	–0.04
Bachelor	–0.04	0.01	0.03	–0.01	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.05
Vocational	–0.04	–0.05	0.05	–0.05	0.01	–0.02	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.05

Table E1 (cont.): Bivariate correlations between selected variables (t-test)

	Ability to save				Main lessons learned						
	Could not save at all	Saved for education	Saved for health	Saved for small business	Commitment	Team-working	Friendship	Patience	Time management	Technical skills	Environ-mental awareness
Occupation before CfW											
Unemployed	–0.01	–0.07	–0.02	0.00	0.13	0.06	–0.04	0.05	0.01	–0.03	0.09
Formally employed	0.00	–0.01	0.06	0.12	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.02
Informally employed	–0.06	0.03	–0.01	–0.07	–0.05	–0.02	–0.01	0.05	0.01	–0.02	0.00
In other CfW programme	–0.05	–0.07	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.11	–0.01	0.00	0.03
Employed within expertise	0.00	0.06	–0.04	–0.02	–0.01	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.12	–0.01	–0.04
Employed outside expertise	–0.08	0.03	0.02	–0.02	–0.01	0.06	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04

Notes:
*t > 0.2; **t > 0.3
Source: Authors, based on the results of Results of GIZ post-employment survey (GIZ 2019)

Table E2: Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019

	All		Jordanian females		Syrian females		Jordanian males		Syrian males		All females		All males		All Jordanians		All Syrians	
Total	984		121		131		392		339		252		731		513		470	
Partners																		
AVSI	93	9%	28	23%	16	12%	31	8%	18	5%	44	17%	49	7%	59	12%	34	7%
RSCN	523	53%	46	38%	72	55%	211	54%	192	57%	118	47%	403	55%	257	50%	264	56%
NARC	248	25%	33	27%	30	23%	92	23%	91	27%	63	25%	183	25%	125	24%	121	26%
VNG International	30	3%	5	4%	7	5%	10	3%	8	2%	12	5%	18	2%	15	3%	15	3%
Saḥāb Municipality	51	5%	6	5%	5	4%	18	5%	22	6%	11	4%	40	5%	24	5%	27	6%
JBW and DRC	39	4%	3	2%	0	0%	30	8%	6	2%	3	1%	36	5%	33	6%	6	1%
Localities																		
ʻAjlūn	228	23%	40	33%	47	36%	85	22%	55	16%	87	35%	140	19%	125	24%	102	22%
Al-Baqaʻah	65	7%	12	10%	12	9%	21	5%	20	6%	24	10%	41	6%	33	6%	32	7%
Al-Mafraq	23	2%	3	2%	2	2%	8	2%	10	3%	5	2%	18	2%	11	2%	12	3%
Al-Quwayrah	93	9%	28	23%	16	12%	31	8%	18	5%	44	17%	49	7%	59	12%	34	7%
Balʻamā	17	2%	3	2%	4	3%	5	1%	5	1%	7	3%	10	1%	8	2%	9	2%
Ḍānā	119	12%	0	0%	13	10%	60	15%	45	13%	13	5%	105	14%	60	12%	58	12%
Deyr ʻAllā	50	5%	8	7%	5	4%	19	5%	17	5%	13	5%	36	5%	27	5%	22	5%
Fayfā	73	7%	5	4%	12	9%	21	5%	35	10%	17	7%	56	8%	26	5%	47	10%
Khaldiyyah	60	6%	6	5%	6	5%	23	6%	24	7%	12	5%	47	6%	29	6%	30	6%
Marū	50	5%	4	3%	5	4%	21	5%	20	6%	9	4%	41	6%	25	5%	25	5%
Mūjib	103	10%	1	1%	0	0%	45	11%	57	17%	1	0%	102	14%	46	9%	57	12%

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019

	All		Jordanian females		Syrian females		Jordanian males		Syrian males		All females		All males		All Jordanians		All Syrians	
Saḥāb	51	5%	6	5%	5	4%	18	5%	22	6%	11	4%	40	5%	24	5%	27	6%
Umm al-Jimāl	13	1%	2	2%	3	2%	5	1%	3	1%	5	2%	8	1%	7	1%	6	1%
Wādī al-Gharaba	39	4%	3	2%	0	0%	30	8%	6	2%	3	1%	36	5%	33	6%	6	1%
Marital status / children																		
Single	344	35%	42	35%	14	11%	235	60%	52	15%	56	22%	287	39%	277	54%	66	14%
Married	596	61%	66	55%	95	73%	152	39%	281	83%	161	64%	433	59%	218	42%	376	80%
Divorced	26	3%	10	8%	9	7%	3	1%	4	1%	19	8%	7	1%	13	3%	13	3%
Separated	5	1%	1	1%	4	3%	0	0%	0	0%	5	2%	0	0%	1	0%	4	1%
Widowed	13	1%	2	2%	8	6%	2	1%	0	0%	10	4%	2	0%	4	1%	8	2%
Number of children	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Highest level of education																		
Less than pre-secondary	213	22%	18	15%	47	36%	50	13%	98	29%	65	26%	148	20%	68	13%	145	31%
Pre-secondary	415	42%	22	18%	45	34%	181	46%	163	48%	67	27%	344	47%	203	40%	208	44%
Secondary	142	14%	34	28%	14	11%	75	19%	19	6%	48	19%	94	13%	109	21%	33	7%
Bachelor	64	7%	19	16%	3	2%	27	7%	15	4%	22	9%	42	6%	46	9%	18	4%
Vocational	112	11%	21	17%	16	12%	47	12%	28	8%	37	15%	75	10%	68	13%	44	9%
Other	38	4%	7	6%	5	4%	12	3%	14	4%	12	5%	26	4%	19	4%	19	4%

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019																				
Employment before joining CfW																				
Unemployed	603	61%	80	66%	101	77%	246	63%	172	51%	181	72%	418	57%	326	64%	273	58%		
Legally employed	98	10%	5	4%	1	1%	43	11%	49	14%	6	2%	92	13%	48	9%	50	11%		
Illegally employed	32	3%	3	2%	3	2%	9	2%	17	5%	6	2%	26	4%	12	2%	20	4%		
Employed within expertise	99	10%	11	9%	5	4%	43	11%	40	12%	16	6%	83	11%	54	11%	45	10%		
Employed outside expertise	37	4%	2	2%	2	2%	20	5%	12	4%	4	2%	32	4%	22	4%	14	3%		
Worked at another CFW project	20	2%	1	1%	2	2%	5	1%	12	4%	3	1%	17	2%	6	1%	14	3%		
Other	38	4%	6	5%	3	2%	10	3%	19	6%	9	4%	29	4%	16	3%	22	5%		
Plans after CfW																				
Stay in Jordan	912	93%	117	97%	126	96%	361	92%	305	90%	243	96%	666	91%	478	93%	431	92%		
Search for new CfW opportunity	709	72%	75	62%	110	84%	242	62%	279	82%	185	73%	521	71%	317	62%	389	83%		
Search for a different job in formal sector	316	32%	42	35%	23	18%	175	45%	75	22%	65	26%	250	34%	217	42%	98	21%		
Trainings	132	13%	14	12%	12	9%	66	17%	40	12%	26	10%	106	15%	80	16%	52	11%		
Work in the informal sector	40	4%	5	4%	2	2%	16	4%	17	5%	7	3%	33	5%	21	4%	19	4%		
Migrate	9	1%	0	0%	0	0%	4	1%	5	1%	0	0%	9	1%	4	1%	5	1%		
I do not know	86	9%	15	12%	18	14%	29	7%	23	7%	33	13%	52	7%	44	9%	41	9%		
Other	61	6%	7	6%	5	4%	26	7%	23	7%	12	5%	49	7%	33	6%	28	6%		

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019										
	All	Jordanian females	Syrian females	Jordanian males	Syrian males	All females	All males	All Jordanians	All Syrians	
Satisfaction with CfW										
Would advise CfW to a friend	910 92%	118 98%	125 95%	364 93%	300 88%	243 96%	664 91%	482 94%	425 90%	
Unsatisfied with payment	224 23%	29 24%	11 8%	93 24%	90 27%	40 16%	183 25%	122 24%	101 21%	
Unsatisfied with employer	39 4%	5 4%	1 1%	21 5%	12 4%	6 2%	33 5%	26 5%	13 3%	
Unsatisfied with supervisor	62 6%	14 12%	3 2%	20 5%	24 7%	17 7%	44 6%	34 7%	27 6%	
Unsatisfied with workplace	71 7%	21 17%	9 7%	15 4%	26 8%	30 12%	41 6%	36 7%	35 7%	
Unsatisfied with working hours	122 12%	18 15%	18 14%	41 10%	45 13%	36 14%	86 12%	59 12%	63 13%	
Unsatisfied with work equipment	98 10%	9 7%	4 3%	46 12%	39 12%	13 5%	85 12%	55 11%	43 9%	
Unsatisfied with safety	61 6%	6 5%	2 2%	23 6%	29 9%	8 3%	52 7%	29 6%	31 7%	
Unsatisfied with food and beverages	303 31%	39 32%	39 30%	114 29%	110 32%	78 31%	224 31%	153 30%	149 32%	
Unsatisfied with transportation	147 15%	19 16%	24 18%	45 11%	57 17%	43 17%	102 14%	64 12%	81 17%	

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019																
Unsatisified with training	79	8%	13	11%	5	4%	35	9%	26	8%	18	7%	61	8%	48	9%	31	7%
Unsatisfied with feed-back mechanisms	97	10%	19	16%	8	6%	37	9%	31	9%	27	11%	68	9%	56	11%	39	8%
Consumptive use of CfW salary																		
Had debts before first salary	625	64%	73	60%	89	68%	248	63%	213	63%	162	64%	461	63%	321	63%	302	64%
CfW wage covered daily needs	730	74%	97	80%	108	82%	296	76%	229	68%	205	81%	525	72%	393	77%	337	72%
Had another job in parallel to CfW employment	55	6%	3	2%	4	3%	30	8%	18	5%	7	3%	48	7%	33	6%	22	5%
Had another income in addition to CfW wage	68	7%	10	8%	2	2%	31	8%	25	7%	12	5%	56	8%	41	8%	27	6%
Rent among top3	446	45%	30	25%	92	70%	94	24%	228	67%	122	48%	322	44%	124	24%	320	68%
Bills among top3	319	32%	40	33%	65	50%	105	27%	109	32%	105	42%	214	29%	145	28%	174	37%
Food among top3	305	31%	41	34%	29	22%	115	29%	119	35%	70	28%	234	32%	156	30%	148	31%
Transportation among top3	167	17%	24	20%	30	23%	63	16%	49	14%	54	21%	112	15%	87	17%	79	17%
Health among top3	217	22%	26	21%	41	31%	61	16%	89	26%	67	27%	150	21%	87	17%	130	28%

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019

	All		Jordanian females		Syrian females		Jordanian males		Syrian males		All females		All males		All Jordanians		All Syrians	
Education among top3	75	8%	16	13%	7	5%	32	8%	20	6%	23	9%	52	7%	48	9%	27	6%
Leisure among top3	46	5%	7	6%	1	1%	36	9%	2	1%	8	3%	38	5%	43	8%	3	1%
Purchasing items among top3	197	20%	45	37%	15	11%	105	27%	31	9%	60	24%	136	19%	150	29%	46	10%
Debt repay among top3	336	34%	63	52%	51	39%	132	34%	88	26%	114	45%	220	30%	195	38%	139	30%
Other among top3	65	7%	5	4%	11	8%	34	9%	15	4%	16	6%	49	7%	39	8%	26	6%
Ability to make savings																		
Could not save at all	684	70%	75	62%	98	75%	255	65%	253	75%	173	69%	508	69%	330	64%	351	75%
Saved for education	89	9%	16	13%	13	10%	34	9%	26	8%	29	12%	60	8%	50	10%	39	8%
Saved for personal items	139	14%	30	25%	15	11%	61	16%	32	9%	45	18%	93	13%	91	18%	47	10%
Saved for health	126	13%	16	13%	23	18%	50	13%	37	11%	39	15%	87	12%	66	13%	60	13%
Saved for small business	29	3%	6	5%	1	1%	16	4%	6	2%	7	3%	22	3%	22	4%	7	1%
Saved for other	36	4%	9	7%	4	3%	8	2%	15	4%	13	5%	23	3%	17	3%	19	4%
Lessons learned																		
Commitment	343	35%	52	43%	54	41%	115	29%	122	36%	106	42%	237	32%	167	33%	176	37%

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019																				
Cooperation teamwork	539	55%	79	65%	89	68%	187	48%	181	53%	168	67%	368	50%	266	52%	270	57%
Friendship	399	41%	60	50%	60	46%	148	38%	129	38%	120	48%	277	38%	208	41%	189	40%
Patience	242	25%	30	25%	32	24%	99	25%	81	24%	62	25%	180	25%	129	25%	113	24%
Time management	177	18%	27	22%	27	21%	75	19%	48	14%	54	21%	123	17%	102	20%	75	16%
New technical skills	235	24%	44	36%	30	23%	98	25%	61	18%	74	29%	159	22%	142	28%	91	19%
Environmental awareness	20	2%	1	1%	4	3%	8	2%	7	2%	5	2%	15	2%	9	2%	11	2%
Nothing	56	6%	5	4%	3	2%	28	7%	20	6%	8	3%	48	7%	33	6%	23	5%
Other	54	5%	3	2%	9	7%	25	6%	17	5%	12	5%	42	6%	28	5%	26	6%
Start-up skills	4	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	3	1%	0	0%	4	1%	1	0%	3	1%
Entrepreneurial skills (perseverance, self affirmation, courage)	6	1%	1	1%	4	3%	1	0%	0	0%	5	2%	1	0%	2	0%	4	1%
Life skills (self-reliance, self-management, respect, love, fraternity, helping others)	32	3%	3	2%	9	7%	10	3%	10	3%	12	5%	20	3%	13	3%	19	4%
Made new friendship with other nationality	843	86%	111	92%	126	96%	288	73%	316	93%	237	94%	604	83%	399	78%	442	94%

Table E2 (cont.): Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019																
	All		Jordanian females		Syrian females		Jordanian males		Syrian males		All females		All males		All Jordanians		All Syrians	
Recommendations																		
Increase project duration	8	1%	1	1%	2	2%	3	1%	2	1%	3	1%	5	1%	4	1%	4	1%
Increase salary	5	1%	1	1%	1	1%	0	0%	3	1%	2	1%	3	0%	1	0%	4	1%
Decrease working hours	16	2%	2	2%	2	2%	7	2%	5	1%	4	2%	12	2%	9	2%	7	1%
Improve meals	19	2%	3	2%	5	4%	7	2%	4	1%	8	3%	11	2%	10	2%	9	2%
In need for assistance to start a new project	2	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	1%	0	0%	2	0%	0	0%	2	0%
Increase training	2	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	1%	0	0%	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%	0	0%
Expressed wish to join in other projects	1	0%	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%
Provide greater accessibility for agricultural sites	9	1%	5	4%	0	0%	1	0%	3	1%	5	2%	4	1%	6	1%	3	1%
Provide work opportunities in other projects	7	1%	2	2%	0	0%	1	0%	4	1%	2	1%	5	1%	3	1%	4	1%
Establish literacy centres for workers	4	0%	1	1%	0	0%	3	1%	0	0%	1	0%	3	0%	4	1%	0	0%

Table E2 (cont.):	**Results of the first round of the GIZ Post-employment Survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019**															
Improve treatment of supervisors	3	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	1%	0	0%	0	0%	3	0%	3	1%	0	0%
Improve transportation	1	0%	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%
Add more projects	6	1%	2	2%	1	1%	1	0%	2	1%	3	1%	3	0%	3	1%	3	1%
Increase application period	2	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%	0	0%	2	0%	1	0%	1	0%
Provide training certificate	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Work discrimination	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
Set a work plan	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%	0	0%
Fair distribution of the workload	7	1%	6	5%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	6	2%	1	0%	6	1%	1	0%
Improve complaint system	6	1%	0	0%	0	0%	6	2%	0	0%	0	0%	6	1%	6	1%	0	0%
Set attendance policy	61	6%	9	7%	13	10%	16	4%	23	7%	22	9%	39	5%	25	5%	36	8%
Improve workplace	27	3%	6	5%	6	5%	2	1%	13	4%	12	5%	15	2%	8	2%	19	4%
Source: Authors, based on the results of the GIZ Post-employment Survey (GIZ 2019), not undergone checks for robustness or endogeneity so far																		

Table E3: Made new friendships with the other nationality

Probit regression

Log likelihood = -239.73979

Number of obs = 778
LR chi2 (9) = 168.81
Proh > chi 2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.2604

new_frnds	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> |z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Gender	.7475154	.1944679	3.84	0.000***	.3663653	1.128666
Nationality	-1.065718	.1602609	-6.65	0.000***	-1.379824	-.7516128
urban	-.3672281	.1595638	-2.30	0.021*	-.6799674	-.0544889
South	-1.031437	.1341911	-7.69	0.000***	-.1.294447	-.7684275
mstatus_ married	-.2363204	.146625	-1.61	0.107	-.5237001	.0510593
mstatus_ divorced	.302945	.5800481	0.52	0.601	-.8339285	1.439818
dbts_uses_slry	.128012	.1475413	0.87	0.386	-.1611636	.4171877
daily_needs_ uses_slry	.0366557	.1577549	0.23	0.816	-.2725381	.3458496
no_savings	.4165064	.1380541	3.02	0.003**	.1459253	.6870875
_cons	1.990852	.2624538	7.59	0.000	1.476452	2.505252

Notes: All variables (the dependent variable and all independent variables) are binary.
"Gender" has been defined as being "1" for females and "0" for males.
"Nationality" has been defined as being "1" for females and "0" for males.
Marital status indicators compare married participants ("mstatus_married"=1) and divorced participants
("mstatus_divorced"=1) with singles.
"dbts_uses salary" means that a participant had debts before starting work in the CfW programme.
"daily_needs_uses salary" means that CfW wage covered the daily expenses of the CfW participant.
"no_savings" means that the participant could not make any savings during the CfW emplyoment.
*means: statistically significant at the 95%-confidence level.
**means: statistically significant at the 99%-confidence level.
***means: statistically significant at the 99.9%-confidence level.
Source: Authors, based on the results of results of the GIZ post-employment survey (GIZ, 2019). Selected probit regressions testing the statistical significance of differences in the results (performed using STATA).

Table E4: Could not make any savings during CfW employment

Probit regression

Log likelihood = -571.80253

Number of obs = 984
LR chi2 (10) = 66.60
Proh > chi 2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0550

no_savings	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> |z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
gender	-.2162433	.103765	-2.08	0.037*	-.4196189	-.0128676
nationality	-.21778	.0956275	-2.28	0.023*	-.4052064	-.0303536
urban	.7304568	.1322762	5.52	0.000***	.4712002	.9897135
south	-.2656011	.096399	-2.76	0.006**	-.4545396	-.0766626
mstatus_ married	.2454744	.0971645	2.53	0. 012*	.0550355	.4359134
mstatus_ divorced	.2921801	.2963084	0.99	0.324	-.2885738	.8729339
another_job_ afterCfW	-.3433629	.1841814	-1.86	0.062	-.7043518	.0716261
edulvl_ below_sec	.348979	.1157886	3.01	0.003**	.1220375	.5759204
edulvl_bchlr	-.1850794	.1756522	-1.05	0.292	-.5293513	.1591926
edulvl_ vocational	.1139042	.1471986	0.77	0.439	-.1745997	.4024081
_cons	.4787478	.1161983	4.12	0.000	.2510033	.7064923

Notes: All variables (the dependent variable and all independent variables) are binary.
"Gender" has been defined as being "1" for females and "0" for males.
"Nationality" has been defined as being "1" for females and "0" for males.
"South" refers to the south of Jordan (governorates of Al-Karak, At-Tawfila, Ma'ān and Al-'Aqaba)
Marital status indicators compare married participants ("mstatus_married"=1) and divorced participants ("mstatus_divorced"=1) with singles.
Education level indicators compare people with less than primary school education ("edulvl_below_sec"=1), university degree ("edulvl_bchlr"=1) or vocational training ("edulvl_vocational"=1) with people who have full but only primary education.
"Another_job_afterCfW" means that a participant had a job in parallel to her/his CfW employment.
*means: statistically significant at the 95%-confidence level.
**means: statistically significant at the 99%-confidence level.
***means: statistically significant at the 99.9%-confidence level.
Source: Authors, based on the results of results of the GIZ post-employment survey (GIZ, 2019). Selected probit regressions testing the statistical significance of differences in the results (performed using STATA)

Table E5: Would advise CfW participants to a friend						
Probit regression Log likelihood = -46.542915					Number of obs = 924 LR chi2 (22) = 52.01 Proh > chi 2 = 0.0003 Pseudo R2 = 0.3585	
advice_friend	**Coef.**	**Std. Err.**	**z**	**P> |z|**	**[95% Conf. Interval]**	
gender	1.131951	.5546166	2.04	0.041*	.0449222	2.218979
nationality	.110164	.3345984	0.33	0.742	-.5456369	.7659649
urban	-.7515016	.3860939	-1,95	0.052	-1.508232	.0052285
south	1.030569	.4931131	2.09	0.037*	-.0640847	1.997052
another_job_ afterCfW	1.490147	.5772357	-0.26	0.796	-1.280376	.9823464
mstatus_ married	.9814666	.3937832	2.49	0.013*	.2096658	1.753267
mstatus_ divorced	-.7601855	.6521055	-1.17	0.244	-2.038289	.5179179
mstatus_ widowed	-1.203755	.7369287	-1.63	0.102	-2.648109	.2405984
edulvl_ below_sec	.1070208	.4357264	0.25	0.806	-.7469873	.9610289
edulvl_bchlr	.1586334	.5348877	0.30	0.767	-.8897272	1.206994
edulvl_ vocational	-.1249568	.415215	-0.30	0.763	-.9387633	.6888497
unsatisfied_ pympt	-.0131809	.396238	-0.03	0.973	-.789793	.7634313
unsatisfied_er	-.5001824	.6619111	-0.76	0.450	-1.797504	.7971395
unsatisfied_ sup	-.4130111	.4398527	-0.94	0.348	-1.275107	.4490843
unsatisfied_ WP	-.7253904	.4421619	-1.64	0.101	-1.592012	.1412309
unsatisfied_ WHrs	-.9614934	.3810765	-2.52	0.012*	-1.70839	-.2145973
unsatisfied_ WEq	.1949029	.4786466	0.41	0.684	-.7432272	1.133033
unsatisfied_ sfty	.5945896	.6985337	0.85	0.395	-.7745112	1.96369

unsatisfied_ meals	.0992028	.4044824	0.25	0.806	-.6935681	.8919737
unsatisfied_ trnspt	.1307423	.4069397	0.32	0.748	-.6668449	.9283295
unsatisfied_ trng	.0161077	.5888063	0.03	0.978	-1.137931	1.170147
unsatisfied_ FBmchsm	-.5086811	.4322887	-1.18	0.239	-1.1355951	.3385892
_cons	2.078618	.350615	5.93	0.000	1.476452	2.765811

Notes: All variables (the dependent variable and all independent variables) are binary.
"Gender" has been defined as being "1" for females and "0" for males.
"Nationality" has been defined as being "1" for females and "0" for males.
"South" refers to the south of Jordan (governorates of Al-Karak, At-Tawfila, Ma'ān and Al-'Aqaba).
"Another_job_afterCfW" means that a participant had a job in parallel to her/his CfW employment.
Marital status indicators compare married participants ("mstatus_married"=1), divorced participants ("mstatus_divorced"=1) and widowed participants ("mstatus_widowed"=1) with singles.
Education level indicators compare people with less than primary school education ("edulvl_below_sec"=1), university degree ("edulvl_bchlr"=1) or vocational training ("edulvl_vocational"=1) with people who have full but only primary education.
The remainder of the independent variables represent dissatisfaction with single aspects of the CfW programme: the wage ("unsatisfied_pymt"), the employer ("unsatisfied_er"), the supervisor ("unsatisfied_sup"), the workplace ("unsatisfied_WP"), the working hours ("unsatisfied_WHrs"), the work equipment ("unsatisfied_WEq"), safety at the workplace ("unsatisfied_sfty"), the meals provided at the worksites ("unsatisfied_meals"), transportation to the worksites ("unsatisfied_trnspt"), the training ("unsatisfied_trng") and the feed-back mechanisms ("unsatisfied_FBmchsm").
*means: statistically significant at the 95%-confidence level
Source: Authors, based on the results of results of the GIZ post-employment survey (GIZ, 2019). Selected probit regressions testing the statistical significance of differences in the results (performed using STATA)

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